China鈥檚 rhetorical style can be as off-putting as its territorial assertiveness. But Beijing鈥檚 ire, while nominally directed at The Hague, the Philippines, and the U.S., is not intended primarily for foreign ears.
Ignore the rhetoric.
For now.
Chinese officials that . The finding has ignited official and popular outrage in China that is drawing unsurprising reviews in the West: bellicose, bullying, nationalistic.
China鈥檚 rhetorical style can be as off-putting as its territorial assertiveness. But Beijing鈥檚 ire, while nominally directed at The Hague, the Philippines (which brought the case), and the U.S., is not intended primarily for foreign ears. It is a performance of anger intended to demonstrate to bureaucrats, the military, and ordinary citizens that the Communist Party remains vigilant in defending China鈥檚 territory and honor.
The 鈥搘hich China believes was directed by the U.S. because American lawyers helped draft the complaint鈥搘as offensive to Beijing because it threatened territory to which . that foreign institutions can set conditions for China may be equally maddening to Chinese.
China鈥檚 rhetorical style can be as off-putting as its territorial assertiveness. But Beijing鈥檚 ire, while nominally directed at The Hague, the Philippines (which brought the case), and the U.S., is not intended primarily for foreign ears.
Beginning in grade school, Chinese are taught that foreign encroachments on Chinese land and law during the 鈥淐entury of Humiliation鈥 (1840-1949) were a primary cause of China鈥檚 modern miseries. The Communist Party bases its political legitimacy on the assertion that it ended the humiliation and handed China back to the Chinese. To back away from that source of legitimacy by acceding to international rulings against China could be fatal to the Communist Party leadership. In other words, Beijing鈥檚 bellicosity is an act of political self-defense. What sounds like pique in Washington reads as strength to many Chinese.
Chinese leaders believe that self-certain domestic rhetoric and tight control of information are essential to stability. Yet when Chinese leaders employ the same rhetorical style and strategies internationally, they harm China鈥檚 image and erode its influence. Foreign Minister Wang Yi did this in June when he chastised a Canadian reporter, and some officials for Chinese ministries are doing it in the wake of the Hague tribunal鈥檚 decision.
China cares deeply about its image, but Chinese leaders know they cannot soften their international rhetoric to appear reasonable to foreigners while sticking to a hard line domestically. and the more than 100 million Chinese who travel abroad each year would see and hear the discrepancy. So Beijing sticks with declarative, often bombastic rhetoric whether addressing citizens at home or audiences overseas. China is willing to sacrifice soft power to preserve stability.
Understanding this, the U.S. should not count on mounting 鈥渞eputational costs鈥 to alter China鈥檚 behavior in the South China Sea. A more productive approach would be to create a strategic pause during which Beijing can absorb the implications of the decision without further 鈥減rovocation.鈥 Then, later, re-engage with China on the South China Sea, regardless of its rhetoric in the interim.
The opinions expressed here are solely those of the author.
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