My shorthand description of the annual Munich Security Conference (MSC) has long been: 鈥淚t鈥檚 Davos for security wonks.鈥 MSC鈥檚 focus is on global security challenges, bringing voices from across the planet to snowy Bavaria in mid-February. Yet these discussions build on a legacy foundation: the relationship between the United States and Europe.
The Conference has often been the site of scolding. A timely review of 60 years of speeches shows just how often the United States has pressed its European allies to spend more鈥攁nd do more鈥攆or their own defense. At the same time, an emphasis on our shared values conveyed a subtext: as transatlantic partners, we stand together.
This weekend鈥檚 conference shook the transatlantic foundation. And it was the United States that shook it.
Europeans came prepared for strong (but familiar) criticism on burden sharing. They were ready to show the second Trump administration they had raised their defense expenditure and preparedness significantly. The change was largely due to a new threat assessment after Russia鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine. Still, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen was blunt: Europe need to do even more. While the EU 27 (together) were just about meeting the current 2% NATO target, it wasn鈥檛 enough. They needed to target 3%.
Von der Leyen proposed removing EU budgetary constraints on members when it came to defense spending (activating an 鈥渆scape clause鈥 meant for use in crises). It was both a bold and practical proposal. Von der Leyen stressed Europe was adapting, stepping up, making a difference 鈥渋mmediately.鈥
In past years, her proposal might have been the headline. Not this time.
US Vice President Vance came on stage after von der Leyen. But his speech was not what Europeans anticipated. For he did not focus primarily on NATO, or 2%, or even Ukraine. Instead, he focused on values.
Vice President Vance told the conference he was worried about 鈥渢he threat from within鈥濃攚hat he saw as Europe鈥檚 retreat from fundamental values it shared with the US. The Vice President had examples: Romania鈥檚 decision to annul its recent Presidential election, Sweden鈥檚 conviction of a Christian activist, a UK legal decision affecting an abortion rights activist. He said bluntly 鈥淚n Britain and across Europe, free speech, I fear, is in retreat.鈥
German policymakers were particularly taken aback by the Vice President鈥檚 criticism鈥攅specially the specific exclusion at MSC of 鈥渓awmakers representing populist parties on both the left and the right.鈥 With Germany鈥檚 parliamentary election a week away, many saw this as electoral interference (especially when the Vice President later met with the leader of one of those parties, the Alternative f眉r Deutschland). 鈥淚f you are running in fear of your own voters, there is nothing America can do for you,鈥 Vance stated. The reaction at MSC was shock.
At this year鈥檚 MSC, there鈥檚 no doubt about the impact of Vice President Vance鈥檚 speech. While it may have been directed as much to a US as to a European audience, its impact was immediate. European policymakers heard it. They leave knowing one thing for sure: grappling with its implications is their task for the foreseeable future.
Germany鈥檚 response was immediate. Defense Minister Pistorius was on stage two hours later. Departing from his prepared text, Pistorius found the Vice President鈥檚 depiction of European democracy as 鈥渘ot acceptable.鈥 He returned Vance鈥檚 bluntness: 鈥淲e not only know against whom we defend our countries, but also what we defend it for.鈥 On the same stage a day later, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz also pushed back, criticizing 鈥渙utsiders intervening in our democracy, in our elections.鈥 Scholz鈥檚 main electoral challenger鈥攃onservative Friedrich Merz鈥攁lso rejected outside electoral interference.
The aftershock absorbed conference bandwidth that would have focused on Ukraine. In his statement, President Zelensky chose to double down on Europe. He told the Conference that the US Vice President had made clear that 鈥渄ecades of the old relationship between Europe and America are ending.鈥 Saying 鈥淚 believe in Europe,鈥 Zelensky urged Europe to become self-sufficient, and be united by Ukrainian and European strength. The time had come, he argued, to create an Armed Forces of Europe. It was a feisty stance to take.
But not surprising. For Europeans were also rocked by the message from US Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia Keith Kellogg that鈥攆ollowing President Trump鈥檚 conversation with Putin鈥擡uropeans would not be a partner at the negotiating table. Kellogg viewed his MSC presence as sufficiently consultative. For Europeans, it wasn鈥檛. A short-fuse gathering in Paris of key (but not all) European leaders on Monday, February 17 was both a pragmatic and symbolic response. But it remains unclear how they will feed their discussion into a process where even Ukraine鈥檚 own role is unclear.
As the MSC wrapped up on Sunday, policymakers and pundits were focused on what came next. Would the values debate ultimately prove more divisive than the long-standing defense capabilities gap? Would the structure of a Ukraine post-war settlement mark a return to 鈥渟pheres of influence鈥? Where would Europe be in that case? What direction would it take?
In 2007, Vladimir Putin gave a speech to the conference questioning NATO鈥檚 expansion and the transatlantic security architecture. In retrospect, many policymakers admit they had underestimated its seriousness. At this year鈥檚 MSC, there鈥檚 no doubt about the impact of Vice President Vance鈥檚 speech. While it may have been directed as much to a US as to a European audience, its impact was immediate. European policymakers heard it. They leave knowing one thing for sure: grappling with its implications is their task for the foreseeable future.
Author

Global Europe Program
The Global Europe Program is focused on Europe鈥檚 capabilities, and how it engages on critical global issues. We investigate European approaches to critical global issues. We examine Europe鈥檚 relations with Russia and Eurasia, China and the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East and Africa. Our initiatives include 鈥淯kraine in Europe鈥濃攁n examination of what it will take to make Ukraine鈥檚 European future a reality. But we also examine the role of NATO, the European Union and the OSCE, Europe鈥檚 energy security, transatlantic trade disputes, and challenges to democracy. The Global Europe Program鈥檚 staff, scholars-in-residence, and Global Fellows participate in seminars, policy study groups, and international conferences to provide analytical recommendations to policy makers and the media. Read more
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