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Mexico鈥檚 Tepid Response to the Middle East Conflict

Mexico between Israel and Hamas

In the immediate aftermath of the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, the Mexican foreign ministry issued a statement 鈥渦nequivocally鈥 condemning it. The October 8 statement said that 鈥渁ny terrorist act鈥 is a 鈥渢hreat to international peace and security鈥 and that 鈥渁ll States鈥 should cooperate to 鈥減revent and punish them鈥. It recognized Israel鈥檚 right to 鈥渓egitimate self-defense鈥 while also condemning the use of force against civilians by all sides and reaffirming Mexico鈥檚 long-standing support for a two-state solution to the conflict.   

The very next day, President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (widely known as AMLO), walked back this condemnation of the Hamas attack. In his morning press conference, he announced Mexican neutrality in the conflict stating, 鈥渨e do not want to take sides鈥 and that 鈥渕ore than condemnations, what is required is a search for peaceful solutions鈥.  He enunciated Mexico鈥檚 long-standing tradition of opposing intervention but also supporting self-determination and the peaceful resolution of disputes. He argued that neutrality would allow Mexico to play a role in the search for a peaceful solution to the crisis.   

What explains AMLO鈥檚 decision to water down his foreign ministry鈥檚 initial statement and refuse to directly condemn the attack? How does this square with Mexico鈥檚 more activist and interventionist foreign policy in the Americas? And what does it mean for Mexican foreign policy in the future?

President Lopez Obrador鈥檚 decision is not unique in Mexican history but instead reflects a position held by every Mexican government for nearly a century, with the exceptions of the Presidential administrations of Felipe Calderon (2006-2012) and to a lesser extent Enrique Pe帽a Nieto (2012-2018). As a developing economy whose national security could only be threatened by its northern neighbor, Mexico long took refuge in five foreign policy principles: non-intervention, self-determination, national sovereignty, the legal equality of all countries, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. These principles were designed to encourage the United States to tie its own hands rather than exploit the bilateral power differential and force Mexico to take positions beneficial to the United States but contrary to Mexican national interests (something the U.S. had done historically). And lacking significant international global interests beyond the United States, Mexico could rely on foreign policy based on principles rather than interests. 

Beginning in the 1960s, this foreign policy was coupled with support for leftist regimes, mostly in Latin America. This allowed a conservative government that claimed lineage to the Mexican Revolution to reinforce its domestic legitimacy by being revolutionary in its support for leftist governments abroad. For example, Mexico is the only Latin American to have never broken diplomatic relations with the Castro regime in Cuba, it provided refuge to leftist politicians fleeing the 1973 military coup in Chile and supported the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Although Mexico no longer is an authoritarian regime with a closed economy, the tendency to rely on a principled foreign policy and avoid global conflict is deeply rooted, and it is embedded in the constitution. Even Mexico鈥檚 first democratically elected opposition president, Vicente Fox (2000-2006), reverted to this tradition in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States. Not unlike today, the Mexican foreign ministry issued a statement expressing condemnation of the attacks and recognizing the U.S. government鈥檚 right to respond. President Fox, however, while formally condemning the attacks, refused to back the U.S. right to respond and instead called for a peaceful resolution of the dispute. 

Presidents Calderon broke with this tradition and staked out Mexican positions on global developments while opposing leftist authoritarian regimes in Latin America, and President Pe帽a Nieto followed suit, albeit less aggressively. AMLO, however, is a political child of the past. He sees foreign policy mostly as domestic policy tool to legitimate his Fourth Transformation suite of policies and to ensure the victory of his candidate in the 2024 presidential election. While AMLO paid little attention to foreign policy during the first three years of his presidency, a significant political setback in the 2021 midterm elections forced a change. AMLO has since taken charge of an activist foreign policy in support of leftist governments in Latin America designed to energize his nationalist, leftist base. Yet he avoids taking firm positions on global conflicts that offer no domestic political benefit and violate the constitution. 

This foreign policy is unlikely to change significantly after the 2024 election. While the opposition presidential candidate, Xochitl Galvez, issued a strong statement condemning the Hamas attacks and expressing solidarity with Israel, she is currently far behind in the polls without an obvious path to victory. It is much more likely that AMLO鈥檚 chosen successor, Claudia Sheinbaum, will be Mexico鈥檚 next President and she fully backs AMLO鈥檚 position. At the same time, most Mexicans are accustomed to this traditional foreign policy and thus tend to support it. In short, Mexico will continue being Mexico on the world stage. 

Author

Mexico Institute

The Mexico Institute seeks to improve understanding, communication, and cooperation between Mexico and the United States by promoting original research, encouraging public discussion, and proposing policy options for enhancing the bilateral relationship. A binational Advisory Board, chaired by Luis T茅llez and Earl Anthony Wayne, oversees the work of the Mexico Institute.   Read more

Mexico Institute