Russia recently suspended its participation in the Black Sea Grain Initiative鈥攖he crucial UN agreement enabling continued exports of Ukrainian grain via the Black Sea. The article examines how this decision affects future EU support for Ukraine and how it exposes broader issues of integrating Ukraine as a full-fledged member state in to the EU.
A few weeks ago, Russia announced it is suspending its participation in the Black Sea Grain Initiative鈥攖he crucial UN agreement enabling continued exports of Ukrainian grain via the Black Sea. This announcement renewed concerns about the stability of global food supply chains, as many countries in Asia and Africa rely on Ukrainian grain. For Europe, it also raised fears of additional pressure on the solidarity lanes鈥攁lternative routes established to facilitate transit of Ukrainian grain through the EU鈥攁nd the impact on member states鈥 agricultural markets. With EU member states bordering Ukraine to prolong the measures limiting Ukrainian grain imports (adopted in May this year), how does Russia鈥檚 abrogation of the Black Sea Grain Initiative affect the EU鈥檚 unity to support Ukraine for 鈥溾?&苍产蝉辫;&苍产蝉辫;
Before the Russian invasion, 90 percent of Ukrainian grain went through its Black Sea ports. Since then, Russia has been actively these key trade routes, severely constraining Ukraine鈥檚 export capabilities. To help Ukraine鈥檚 wartime economy the EU implemented trade benefits that eliminated all import tariffs on Ukrainian goods, including agricultural products. This was first and foremost a crucial economic lifeline for Ukraine, but secondly a radical step for the EU, taking into consideration the usually more protectionist approach for its agricultural sector. The EU also established 鈥榮olidarity lanes鈥欌攁lternative logistic routes by land and EU ports to help Ukraine continue exporting agricultural goods despite the war. Since May 2022 over 45 million tons of grain, oilseed, and other agricultural products have been via the EU solidarity lanes. In comparison, as of July 2023, around 33 million tons of grain has been exported under the Black Sea Grain Initiative鈥攖he agreement brokered by the UN and T眉rkiye that includes Russia鈥檚 participation.
However, this support from the EU has had an impact on the agricultural markets of member states bordering Ukraine. The sudden pressure on logistical capabilities to transport large amounts of grain bottlenecks. This resulted in grain intended for external markets remaining in these border countries, lowering the prices and the demand for domestic products. In March, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia unilateral bans on imports from Ukraine to curtail this influx of grain and protect their local farmers.
Agriculture is considered the 鈥榯hird rail鈥 of politics in many European countries, and the unintended consequences of supporting Ukraine have resulted in a bitter debate within the EU. The European Commission initially the unilateral measures taken by countries bordering Ukraine as unacceptable, as trade policy is an exclusive competence of the EU. Similarly, several member states the bordering countries of double standards鈥攃laiming to support Ukraine, while adopting protectionist measures at the expense of a vital economic lifeline for Ukraine鈥檚 grain exports. To both mitigate the situation and continue supporting Ukraine, the European Commission introduced temporary import limits for Ukrainian grain in the five member states bordering Ukraine and provided financial support for farmers and logistical capabilities to continue the transit to other EU member states or third countries. These exceptional measures were initially in place until June 5, although they were later to September 15.
After Russia pulled out of the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July, tensions in the region rose again. Russia has its attacks on Ukrainian grain warehouses and Ukraine has been retaliating by Russian vessels in the Black Sea. Concerned about another surge of Ukrainian grain into their markets, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, in a to the Commission, requested an extension of preventative measures until the end of the year. This has received from Ukraine as well as several EU member states. The latter's fears twofold: firstly, the disruptive effects this would continue having on the EU internal market; and secondly, that this would aid Russia鈥檚 efforts to push Ukraine out of the world grain market, especially after the recent Russia-Africa Summit, where President Putin free supplies of grain to African countries.
Talks on another extension of measures are expected to continue in September and all five countries are to impose new unilateral measures if there is no agreement. For Poland and Slovakia, the stakes are high due to parliamentary elections in the fall. In both countries, the costs of supporting Ukraine have been exploited by pro-Russia leaning parties. In Poland, farmers represent an important voting block for the leading Law and Justice party; however, in recent polls the Confederation alliance, with a of anti-Ukrainian rhetoric, is to receive enough seats to have a decisive role in forming the new government. Similar fears have been raised in Slovakia, where the former Prime Minister Robert Fico鈥攁 pro-Russia politician鈥攊s in the polls. With the EU expecting to adopt the new Ukraine Facility this fall, these potential new governments could present an obstacle for developing new EU efforts to support Ukraine
Agriculture is considered the 鈥榯hird rail鈥 of politics in many European countries, and the unintended consequences of supporting Ukraine have resulted in a bitter debate within the EU.
This latest suspension of the Grain Initiative by Russia will therefore put a greater burden on EU鈥檚 continued support of Ukraine. The EU will need to strike a balance between addressing the concerns of the farmers and continuing to facilitate Ukrainian grain exports. So far it has been able to mitigate internal market disruptions from the influx of Ukrainian grain and compensate affected farmers with funds from the . However, to the Spanish Presidency of the Council of the EU, these funds for 2023 are already depleted. This is on top of the challenges concerning future financial support for Ukraine鈥檚 recovery and reconstruction, for which the EU is expected to revise its Multiannual Financial Framework in order to provide stable funding for Ukraine as well as its own green and digital transition. Without this stable funding and budget support in place, the EU will be unable to sustain its level of support for Ukraine.
This ongoing discussion also exposes broader issues of Ukraine鈥檚 integration into the EU. There have been calls for the EU to consider its capacity to integrate a country the size of Ukraine into the union. Ukraine鈥檚 membership, given its status as the breadbasket of Europe, would impact the functioning of the single market, the deliverables of the Common Agricultural Policy, and require a fundamental rebalance of the agricultural policy across the bloc. The current challenges of supporting Ukraine, including maintaining its capabilities to export grain, therefore serve as a great learning moment for the EU 鈥 as well as a prelude what to expect when the bloc welcomes Ukraine as a full-fledged member state.
The Global Europe Program is focused on Europe鈥檚 capabilities, and how it engages on critical global issues. We investigate European approaches to critical global issues. We examine Europe鈥檚 relations with Russia and Eurasia, China and the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East and Africa. Our initiatives include 鈥淯kraine in Europe鈥濃攁n examination of what it will take to make Ukraine鈥檚 European future a reality. But we also examine the role of NATO, the European Union and the OSCE, Europe鈥檚 energy security, transatlantic trade disputes, and challenges to democracy. The Global Europe Program鈥檚 staff, scholars-in-residence, and Global Fellows participate in seminars, policy study groups, and international conferences to provide analytical recommendations to policy makers and the media. Read more
