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British and American sources show the impact of 颁别补耻艧别蝉肠耻鈥檚 stance toward the Arab-Israeli war on his international image

Romania鈥檚 neutrality in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War distinguished it from other Eastern bloc states. Yet there is a common misperception that Bucharest鈥檚 anti-Soviet animus drove its positions during the Six-Day War.

This view fails to place Romania鈥檚 behavior within a broader context. To be sure, anti-Soviet sentiments played a factor in Nicolae 颁别补耻艧别蝉肠耻鈥檚 decision-making, but Romania鈥檚 neutral stance in the Six-Day War was driven primarily by an interest in strengthening relations with the West.

What was Romania鈥檚 position? In June 1967, the Romanian Communist Party refused to sign the Warsaw Pact final communiqu茅 regarding the Six-Day War and instead issued a separate declaration. In contrast with the rest of the communist world, Bucharest did not condemn Israel as an aggressor and even sought to maintain diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv.

The West took notice. 鈥淥n other main international crises Romania鈥檚 attitude, although distinguished by nuances from those of other Communist countries, are not seriously out of line with them鈥ut in the case of the Arab/Israeli dispute Romania鈥檚 policy is at odds both with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and with China not to mention Yugoslavia.鈥�

This image of a non-conformist Romania did not emerge organically. Rather, it was a calculated move, promoted by Romanian propaganda and tied to 颁别补耻艧别蝉肠耻鈥檚 desire to be recognized as a world statesman and an honest broker. Although 颁别补耻艧别蝉肠耻鈥檚 behavior during and after the Six-Day War also meant to appeal to domestic audiences (who appreciated the Romanian leader鈥檚 anti-Soviet ethos), it was principally aimed at the West, including the United Kingdom and the United States.

British cables show that, as early as spring 1967, the Romanians had initiated a pro-Western diplomatic offensive. One British diplomat reporting from Cairo, W.H.G. Fletcher, told the British Foreign Office that the Romanians were eager to Around the same time, Hanbury Tenison at the UK Embassy in Bucharest reported that a Romanian counterpart had invited him to the most expensive restaurant in the city

US cables dispatched after the Six-Day War show concretely that Romanian foreign policy in 1967 was intended to appeal to American authorities. In July 1967, George Elian, the Romanian ambassador to The Hague, specifically advocated for closer relations between Romania and the United States during a meeting with an American diplomat. He stressed how the United States and Romania shared similar views regarding the Arab-Israeli dispute, and even revealed that Romanian ambassadors in multiple locations had been instructed to get in touch with their Western counterparts and convey a similar message.

Our talk was largely a strong plea by ambassador Elian for closer relations, and increased exchanges between Romania and the United States. He recalled that the Romanian position with regard to the Middle East crisis was close to that of the United States... He developed the Romanian policy with regard to the Middle East, claiming similarity of its basic assumptions to those underlying US policy.

Although Washington had already acknowledged the more autonomous course of Romania鈥檚 foreign policy (doing so as early as the Kennedy Administration), the Six-Day War acted as a watershed, boosting 颁别补耻艧别蝉肠耻鈥檚 rebellious image in the West. In the aftermath of the war, Romania became known as a 鈥渕averick鈥� state within the Warsaw Pact. Both British and American diplomats placed great weight on Romania鈥檚 attitude in the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1967 and were determined to develop their ties with Bucharest.

颁别补耻艧别蝉肠耻 himself gained international acclaim, setting the stage for his role as facilitator in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Maintaining relations with both the Arabs and the Israelis fit Romania鈥檚 rhetoric of establishing relations with all countries, no matter the ideology, and allowed 颁别补耻艧别蝉肠耻 to portray himself as an 鈥渉onest broker鈥� despite the embedded antagonism of the Cold War. 

But was 颁别补耻艧别蝉肠耻 successful in the long-run?

Retrospective accounts from the Americans and British cast some doubt on 颁别补耻艧别蝉肠耻鈥檚 abilities as an Arab-Israeli mediator. A 1972 account from a UK diplomat claimed Romania was more focused on its image than achieving results.

Regardless of 颁别补耻艧别蝉肠耻鈥檚 actual impact on the Arab-Israeli peace process, his endeavors may be perceived as successful if we consider Romanian foreign policy priorities as promoting the image of an honest power broker and increasing Romanian international prestige.

The Arab-Israeli conflict, then, turned out to be a key turning point for the Romanian leader. Romania cultivated an image of itself as a maverick satellite and took a controversial stand in the Arab-Israeli conflict.