浪花直播

Over the past decade, Chinese infrastructure investments under the umbrella of the (BRI) in Myanmar experienced a rocky history of stops and starts, as have in Southeast Asia. Despite setbacks, the infrastructure route in Myanmar鈥攍abeled the 鈥淐hina-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC)鈥濃�攑romises to connect the Indian Ocean oil trade to China鈥檚 Yunnan Province and pay dividends for China by addressing internal development priorities, the strategic vulnerabilities of China鈥檚 oil supply, and its competition with India. A successful CMEC would therefore substantially improve China鈥檚 overall geopolitical fortunes in the region and further tie Southeast Asia into its orbit. Ultimately, the depth of China鈥檚 domestic and foreign policy interests in Myanmar and its significant influence and history of involvement in the country suggest that China鈥檚 escalated efforts to jumpstart the project will likely lead to CMEC鈥檚 success over the medium- to long-term. On a broader level, CMEC represents how BRI in Southeast Asia often operates in support of core Chinese interests and that these interests will remain and incentivize Chinese policy commitment even amidst global pushback and criticism of the initiative.

This year marks 70 years of diplomatic relations between the People鈥檚 Republic of China and Myanmar, which was recently with a formal visit by President Xi Jinping to Naypyidaw in January 2020. More than just a symbolic show of closeness, the visit signaled renewed Chinese interest in the country. Xi strongly China鈥檚 commitment to revive the stalled multibillion-dollar BRI projects in Myanmar by signing , some of which the Chinese as even amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.

These BRI projects alternative access to the Indian Ocean for the remote and underdeveloped Yunnan Province in southeast China, but remain troubled by slowdowns. Theoretically designed to upgrade the deep-water port at Kyaukphyu and connect it to Yunnan with an extensive infrastructure network, as well as several large-scale energy projects, CMEC bears most resemblance to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Although the exact price tag of China鈥檚 BRI investments in Myanmar is based on publicly-available information, the government-appointed Myanmar Investment Commission鈥檚 Directorate of Investment and Company Administration over $21 billion dollars in approved Chinese foreign direct investment as of March 2020.

However, the need for Xi鈥檚 personal intervention underscores significant ongoing implementation problems for China鈥檚 investments in Myanmar, issues that lead some analysts to consider the CMEC initiative unlikely to ever meet Chinese expectations.

However, the need for Xi鈥檚 personal intervention underscores significant ongoing for China鈥檚 investments in Myanmar, issues that lead some analysts to consider the CMEC initiative . As by the Transnational Initiative, only 9 of the 40 previously proposed projects were underway prior to Xi鈥檚 January visit while 51 similar projects in Pakistan have been launched.

Although this poor state of affairs for CMEC serves as a microcosm of the lofty promises but continued uncertainties still dogging recently rejuvenated China-Myanmar relations, Xi鈥檚 recent injection of confidence and attention from the highest-levels of the Chinese government indicates China鈥檚 firm intention to resurrect CMEC amidst against BRI. The question thus emerges: can China鈥檚 renewed attention successfully turn CMEC into a flagship for global BRI or will the project鈥攁nd China鈥檚 wider relationship with Myanmar鈥攔emain on life support? Accounting for the weight of China鈥檚 intensifying interests in Myanmar and new opportunities for engagement, the answer appears to be yes, CMEC is likely to become viable over the medium- to long-term after the conclusion of the 2020 elections in Myanmar鈥攊f Beijing remains determined to apply its policy levers to incentivize Naypyidaw鈥檚 acquiescence and overcome concerns among local populations and elites.

Myanmar Remains Wary of China

CMEC largely remains an idea on the rather than a reality, as efforts to get it off the ground have met with repeated challenges. Amidst fears of 鈥�,鈥� CMEC had until Xi鈥檚 recent Chinese effort been replaced by . In the first sign of trouble for China, Naypyidaw the $3.6 billion dollar hydroelectric Myitsone Dam project in 2011. Myanmar鈥檚 subsequent National League for Democracy (NLD)-led civilian government first and then several high-profile Chinese projects worth billions of dollars. In 2018, the NLD Myanmar鈥檚 ownership agreement with China for the crucial deep-water port at Kyaukphyu from a 15% stake to for Myanmar and . Furthermore, much of the local human rights community remains wary of and s, and even Myanmar鈥檚 military Chinese involvement due to China鈥檚 history of supporting ethnic minority rebels. Although this backlash has been tempered by the Myanmar government鈥檚 for the project, such as State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi鈥檚 visit to the Belt and Road Forum in 2019, a climate of wariness remains a hindrance to CMEC.

This wariness stems from a long, surprisingly intimate, and sometimes-troubled history between China and Myanmar. In medieval times prior to Chinese conquest of Yunnan Province, the region was home to the Kingdoms of Nanzhao and Dali whose borders and ethnic ties extended into what is now northern Myanmar. In a manner reminiscent of CMEC's role as an infrastructure route to China, the Burma and Ledo Roads provided the Allies logistical access to Yunnan and Nationalist China during World War II. After the Chinese Civil War, thousands of Nationalist Chinese troops fled across this frontier to wage a cross-border guerilla struggle from bases in Myanmar鈥檚 loosely-controlled jungle regions before establishing a narcotics empire in the 鈥淕olden Triangle鈥� border regions. , China began backing the insurgent Communist Party of Burma and continued to do so throughout the Cold War. The remnants of the Nationalists and Communist-supported groups still today in Yunnan-bordering Wa State and Shan State, while ethnically-Chinese Kokang rebels to Naypyidaw. As a result of this history, China still exerts a over the ongoing peace process it now supports out of that Myanmar鈥檚 instability presents a threat. CMEC鈥檚 troubles can be at least partially explained by the fundamental distrust that exists between China and Myanmar, primarily as a result of Beijing鈥檚 past support for insurgent groups inside Myanmar beginning almost 70 years ago.

China鈥檚 Significant Interests in CMEC and Myanmar

Despite these limitations, however, CMEC is not doomed to fail. From a strategic perspective, China鈥檚 domestic and foreign policy interests tied to Myanmar indicate that China has both the wherewithal and intention to invest the significant energy and policy efforts necessary to ensure CMEC follows the path of Pakistan鈥檚 CPEC. China cannot easily allow CMEC to completely stall in the manner of , as CMEC鈥檚 strategic significance is simply too important.

Domestically, Myanmar鈥檚 close ties with one of China鈥檚 most underdeveloped and ethnically diverse provinces, Yunnan, are one factor that draws the two countries together. Described by Chinese as the 鈥渕ajor gateway to Southeast Asia and South Asia,鈥� Yunnan Province shares a long and intertwined history with Myanmar. In a symbolic reminder of Yunnan鈥檚 ongoing issues with crime, many rural buildings along rough mountain tracks not far from the Myanmar border near Lijiang bare sharp glass shards to ward off intruders. Still one of China鈥檚 , Yunnan remains riddled with branching out of the Golden Triangle and suffers from occasional cross-border violence. In 2015, a between Myanmar鈥檚 military and local ethnic insurgents resulted in an airstrike that accidentally killed four Chinese citizens on China鈥檚 side of the border, and in 2011 a drug trafficking gang 13 Chinese sailors in Thailand. The stability-minded Chinese authorities have demonstrated a desire to this cross-border drug trade. However, this effort is complicated by the fact that the Chinese government has at times 鈥攁nd, according to Myanmar鈥檚 military, 鈥攅thnic armed organizations (EAOs) in Myanmar鈥檚 outlying provinces funded by the narcotics trade. With Chinese authorities   to the province鈥檚 poverty by 2020, stabilizing Myanmar鈥檚 border and ensuring healthy international trade via CMEC to Yunnan can be considered a domestic interest of note for China.

Since the early days of the Cold War, India and China have been mired in a simmering competition exacerbated by China鈥檚 avid support for Pakistan.

Beyond domestic political concerns, Myanmar鈥檚 CMEC serves a similar purpose for China as Pakistan鈥檚 CPEC鈥攁n avenue for strategic advantage. 80% of China鈥檚 oil imported by sea travels along Indian Ocean routes through the vulnerable Malacca Straits, a geographic weakness to . The importance of this trade route is demonstrated in part by the choice of Djibouti for China鈥檚 first overseas military facility to the sea-lines of communication carrying Chinese oil. However, opening CPEC鈥檚 Gwadar Port to Middle Eastern oil only partially solves the problem because it creates another vulnerable chokepoint for blockade. Thus, diversifying energy shipping routes with investments in Myanmar鈥檚 CMEC becomes necessary policy for China鈥檚 leadership. Additionally, China also hopes to strategically surround India. Since the early days of the Cold War, India and China have been mired in a simmering competition exacerbated by China鈥檚 avid support for Pakistan. With CPEC to the west, CMEC could from the east. The Indian government is well-aware of the China threat emanating from Myanmar: China claims much of India鈥檚 Myanmar-bordering state of Arunachal Pradesh and the dispute . To address these vulnerabilities, India invested heavily in establishing naval bases in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands offshore of Myanmar as a in the Indian Ocean. Considering this ongoing strategic rivalry, China鈥檚 involvement in Myanmar also represents a chess move against India.

CMEC鈥檚 Future Outlook

With its considerable interests in mind, the Chinese government recently launched to reassure Myanmar鈥檚 people, and more importantly, its ruling elites about their activities in the country. Throughout the international opprobrium over Myanmar鈥檚 genocidal campaign against the Rohingya, China has the civilian government on the international stage and provided cover in the . On the issue of Myanmar鈥檚 internal insurgencies, China to 鈥攁lbeit while allegations remain of Chinese support for some rebel groups along the border. On the public diplomacy front, China鈥檚 preferred narratives about CMEC and their most prominent concerns about relations with Myanmar emerge most clearly in Chinese state media as some articles the economic benefits of CMEC and others how CMEC could resolve Myanmar鈥檚 ongoing internal conflicts. In a possible sign of these Chinese initiatives, the ethnic Chinese-led United Wa State Army in national elections for the first time ever this year.

However, despite China鈥檚 best efforts to expedite CMEC鈥檚 timeline and reduce Myanmar鈥檚 wariness, the 2020 elections likely mean that CMEC will remain slow-going until after 2021. From the NLD government鈥檚 perspective, the primary goal in 2020 will be to minimize electoral losses, a goal that necessitates careful handling of CMEC due to the of anti-China feelings in Myanmar. On the other hand, however, the government鈥檚 to force the military to accept anti-military constitutional reforms in early 2020鈥攁s well as 鈥攎eans the NLD must publicly to generally anti-NLD ethnic minorities that advancing peace talks will be a priority should the NLD win the election. Considering China鈥檚 continued influence amongst some of the larger rebel groups, an opportunity arises for the Chinese government to work with the NLD to ensure CMEC progresses during and especially after the elections. Looking past the next year, it is therefore likely that more space will open up for China to expand CMEC over the next several years should the NLD government successfully survive the coming elections.

China鈥檚 investments under CMEC promise to satisfy several of Beijing鈥檚 domestic and foreign policy interests, and the recent visit by Xi demonstrates his strong desire to jumpstart a stalled process.

China鈥檚 investments under CMEC promise to satisfy several of Beijing鈥檚 domestic and foreign policy interests, and the recent visit by Xi demonstrates his strong desire to jumpstart a stalled process. Thus, although far behind CPEC, CMEC鈥檚 associated projects will likely expand over the next decade. Furthermore, with the ongoing Rohingya crisis and the subsequently to partnership with Myanmar, the Chinese are increasingly the primary international backer for the Myanmar government. Thus, Myanmar鈥檚 soft opposition to growing Chinese involvement in the country can be viewed as trending positively in favor of China. In the end, the likely outlook for CMEC in the immediate term remains 鈥渟low going,鈥� but China鈥檚 deep interest ensures the initiative is unlikely to fail and will potentially result in a functioning infrastructure route over the medium- to long-term. Like Pakistan鈥檚 CPEC, an open and functional CMEC could substantially shift the strategic outlook for the region and China by countering India and addressing the Malacca Dilemma. For the region as a whole, CMEC exemplifies the strategic and domestic interests at play in China鈥檚 BRI projects, as well as its determination to see them through.

The views expressed are the author's alone, and do not represent the views of the U.S. Government or the 浪花直播 Center. Copyright 2020, Asia Program. All rights reserved.