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This essay is one in a series about the Helmut Kohl Transcripts, a new 浪花直播 Center Digital Archive resource featuring hundreds of Helmut Kohl鈥檚 foreign policy meetings with world lead

After the end of the Cold War, Chancellor Helmut Kohl hoped to increase Germany鈥檚 global presence by turning the country into a major trading power. Kohl also sought to use Germany鈥檚 economic and financial strength to defend the country鈥檚 political interests abroad. Kohl鈥檚 meetings with heads of state from Asia reflect these elements of German foreign policy in the 1990s.

One key partner in defending these interests was Japan. Kohl supported Japan鈥檚 requests for more politico-military consultations at the World Economic Summits. Prior to the 1992 World Economic Summit in Munich, for example, that because Japan was not a member of NATO, the European Commission, or the CSCE, 鈥渢he G-7 summits were the pivotal forum for political discussions with other industrialized countries.鈥� Kohl nodded his head in agreement, saying 鈥渉e knew the Japanese issues very well.鈥�

At this time, the Japanese side was also interested in the return of the , which the Soviet Union had seized after the end of World War II in August 1945. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa saw the return of the Kuril Islands as a precondition for Japan鈥檚 economic assistance for the countries of the new Commonwealth of Independent States. that 鈥渋t would be considerably easier for him to participate in assistance for the CIS states if he obtained the consent of the Japanese population in this way.鈥� Kohl promised to support Japan鈥檚 position and emphasized that he had already discussed the issue with Gorbachev and Yeltsin. 

In February 1993, Helmut Kohl embarked on a 12-day, five-nation journey to Asia 鈥� it was his first to the fast-growing region since unification in 1990. Kohl鈥檚 interlocutors in India, Singapore, Indonesia, South Korea, and Japan were especially interested in the state of the European Union鈥檚 economic and financial integration after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and its implications for Europe鈥檚 global trade. , his message for Miyazawa was that European integration was on track and that Sweden, Finland and Austria would join the European Union in 1995. 

One of Kohl鈥檚 key points pertained to European trade with Asia. 鈥淸Kohl] wanted to make it very clear that there would be no fortress Europe,鈥� his aides jotted down during a meeting with Miyazawa. 鈥淲e need free trade,鈥� he said. Because 鈥淎sia was the continent of the 21st century," Kohl sought to elevate trade relations between Europe and Asia.

in this February 1993 meeting. Free trade was essential to foster globalization and Asia鈥檚 integration into the world economy, and it should not become an economic fortress either. He said he 鈥渨as convinced that by 2015, the GDP of the six ASEAN states plus Japan and Chinas would be larger than the GDPs of the EC or the free trade zone between the USA, Canada, and Mexico, respectively.鈥� 

Moreover, Miyazawa suggested the establishment of a joint cooperation council for high tech and environmental technology, two key fields for a potential German-Japanese partnership. Kohl fully endorsed the idea, as it dovetailed with his overall aim to broaden the scope of the bilateral relationship. 

Kohl and Miyazawa also discussed Indonesia鈥檚 changing role in foreign affairs after the end of the Cold War. After the dissolution of the bipolar confrontation, it no longer made sense for Indonesia鈥檚 leader Suharto to be a leader of the neutral and non-aligned movement, just as it no longer paid dividends for Indonesia to try to confront the Western industrialized world. Instead, Indonesia was searching for a new role and some sort of rapprochement with the industrialized countries through the World Economic Summit. Indeed, Indonesia sought to become a key link in a potential partnership between the North and the Global South. 

Indonesia鈥檚 aspiration was to be a role model for development and economic change, Suharto pointed out in a . As chairman of the neutral and non-aligned movement, 鈥渋t was Indonesia鈥檚 duty to explain the movement鈥檚 position toward the G-7,鈥� Suharto said. 鈥淚t was clear that they could not become a member. At the same time, they wanted to avoid confrontation.鈥�

Moreover, Kohl and Suharto agreed on the sale of former East German naval ships to Indonesia 鈥� in spite of substantial domestic opposition in Germany. Human rights activists and opponents of arms exports criticized the supply of 39 old frigates for Indonesia as they could be used against domestic opposition or in Indonesia鈥檚 long-standing conflict with East Timor. Kohl to Suharto that 鈥渋t was essential for the Indonesian side to emphasize that the ships were used to fight pirates and drug smugglers.鈥�

Military issues also played an important role when . There, he discussed restrictions on the export of German dual-use goods with India鈥檚 Prime Minister Rao. The latter requested that Germany lift restrictions on the export of the latest-state-of-the-art technology, and argued his government was emphasizing infrastructure, especially in the fields of energy, traffic, and telecommunications. In turn, Kohl drew a red line and said that 鈥渉e did not want Germany to become the number one armaments exporter in the world. This would have devastating effects.鈥�

Military affairs were also a key part of , who was concerned about North Korea鈥檚 nuclear weapons program and the expansion of China鈥檚 military power. Kim said that 鈥渉e was not certain if North Korea already had nuclear weapons, but there was sufficient evidence that the country was in the process of manufacturing nuclear weapons and could produce 5 atomic bombs by 1995.鈥滽ohl鈥檚 suggestion was to increase international pressure on North Korea and to include China in the search for a solution. 

Moreover, Kohl and Kim had an in-depth discussion on Germany鈥檚 former division and the lessons that might be drawn for the question of a divided Korea. Kohl pointed to the relevance of Western TV and human contacts, two means of scaling the Berlin Wall. After overcoming East German restrictions on broadcasting and people-to-people exchanges, West German saw a breakthrough in the 1980s. 鈥淎ll of this had led to the collapse of the GDR鈥檚 propaganda.鈥�