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In India鈥檚 Latin American dealings, pragmatism and idealism collide

How did Cold War flashpoints shape India鈥檚 relationships with Latin America?

Recent scholarship offers some hypotheses. Historian C茅sar Ross claims that the 1954 coup in Guatemala engendered closer relations between India and Guatemala due to New Delhi鈥檚 championing of autonomy and democracy. Former Indian Foreign Secretary Krishnan Srinivasan cites 鈥渄ifferences鈥� between India and Latin America over the 1973 Chilean coup and the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War.

Evidence from the Ministry of External Affairs collection at the National Archives of India, however, challenges both of these interpretations.

The paper trail left behind by the Ministry of External Affairs suggests that the 鈥減rinciples鈥� specified by Ross did not determine India鈥檚 approach towards the Guatemalan coup. India鈥檚 posture towards the Chilean coup and the Falklands/Malvinas War, moreover, aligned with that of many Latin American nations.

India and the 1954 Guatemalan Coup

In June 1954, US-backed Guatemalan rebel forces overthrew Guatemala鈥檚 democratically elected President Jacobo 脕rbenz Guzm谩n. Ross argues:

According to its principles, India gave strong support to [Latin American] countries which saw their autonomy, independence, and democracy threatened鈥� Thus, after [the] US intervention in Guatemala in 1954, India strongly supported Guatemala, which helps explain why Guatemala was one of the countries which most fiercely adhered to India's international agenda in the UN.[1]

Evidence from India鈥檚 National Archives challenges Ross鈥檚 claims: despite opposition to the US-supported military junta, India still found reason to recognize the new Guatemalan government.

M.A. Husain, India鈥檚 Joint Secretary for the Americas Division, did express concern over recognizing a government that had seized power without a constitutional mandate. But lacking formal diplomatic relations with Guatemala or personnel on the ground, Indian officials were confined to American and British versions of events. India learned from British officials in September that the Guatemalan junta was 鈥渨ell established, in complete control of the country, and evidently anxious to adopt a progressive and democratic policy.鈥� Husain limply concluded that, 鈥淭his view may, perhaps, be accepted at its face value.鈥�[2] If anything, Husain took comfort in the fact that the US 鈥渟eems determined to ensure the safety of the new regime.鈥�[3]   

Other considerations also appeared important to India. Husain hoped that recognition of the emerging Guatemalan regime would lead Guatemala to support future Indian initiatives at the United Nations.[4]

G.J. Malik, India鈥檚 charge d鈥檃ffaires in Buenos Aires, argued that India鈥檚 traditional policy of waiting to recognize a government until it had proven itself 鈥渟table鈥� was ill advised for Latin America 鈥渂ecause then some countries might be permanently without recognition!鈥� As evidence, Malik claimed that the average duration of Bolivia鈥檚 government since independence had been less than one year.[5]

Most important, India did not feel 鈥渟trongly鈥� about the Guatemalan coup. Husain concluded that recognition was no more than 鈥渁 matter of academic importance鈥� given that India and Guatemala had not established formal diplomatic relations and possessed 鈥渘o problems of especial importance whose solution had to be sought by special negotiations.鈥�[6] India recognized Guatemala鈥檚 military junta in 1955, but India and Guatemala did not establish formal diplomatic relations until the 1970s.[7]

The 1973 Chilean Coup and the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War

Srinivasan argues that 鈥溾�� in 1973. Srinivasan fails to delineate these 鈥渄ifferences,鈥� their ramifications, or their origins. In fact, archival evidence suggests that India鈥檚 posture toward both regional crises aligned with that of many Latin American nations.

On September 11, 1973, Chilean military officers鈥攍ed by Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army Augusto Pinochet鈥攐verthrew democratically elected President Salvador Allende. India鈥檚 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Foreign Minister Swaran Singh condemned the coup and the erosion of democracy in Chile.[8] Gandhi even warned of 鈥渂ig external forces鈥� combining with 鈥渋nternal vested interests鈥� to produce a similar coup in India.[9] Malik, India鈥檚 Ambassador to Chile, expressed shock at the human rights abuses committed by the Chilean military. Two months after the coup, he wrote that, 鈥淚t is hard to believe that the well-educated, civilized Chilean army officer鈥� is responsible for all this. Yet, the evidence cannot be denied.鈥�[10] India subsequently withheld de jure recognition of the Chilean government for the remainder of 1973.

But India was unprepared to forego relations with the Pinochet regime. Malik concluded that the 鈥渇act that Chilean Junta is behaving with total disregard for human rights should not stand in way of our recognizing them.鈥� Malik reasoned that India could express its disapproval of the Chilean atrocities 鈥渂y saying publicly that recognition does not imply any kind of moral judgment.鈥� He believed that 鈥渞ecognition may enable us to help some victims of Junta.鈥�[11] An internal note sent from J.S. Teja, Joint Secretary of the Americas Division, to the Lok Sabha Secretariat encapsulated India鈥檚 ambiguity toward the coup: 鈥淭he Government and people of India have deplored the events in Chile鈥� but it is essentially an internal affair of the Chilean people.鈥� Teja hoped that Indo-Chilean relations would be 鈥渟trengthened in the future.鈥�[12]

By November, India鈥檚 public condemnation of Chile and its agreement to handle the diplomatic affairs of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia in Santiago made India 鈥渦npopular鈥� in the eyes of the Pinochet regime.[13] It is certainly possible that other Latin American military dictatorships in favor of the Chilean coup, such as those in Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, felt a similar antipathy towards India. But India鈥檚 position did not place it at odds with many key Latin American nations.

On the day of the coup, Cuban leader Fidel Castro landed in New Delhi and dined with Gandhi. Gandhi toasted Indo-Cuban friendship and Cuban prosperity, , 鈥淲e offer our sincere friendship and deep sympathy and strongest solidarity in your struggle, in your efforts to overcome underdevelopment.鈥� Six days later, Castro again stopped in New Delhi. On this occasion Gandhi informed Castro that India鈥檚 UN delegate would 鈥渧oice the dangers to developing societies in having the Chilean type of threats to their democratically established regimes,鈥� but that India 鈥渨ould not talk about American involvement as it would unnecessarily strain Indo-American relations.鈥�[14] There does not appear to be any memoranda of these Castro-Gandhi conversations, but neither does there appear any evidence that the Chilean coup altered Indo-Cuban relations.

Meanwhile, Argentina quickly recognized the Pinochet regime, but India鈥檚 Ambassador to Argentina M.M. Khurana concluded that it 鈥渄oes not mean that they approve of the coup or the method in which it was undertaken or support the policies of the new government鈥� as neighbors sharing the longest border in the world, they have no other alternative.鈥�[15] If anything, Khurana viewed Allende鈥檚 overthrow as a call for India to strengthen its relations with Argentina: 鈥淭he coup鈥� makes it more important for us to cultivate Argentina because she is now one of the few countries left on the Continent which adhere to the principle of non-alignment and constitute a democratic government based on popular support.鈥�[16]    

S.K. Roy, India鈥檚 Ambassador to Mexico, agreed. He saw Argentina as 鈥渢otally isolated鈥� following the Chilean coup, while an 鈥渁lmost equally difficult situation faces Peru鈥� given the socialist policies adopted by its government. Roy concluded that Mexico was also 鈥渘ow virtually isolated.鈥� With the hardline Nixon Administration to the north and US-backed military regimes in Central and South America, the Chilean coup made Mexican President Luis Echeverr铆a 鈥渁 very worried man indeed.鈥� Like India, Mexico withheld de jure recognition from the Pinochet regime.[17] Finally, Venezuela recognized the Pinochet regime following its policy of 鈥渋deological pluralism,鈥� a posture unlikely to condemn India鈥檚 position.[18] Overall, India鈥檚 cautious approach towards the Chilean coup paralleled that of many Latin American nations.

Archival evidence also challenges Srinivasan鈥檚 depiction of the Falklands/Malvinas War. In the spring of 1982, Argentina and Great Britain waged war over the Falklands/Malvinas, South Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands. While India condemned Argentina鈥檚 use of force to retake the islands, it supported Argentine sovereignty over the disputed territory.

India鈥檚 Ambassador to Argentina K.F. Ernest believed that Argentina had 鈥渂een inspired by鈥� India鈥檚 equilibrium in international affairs and 鈥渁dmired the fact鈥� that India took an independent stance on the War despite its close ties to Great Britain. Ernest noted that when India was selected to host the seventh Non-Aligned Summit in 1983, Argentina was one of the first nations to respond and declared that its President would lead the Argentine delegation for the first time.[19] Moreover, India鈥檚 qualified support for Argentina (with Chile an important exception).

Evidence presented here challenges previous notions of how flashpoints in Latin America鈥檚 Cold War shaped India鈥檚 relationship with the region. These documents offer insight into perceptions of Latin America by a key nation of the Global South. Like the CWIHP e-Dossiers by Vanni Pettin谩, Thomas C. Field, Jr., and Daniela Spenser, this entry helps to foster a more global understanding of Latin America鈥檚 Cold War.

[1] C茅sar Ross, 鈥淚ndia, Latin America, and the Caribbean During the Cold War,鈥� Revista Brasileira de Pol铆tica Internacional, Vol. 56, No. 2 (July/December 2013), 26

[2] Telegram No. D.6151/54-AMS From Joint Secretary of the Americas Division (M.A. Husain) to the Prime Minister (J. Nehru), September 15, 1954, SECRET, S/54/1732/73, NAI, Delhi  

[3] Telegram From Joint Secretary of the Americas Division (M.A. Husain) to Foreign Minister (R.K. Nehru), September 9. 1954, SECRET, File No. S/54/1732/73, NAI, Delhi

[4] Telegram No. D.6151/54-AMS From Joint Secretary of the Americas Division (M.A. Husain) to the Prime Minister (J. Nehru), September 15, 1954, SECRET, S/54/1732/73, NAI, Delhi.

[5] Letter F.21-4/54/BA From Charge d鈥檃ffaires in Buenos Aires (G.J. Malik) to Joint Secretary for the Americas (M.A. Husain), October 13, 1954, SECRET, S/54/1732/73, NAI, Delhi

[6] Telegram No. D.6151/54-AMS From Joint Secretary to the Americas (M.A. Husain) to the Prime Minister (J. Nehru), September 15, 1954, SECRET, S/54/1732/73, NAI, Delhi

[7] N.P. Chaudhary, India鈥檚 Latin American Relations (New Delhi, India: South Asian Publishers, 1990): 27

[8] Text of Swaran Singh鈥檚 Statement at UN Assembly, Ministry of External Affairs Press Relations Section, October 3, 1973, WII/101/20/73, NAI, Delhi 

[9] Letter From Joint Secretary for Public Diplomacy (S.K. Singh) to Indian Delegation in New York, September 17, 1973, SECRET, WII/101/20/73, NAI, Delhi

[10] Telegram No. SANT/101/3/73, From Indian Ambassador to Chile (G.L. Malik) to Secretary of the Western Division (A. Singh), November 22, 1973, SECRET, WII/101/20/73 鈥� Vol. II, NAI, Delhi

[11] Telegram No. 59, Indian Embassy in Santiago (G.J. Malik) to Ministry of External Affairs, November 23, 1973, SECRET AND IMMEDIATE, WII/101/20/73 鈥� Vol. II, NAI, Delhi

[12] Self-Contained Note From Joint Secretary for the Americas Division (J.S. Teja) to the Lok Sabha Secretariat (P.K. Patnaik), December 17, 1973, SECRET, WII/162/26/73, NAI, Delhi

[13] Telegram No. SANT/101/3/73 From India鈥檚 Ambassador to Chile (G.J. Malik) to Foreign Secretary (K. Singh), November 16, 1973, WII/101/20/73 鈥� Vol. II, NAI, Delhi

[14] N.P. Chaudhary, India鈥檚 Latin American Relations (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1990): 163

[15] In fact, at the time the Argentine-Chilean border was second in length to the U.S.-Canadian border.

[16] Letter No. BUE/101(4)/73 From India鈥檚 Ambassador to Argentina (M.M. Khurana) to Secretary for the Western Division (A. Singh), September 20, 1973, SECRET, WII/101/20/73, NAI, Delhi 

[17] Letter No. MEX/101/18/73 From India鈥檚 Ambassador to Mexico (S.K. Roy) to Joint Secretary for the Americas (J.S. Teja), September 24, 1973, SECRET, WII/101/20/73, NAI, Delhi

[18] Letter No. CAR/104/3/71 From India鈥檚 Ambassador to Venezuela (A.R. Kakodkar) to Deputy Secretary for the Americas Division (S.K. Arora), September 21, 1973, WII/101/20/73, NAI, Delhi

[19] Telegram No. BUE/101/1/82 From First Secretary, Embassy of India in Buenos Aires (K.F. Ernest) to Ministry of External Affairs, March 25, 1983, WII/101/54/83, NAI, Delhi