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This spring marks the 20th anniversary of the Iraq War. As one might expect, it has reignited debates about American decision making and intelligence failures. Far less attention has been paid to the considerable advances made in what we know about Iraqi thinking in 2002 and 2003. Ironically, scholars have wider access to archival documentation about Saddam Hussein鈥檚 regime than they do about the George W. Bush administration. The records of the latter are still classified. By contrast, the entire archive of the ruling Iraqi Ba鈥榯h party as well as a smaller number of Iraqi state records have been open for over a decade. These records offer unprecedented insight into Saddam Hussein鈥檚 worldview and his strategies as Iraq and the United States barreled toward war in 2003.

The following is drawn from my book Iraq against the World, which uses internal Iraqi files to examine Saddam Hussein鈥檚 confrontation with the American-led, post-Cold War order in the 1990s and early 2000s. As these documents demonstrate, Saddam was a populist and he felt that the most important driver of international politics was the ability to manipulate the masses. He felt he could achieve his goals through bottom-up political pressure in foreign states. In doing so he thought he could influence the foreign policies of his adversaries. This highly politicized approach to international politics served Saddam well in times of peace. He was able to divide his opponents and undermine international policies designed to contain his regime. However, he failed to understand the limits of his strategies in the face of conventional wars first in 1991, and then even more disastrously for his regime and his personal safety in 2003.

Western analysts have tended to view Saddam鈥檚 Iraq through the frameworks that have dominated Western international relations: the military, high diplomacy, and economics. Those were important elements of Iraqi power under Saddam 鈥� after all he used his oil wealth to build a large army, then invade two of his neighbors, and he dreamed of leading Arab armies into Jerusalem. While military officers and diplomats are certainly not absent from internal Iraqi records, those files place more emphasis on political and populist elements of Iraqi strategy. Ba鈥榯hist records highlight what Western analysts would call Baghdad鈥檚 political 鈥渋nfluence operations鈥� and what the Iraqis called al-taharruk (literally, moving someone). These operations were far more extensive than anyone outside the Ba鈥榯hist regime understood. The Ba鈥榯h Party and the Iraqi Intelligence Service embedded themselves in Arab diasporas and worked from Iraqi embassies around the world. They attempted to shape political discourse in and among key states and they organized disparate constituents in foreign countries using a combination of moral and political persuasion.

Partly, the prominence of such strategies in Iraqi records stems from some idiosyncrasies surrounding the available sources. Archives from the Iraqi Intelligence Service and the Ba鈥榯h Party survived the 2003 war. The records from the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, which undoubtably would have emphasized more traditional forms of diplomacy, did not.

However, even without relying on skewed sources, a careful study of Ba鈥榯hist Iraq would reveal that the military and traditional diplomacy were not the primary lenses through which Saddam viewed international politics. Saddam owed his power to his place within a populist, self-described revolutionary political party. Unlike most other Arab dictators, he did not rise through the ranks of the military or state security services. As one of his biographers noted, 鈥渇or all the uniforms, titles, and honorary ranks 鈥� Saddam never had any military experience, had probably never read a military textbook, or even considered the finer points of strategy and tactics.鈥�[1] In fact, the Ba鈥榯hist regime that he ruled had a history of turbulent relations with the Iraqi military and other state institutions. A short-lived Ba鈥榯hist coup in Iraq had gone awry in 1963 when military officers turned against the party. Therefore, immediately after they took power in 1968, the Ba鈥榯hists purged Iraqi military and intelligence officers, replacing them with political activists who were loyal to the party. It should come as no surprise, then, that Saddam saw the party rather than the military as the source of his power, and throughout his life, he tended to view the world through the lens of its populist politics.

It was also no coincidence that many of what might be called quintessentially Saddamist institutions were described as 鈥減opular.鈥� When Saddam needed a loyal militia to defend his regime in the 1970s, he created the 鈥淧opular Army.鈥� When he wanted to mobilize international Arab support, he held the 鈥淐onference of the Popular Arab Forces.鈥� When he wanted to mobilize Islamic opinion, he organized the 鈥淧opular Islamic Conference.鈥� The word popular in these instances is a translation of the Arabic term 蝉丑补鈥榖颈. It suggests something coming from the masses, unofficial, and of the people. And even Iraqi sources from outside the Ba鈥榯h Party show that when the regime engaged in international politics, it saw populist efforts as its natural source of strength. For example, when attempting to influence international Islamic opinion during the war with Iran, the Iraqis distinguished between official (rasmi) and popular (蝉丑补鈥榖颈) efforts. The Iraqis considered other states to be more adept in pursuing the official track; Saddam鈥檚 regime focused on the populist track.[2] This view of the importance of popular mobilization in international politics was not limited to Islam and it remained an important part of Iraqi strategy until the end of Saddam鈥檚 rule in 2003.[3]

This populist worldview permeated Iraqi strategic thought, even during conventional wars. Beginning almost immediately after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, Baghdad sent a steady stream of instructions to Iraqi Ba鈥榯hists outside Iraq. The regime ordered them to use all their connections and capabilities to mobilize the Iraqi, Arab, Islamic, and foreign masses. They were to work through local parties and unions, as well as political, humanitarian, cultural, and social leaders to hold 鈥渁ngry demonstrations鈥� against 鈥淎merica, the Zionists, and their allies among the bloodsucking (masasi dima鈥�) peoples who are cooperating with them.鈥� The Ba鈥榯h Party told its followers to hold sit-ins and gatherings at religious sites, UN offices, humanitarian organizations, and any other influential place in their areas.[4] Ba鈥榯hists abroad were to arrange statements of support from local allies for Saddam and for 鈥渢he free government of Kuwait,鈥� which was an Iraqi creation that Baghdad tried to present as an indigenous Kuwaiti initiative.[5]

            Throughout the Gulf Crisis, Saddam attempted to defeat his enemies by making the war politically untenable for them. Most notably he tried to draw Israel into the war by targeting it with SCUD missiles. The Iraqis hoped that Arab coalition members such as Saudi Arabia and Syria would balk at finding themselves on the same side of the conflict as the Jewish state. Tellingly, some of the SCUDs fired at Israel were a variant the Iraqis called Hijara al-Sijil (stone from dry clay) because they contained concrete warheads.[6] Western analysts concocted all sorts of explanations for why Iraqis would employ such warheads. An Iraqi general later revealed that Saddam wanted to mimic the rocks that Palestinians were hurling at their Israeli occupiers in the First Intifada.[7] In other words, the SCUDs were more performative than operational; they were designed to be a spectacle.

Elsewhere, Iraqi Ba鈥榯hists and intelligence officers embedded themselves in anti-war movements. In the United States, Ba鈥榯hist cells used slogans such as: 鈥淲hy sacrifice the sons of America for the sake of the families of corrupt dictators.鈥� And, 鈥淲e do not want another Vietnam.鈥� They criticized the 鈥渙il sheikhs,鈥� and argued, 鈥淚t is not possible to compare the blood of Americans with the price of oil.鈥�[8]  Throughout the Middle East and Islamic world, the Iraqi military joined with the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs to produce propaganda designed to 鈥渞aise the emotions of hatred and hostility of all Muslims against [the Saudis and their Western allies].鈥� It stressed 鈥渢he Islamic holy sites are being violated by foreign forces that entered the holy land and the desecration of the Kaaba and the Prophet鈥檚 grave.鈥� In doing so, the regime hoped to 鈥渆mphasize jihad for God鈥檚 sake to expel the American invaders and their allies.鈥�[9]

These efforts were not enough to stop the war. Yet, they did succeed in gaining Iraq countless new allies among anti-war activists around the world. The Iraqi military and economy were decimated in the war. Nevertheless, several months after the Gulf Crisis, Saddam looked back on it and noted, 鈥渢his war, however, was beneficial for us.鈥�[10] As astounding as such a claim sounds, one must remember that Saddam interpreted power through the lens of mass politics. In the months after its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq knitted together a network of international supporters. The Ba鈥榯hists worked covertly, using proxy organizations and disassociating with the Iraqi embassies 鈥渢o provide cover for their [Ba鈥榯h] Party activities.鈥�[11] They courted people on both the political left and the right: academics, student organizations, militant Islamists, pacifists, liberal activists, and conservative isolationists. They found allies in the media and even among some mainstream politicians. Then, they attempted to bring these incongruent groups together into a loosely organized political force designed to achieve Iraq鈥檚 strategic goals.[12]

The Ba鈥榯hists built upon this coalition in the 1990s. In places like France, Ba鈥榯hists tapped into growing discontent with what French Foreign Minister Hubert V茅drine derisively termed American hyperpower.[13] In Russia, Iraq courted hardline nationalists who were dissatisfied with what they considered to be Moscow鈥檚 kowtowing to Washington.[14] Elsewhere, Iraqis touted their opposition to Western hegemony, a position that was increasingly popular among non-Western and post-colonial populations.

By the mid-1990s and then even more so after a corrupt oil-for-food program went into effect in 1996, the Ba鈥榯hists incorporated economics into their influence campaigns. The political and economic aspects of Iraqi influence operations reenforced one another. Party branches around the world and the Iraqi Intelligence Service identified actors who would assist the regime in circumventing or degrading sanctions. Iraq had one of the world鈥檚 largest proven oil reserves, and as the United Nation鈥檚 independent inquiry later noted, Saddam鈥檚 regime 鈥渨as willing to forego revenue from oil sales or to overpay for imports to reward or encourage certain foreign politicians, journalists, and businesses to exert influence in its favor, 鈥� especially in advocating a lifting of the sanctions.鈥�[15]

Iraqis could not alter the fundamentals of international politics, but they prodded potentially revisionist states to act on latent inclinations. Throughout the 1990s, they did so to great effect, breaking up the coalition that had fought against Iraq in the Gulf War and then contained it with economic sanctions and weapons inspections in the 1990s. By the turn of the century, that containment regime had broken down in the face of French, Russian, and Middle Eastern opposition. Weapons inspectors were no longer in the country and the Iraqi economy was quicky recovering.

Saddam never fully understood how the September 11 attacks changed the United States or the danger that these changes posed for his regime. As Iraq moved into George W. Bush鈥檚 crosshairs in 2002, the Ba鈥榯hists felt their strategy to divide the international community and raise popular opposition to American policies was working and that it would protect Iraq from American aggression. Iraq鈥檚 Deputy Prime Minister, and its most important foreign policy official, Tariq Aziz, argued that prior to the war, 鈥淔rance and Russia each secured millions of dollars鈥� worth of trade and service contracts in Iraq, with the implied understanding that their political posture with regard to sanctions on Iraq would be pro-Iraq.鈥� Of course, these countries would oppose war. Aziz insisted that the French wanted 鈥渢o safeguard their trade and service contracts in Iraq. Moreover, they wanted to prove their importance in the world as members of the Security Council; that they could use their veto to show they still had power.鈥�[16]

Similarly, in October 2002, the Iraqi ambassador to Moscow wrote to Baghdad that 鈥渙ur friends [in Russian intelligence] have told us that President Putin has given very clear instructions to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs vis-脿-vis Iraq.鈥� Russian President Vladimir Putin, according to the ambassador, 鈥渨ill not allow the new resolution to include any intention that would allow the use of force against Iraq.鈥�[17]

In addition to these official positions, Saddam put considerable weight on the fact that opposition to another war against Iraq inflamed popular opinion around the world. Mass anti-war protests began in the fall of 2002. Between January and April 2003, these ballooned into the largest wave of protests in global history. More than 35 million protestors participated in nearly 3,000 separate protests in 90 countries. The largest single protest in history occurred on February 15, 2003. Over 10 million people gathered at almost 900 separate events in 78 countries.[18]  

Iraqi Ba鈥榯hists had embedded themselves in the anti-war networks that coordinated these protests and they helped to organize them. Of course, there were numerous reasons for the protests, many of which would have existed without Ba鈥榯hist involvement. The George W. Bush administration鈥檚 hubris alienated global audiences. The Bush administration鈥檚 glib attitude toward anyone who disagreed with it 鈥� even close allies 鈥� inflamed anti-American and anti-Western sentiment around the world. The Ba鈥榯hists channeled and amplified those sentiments. They connected disparate groups and ideologies, and they linked large networks, which allowed activists to coordinate protests across time and space.

These forces led the regime to feel secure in the face of American threats. The Iraqis never fully cooperated with the international community because their worldview blinded them to the threat they faced. After the downfall of the regime, several senior Iraqi officials spoke about their misperceptions prior to the invasion. Incredibly, the then former Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Armed Forces stated, 鈥淣o Iraqi leaders had believed Coalition forces would ever reach Baghdad.鈥� The Commander of the Iraqi Air and Air Defense Forces said, 鈥淲e thought this would be like 1991. We figured that the United States would conduct some operations in the south and then go home.鈥� The Director General of the Republican Guard鈥檚 General Staff similarly claimed, 鈥淲e thought the Coalition would go to Basrah, maybe to Amarah, and then the war would end.鈥� When an American debriefer asked the Director of Iraqi Military Intelligence, 鈥淲hat did you think was going to happen with the Coalition invasion?鈥� He responded, 鈥淲e were more interested in Turkey and Iran.鈥�[19]

Yet, in a damning indictment on the Ba鈥榯hist understanding of international politics, the Bush administration pushed ahead despite everything. The American-led military coalition quickly dispatched the Iraqi military and sacked Baghdad, ending over three decades of entrenched Ba鈥榯hist rule. For all the successes that Saddam felt he had achieved with populist politics and manipulative statesmanship, these strategies proved no match for a determined adversary willing to use overwhelming military power.

Some of the material in this article was originally published in Iraq against the World: Saddam, America, and the Post-Cold War Order, by Samuel Helfont, and has been reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press .

[1] Con Coughlin, Saddam: His Rise and Fall, (New York: Ecco, 2005), 177.

[2] 賵賯丕卅毓 丕賱賲丐鬲賲乇 丕賱廿爻賱丕賲賷 丕賱卮毓亘賷 丕賱孬丕賳賷  [Proceedings of the Second Popular Islamic Conference] (Baghdad: Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs, 1986), 385-90.  

[3] Taha Yasin Ramadan, 鈥淐ontinuous Popular Mobilization,鈥� CRRC, SH-MISC-D-001-446, January 28, 1999,

[4] 鈥溫ㄘ辟傎娯� 噩賮乇賷丞鈥� [Cable] From the Command of the Office of Iraqis outside of the Region, To: The Organizations of Iraqis outside of the Region. BRCC, 2827_0001 (0482-0483), December 26, 1990.

[5] 鈥溫堌囏ж�� [Directives] From: The Secretary General of the Office of the Bureau of Iraqis outside the region, To: All Organizations of Iraqis outside the region. BRCC, 2827_0001 (0294), August 4, 1990; 鈥溬嗀簇ж坟ж�� [Activities], From: The Secretary General of the Office of the Bureau of Iraqis outside the Region, To: All Organizations of Iraqis outside the Region. BRCC, 2827_0001 (0297), August 9, 1990.

[6] Pesach Malovany, Wars of Modern Babylon: A History of the Iraqi Army from 1921 to 2003 (Lexington KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2017), 549.

[7] Charles Duelfer, Hide and Seek: The Search for Truth in Iraq Hardcover (New York: Public Affairs, 2009), 71-2.

[8] 鈥溫ㄘ辟傎娯┾�� [Cable], From: The Director General of the Office of the Secretariat of the Region, To: The President of the Republic / Secretary of the President of the Republic for Party Matters. BRCC, 2827_0001 (0391), September 18, 1990.

[9] 鈥淢iscellaneous Information Regarding the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait and the American Operation to Liberate Kuwait,鈥� CRRC, SH-GMID-D-000-998, September-October 1990.

[10] 鈥淒iscussion Following the First Gulf War,鈥� CRRC, SH-SHTP-A-000-835, 1991.

[11] 鈥溬呚敦� 丕噩鬲賲丕毓 賴賷兀毓 賲賰鬲亘 丕賱丕賲丕賳丞 丕賱毓丕賲丞鈥� [Proceedings of the Meeting of the General Secretariat Group], BRCC, 026-5-5 (207), February. 15, 1989.

[12] The Ba鈥榯h Party archives contain thousands of pages on the party鈥檚 influence operations in the 1990s and early 2000s. In addition to sources cited above and below, see the following for a small sampling: 鈥溬呝傌必�� [Recommendation], From: The Director of the Office of the Secretariat of the Region, To: The Presidential Diwan, BRCC, 2837_0002 (585), April 1992; 鈥溫ㄘ辟嗀з呚� 毓賲賱鈥� [Work Plan], From: The Secretary General of the Central Office of Students and Youth, To: The Office of the Secretariat of the Region, BRCC, 2749_0000 (567), Dec. 22, 1991; and 鈥溬嗀簇ж坟ж�� [Activities], From: The Assistant to the Secretary General of the Founding Leader Branch Command, To: The Regional Command of Iraq/Office of the Secretariat of the Region, BRCC, 2099_0003 (505), Feb. 24, 1999.

[13] 鈥淭o Paris, U.S. Looks Like a 'Hyperpower,'鈥� International Herald Tribune. February 5, 1999. .

[14] Samuel Helfont, 鈥淭he Gulf War鈥檚 Afterlife: Dilemmas, Missed Opportunities, and the Post-Cold War Order Undone,鈥� Texas National Security Review, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2021); Samuel Helfont, 鈥淔rom Iraq to Ukraine: A New Perspective on The Russian-Western Confrontation,鈥� War on the Rocks, May 16, 2022,

[15] Paul A. Volcker, et. al., 鈥淢anagement of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme,鈥� Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme Vol 1. (2005): 39.

[16] Kevin Woods, et al., Iraqi Perspectives Project: View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam鈥檚 Senior Leadership (Washington DC: Institute for Defense Analysis, 2006), 28-9.

[17] Woods, et al., Iraqi Perspectives Project: View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam鈥檚 Senior Leadership, 28-9.

[18] Dominique Reyni茅, 鈥淒oes a 鈥淓uropean Public Opinion鈥� Exist?,鈥� Forum Constitutionis Europae, Humboldt University, Germany, September 2009, 12-3,

[19] Quotes taken from, Woods, View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam鈥檚 Senior Leadership, 25, 31. See also, Duelfer, Hide and Seek, 10.