浪花直播

How a lunch in Rio de Janeiro confirmed a US diplomat鈥檚 hunches about Brazilian nuclear weapons research 

This post also appears on the

The history of nuclear proliferation is partly a story of countries searching for latent weapons potential, without ever committing to build a complete device. A recently , US scientific attache in Rio de Janeiro, provides fascinating detail on the degree to which nationalists in the Brazilian nuclear energy bureaucracy pursued elements of a weapons program during the 1960s and later.

Hudson describes a farewell (despedida) lunch in early November 1970 held for a Brazilian diplomat friend, Fernando Augusto Buarque Franco Netto, who was heading to a new posting in West Berlin. During dinner, Hudson and Buarque recalled old foreign policy business over martinis (probably 3 each), wine, and cognac.

Buarque, who had 鈥渜uite a capacity鈥� to drink, eventually disclosed the contents of secret policy papers, the existence of which Hudson had suspected for some time. According to Hudson, he probably shared those secrets because of 鈥渂itterness about not being promoted recently,鈥� which the attache attributed to Buarque鈥檚 various run-ins with higher-ups and a 鈥渕ixed up personal life鈥濃�攁 term used during the military dictatorship period to taint people who did not conform to its standards of personal conduct.

Buarque revealed that , president of Brazil鈥檚 Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) during the early 1960s, instructed Brazilian diplomats at the International Atomic Energy Agency to avoid any action, votes, or speeches on safeguards or related issues that would 鈥減reclude or adversely affect Brazil's right to pursue a nuclear device program.鈥� The instructions included language that Brazil was 鈥渁ctively engaged in the necessary preparations and preliminary research which will permit [it] to embark on a nuclear device program in the near future should that be desirable.鈥�

When Hudson worked for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, he did not suspect that Brazil had such intentions, although a on 鈥渘on-peaceful鈥� intentions at another 鈥渜uiet lunch.鈥�  When Hudson began work at the Embassy in 1967, he was soon on the nuclear trail. He 鈥渃ame to suspect Damy of attempting to emulate the path which we suspected India and Israel were embarked upon.鈥� In his letter, Hudson cited and noted that Buarque 鈥渆ssentially confirmed virtually all of the points made in that analysis.鈥�

Hudson鈥檚 1968 airgram concluded that, in spite of the lack of 鈥渧isible evidence鈥� that Brazil sought a nuclear device, 鈥淏razil does have a significant base in the science and to a lesser degree the technology necessary to mount such a program should a political decision to do so ever be made.鈥� Moreover, 鈥減ersuasive evidence鈥� indicated that before the 1964 coup, the CNEN 鈥渨as deliberately pursuing a development policy which would have resulted in a 鈥榮afeguards-free鈥� device capability had the effort been adequately staffed and supported.鈥�

Damy was at the center of the CNEN鈥檚 effort to develop a nuclear device. Holding 鈥渟trong nationalistic views,鈥� he 鈥渁spired to be a Brazilian Bhabha,鈥� a reference to the Indian nuclear physicist . According to Hudson鈥檚 airgram, in private Damy 鈥渁dmits quite frankly to having designed and pursued a development policy which had it been adequately staffed and supported would almost certainly have provided Brazil with a rudimentary device capability.鈥� Among the programs Damy divulged were the secret effort to develop uranium enrichment technology using West German gas centrifuges purchased in the late 1950s, which

According to Hudson鈥檚 assessment, the Castelo Branco military regime made major changes at CNEN that halted 鈥渟ystematic progress toward creating a scientific and technological base from which a device program could be launched鈥� when it seized power in 1964. All the same, Damy 鈥渕ade a determined effort to staff鈥� both the CNEN and the Institute for Atomic Energy (IAE) 鈥渨ith people who were both qualified and shared his nationalistic point of view and determination.鈥� Those changes remained in place after 1964, to the point where one source told the Embassy about a 鈥渁 hot bed of silly nationalists [at the IAE] who want a prestige bomb although they would never admit it publicly."

Hudson鈥檚 account provides much detail about developments during 1964 and after. The airgram notes that Damy鈥檚 program met the opposition of the 鈥渕ore rational 鈥楥astelistas.鈥欌�� As Hudson put it, 鈥淔ortunately for all of us, it was the latter who won out as far as operational activities in Brazil are concerned, and according to [Buarque] that remains the official ... policy to this day.鈥� With nuclear aspirations 鈥渃learly latent鈥� in the bureaucracy, Hudson believed that it was important 鈥渢o keep an eye on any developments which 鈥� would again encourage 鈥榓dventures鈥� like Damy envisioned.鈥�  With the 鈥淐astelistas鈥� staying in power, they excluded the nuclear option.

During the luncheon, Buarque also explained the circumstances shaping Brazil鈥檚 decision against signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). As the NPT negotiations progressed during mid-1967, US Atomic Energy Commission chairman Glenn Seaborg visited Brazil and other countries in South America. Brazilian 鈥渉ard liners鈥� interpreted the trip as an 鈥渁ttempt to pressure Brazil into signing the NPT by offering 鈥榞oodies鈥� and implicitly threatening to withhold cooperation if Brazil did not sign.鈥� That interpretation became prevalent and, as a 鈥渕atter of national pride,鈥� the junta decided not to sign the treaty. This gave then foreign minister 鈥渁 domestic political advantage鈥� while Brazil preserved the 鈥渙ption鈥� to continue a nuclear device program. 

Miller Hudson鈥檚 letter and airgram illustrate the degree to which nuclear energy officials at various levels pursued a weapons capability during the 1960s.  Yet they do not answer the 鈥渨hy鈥� question鈥攚hat motivated figures like Damy?

While prestige alone might have motivated some scientists, Brazilian policymakers would have needed a stronger reason to accept the diplomatic, political, and economic costs of weaponization. Hudson鈥檚 reporting provides important perspective on Brazil鈥檚 nuclear activities, but more primary sources are needed to complete the picture. Ongoing research by Nuclear Proliferation International History Project partners Carlo Patti and Matias Spektor promises to put Brazil鈥檚 nuclear weapons research in fuller context.  

Browse our archival holdings on Brazilian Nuclear History at the