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Russia鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine has now gone on 841 days and counting (the newspaper Kommersant keeps a running daily tab). Putin euphemistically still refers to the conflict as a special military operation, as opposed to its actual name: war. With no end in sight, the recriminations have now bubbled up to the surface in the Kremlin. 

The political infighting is taking place at the highest levels of government. Several high-ranking generals have been  on bribery and other criminal charges. This controversy is occurring at the worst possible time as a new minister of defense, Andrei Belousov, has just assumed control of the army. 

Belousov appears to be an observer and not a trigger of this upheaval. How deep the purge will be remains anyone鈥檚 guess, although Putin has already limited Belousov鈥檚 authority by  any change in the Russian General staff.

The security services  this purge and at each other鈥檚 throats. Evidently, they still  the army for its failure to take Kyiv in the early stages of the war. The FSB and the army are also allegedly competing over limited defense funds. And, not to feel neglected, a high-ranking FSB official was  on bribery charges.

Company Men

Dmitri Peskov, Putin鈥檚 spokesman, provided the official rationale behind Belousov鈥檚 appointment. Military spending had increased significantly since the war, and Putin wanted an economist to manage the consequences. Belousov is also the ultimate company man: before his new appointment, he was in charge of implementing Putin鈥檚 national projects and post-2024 election decrees. Belousov鈥檚  also includes ensuring the soldiers in the special operation receive the necessary social services that they are owed.

But providing these services remains difficult. Russia severe shortages of medicine because of sanctions. The head of the Duma, Vyacheslav Volodin, also recently that Russia faces a deficit of 30,000 doctors. Putin has also  to increase the pay of health workers and modernize the health care system. All this takes money, something that is in short supply in the Russian Federation. Add interest rates at 16 percent and a , and Russian business is strapped for funds.

There are other political actors in the mix as well. Prime Minister Mishustin has talked about creating new conditions for opening businesses, especially small and medium-size enterprises. He also brings considerable bureaucratic heft to the table, with no fewer than  in his cabinet. Not to be outdone, Putin also wants to promote the economy, although his recent plan to raise Russian taxes has only  of the Russian business community.

The shadow of the former defense minister, Sergei Shoigu, looms large over all this turnover and political intrigue. Shoigu has long been a favorite of President Putin (as opposed to the technocrat Belousov). Shoigu may no longer be minister of defense, but he has found a new sinecure as secretary of the Security Council. This consultative body under Putin鈥檚 leadership advises on national security and defense matters. Shoigu will also supervise the Federal Service on Military-Technical Cooperation, a federal organ that supervises military coordination with foreign states, and more broadly s the work of the military-industrial complex. All these  still offer plenty of opportunities for kickbacks.

High-Level Backstabbing Hampers Russian Army Operations

The internal backstabbing shows no sign of abating. Indeed, the first general  in this recent purge was Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov, a prot茅g茅 of Shoigu. The irony is that while criticism of the Russian army is taking place behind closed doors, the Russian people are forbidden to talk about the current state of the war because of draconian administrative fines for discrediting the Russian military, as well as criminal penalties for disseminating 鈥渇ake news鈥� about the Russian army.

Thus, everyone appears to be watching their back, a terrible situation as Russia conducts its pivotal spring offensive. Whether Belousov can rise above the intrigue remains an open question. He recently  with pro-military bloggers to improve his public image. He further  his immediate plans for reform, including integrating the army into the overall economy, optimizing military expenditures, and raising the standards of military education. In the process, he  that no new mobilization was being contemplated.

But reforming the Russian military, a daunting task in good times, is impossible after two-plus years of a war of attrition and global sanctions. Among the headwinds roiling the Russian economy are budget deficits (hence the  to raise taxes), a bad harvest, an energy sector under military attack, and a  for both importers and exporters. China has piled on by asking that Russia sell its gas at its internal discounted rates. Throw in  beer prices and a vodka industry  from multiple directions and you have all the ingredients for a real social meltdown.

Belousov is no maverick but a trusted technocrat. Nevertheless, he will have to watch his back. He has entered a nontransparent web of corruption, clans, and personal fiefdoms, all of which could come back to bite him, especially if Putin does not stand behind his military reforms.

The Dream of a Unified State Faces Headwinds from Personal Vendettas and Economic Frailty

Putin鈥檚 future plans include nothing short of creating a new global order. Such aspirations appear to be a pipe dream in light of the infighting and personal vendettas that now consume the upper echelons of the Russian government. Russia further remains more isolated than at any time since the end of the Cold War. The recent St. Petersburg Economic Forum welcomed only four heads of state (including such economic powerhouses as Bolivia and Zimbabwe) and ultimately  in zero major deals or investments.

In any crisis, Russia always rallies around the notion of the unified state (yedinoye gosudarstvo) and national sovereignty. Such unity and resilience remain in short supply as Putin鈥攁nd Belousov鈥攃onfront economic and military challenges on multiple fronts.

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.