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The fourth release in the Saddam Files includes ten record files consisting of nearly 700 pages of documents and accompanying translations. Like in the previous releases, this one also contains the translations and some transcriptions of ten audio tapes.
While reviewing the influx of records to be eventually made available at the Conflict Records Research Center, Department of Defense contractor linguists spent thousands of hours not only listening to audio recordings Saddam Hussein made of his meetings, but also typing English translations of them, along with Arabic transcriptions of many. Because these audio files vary widely in quality, the linguists could not always identify the voices of the speakers participating in each meeting, especially when they came from below the regime鈥檚 highest echelons.
As this new batch of records indicates, the staff of Saddam鈥檚 Presidential Diwan and a committee of Iraqi military officers, many of whom had retired from active duty, found themselves similarly tasked with transcribing tapes of old meetings between Saddam and the General Command of the Armed Forces. Perhaps for the purpose of official historical studies of Iraq鈥檚 war with the Islamic Republic of Iran between 1980 and 1988, the tapes were transcribed by hand during the 1990s, although the accompanying documentation does not specify the exact reason.
Recorded during the early years of the war with Iran, the tape transcripts reflect the difficulties that Iraq faced as a result of an unanticipatedly protracted conflict. The search for spare parts and munitions on the international arms market was a recurring theme even during the war鈥檚 first year.
, the Soviet Union鈥檚 arms embargo against Iraq, stemming from Baghdad鈥檚 decision to invade Iran without Soviet approval (and without even notifying Moscow in advance), led Saddam to order his officials to contact India and Yugoslavia to inquire about selling Soviet munitions. The same record also contains valuable insights on the diplomatic dimensions of this period.
Despite Iraq鈥檚 anger towards its Soviet patron, the Iraqi position regarding the Soviet Union鈥檚 invasion of Afghanistan, where the resistance supported Iran, remained one of official neutrality. As Saddam explained Iraq鈥檚 neutrality to those gathered, 鈥渂ecause the Afghan resistance is against us in favor of the al-Khomeini side, so that is what we will tell the Non-Aligned states when they ask. Why give them something for free?鈥
In in 1981, Saddam鈥檚 youngest daughter Hala appears in the middle of the discussion. At one point, Saddam turns to her and says, 鈥淵ou are now a big girl and can stay by yourself at the house.鈥 Observing the actions of the meeting鈥檚 attendees seated around the table, Hala announces, 鈥淒addy, I want a pen!鈥
Saddam鈥檚 meetings with the military leadership during this time often combined current events and historical topics, with parallels drawn between the former and the latter. An unidentified speaker in invoked collaboration between Arabia鈥檚 Jewish tribes and rebellious Arab tribes during the Ridda (鈥渁postacy鈥) wars, which occurred after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, seeing it as a historical antecedent to perceived current cooperation between Iran and Israel against Iraq. The same meeting later turned to the issue of foreign exchange, especially French Francs needed to fulfill an artillery contract, along with the need to transfer funds to Jordan, which would remain a crucial financial hub for Saddam鈥檚 regime until 2003.
The detailed technical discussions about targeting Iran鈥檚 oil infrastructure to degrade its export capacity, along with Iraq鈥檚 commercial dealings on the international arms market. The attendees discussed the delivery of Egyptian missiles, along with recent visits by an Egyptian major general and the intelligence director to Iraq. They mentioned Iraq鈥檚 purchase of 155mm artillery pieces from both Austria and France while underscoring the importance of expanding Iraq鈥檚 domestic production of artillery rounds. With respect to the latter, the Soviet Union, which had lifted its arms embargo against Iraq the previous year, reportedly authorized the transfer of Soviet factory equipment from Switzerland to Iraq. Chile had allegedly offered Iraq five thousand American-made cluster bombs for $30 million, although the offer was declined.
Most of the audio tape records in this batch are among those that were translated, but not transcribed, or have corrupted Arabic transcriptions alongside legible English translations. The first comes from the partial recording of on the subject of Iraqi-Syrian relations. Saddam鈥檚 ascendancy to the presidency was accompanied by , which dramatically terminated unification talks between the Iraqi and Syrian branches of the party, along with bilateral relations between the two countries. During the November meeting, Saddam explained to the attendees, 鈥淎ny relationship between Iraq and the regime in Syria must take one of two directions and there is not a third direction. It is either collision or merger; there is not a medium in this matter.鈥
In , undoubtedly colored by Syria鈥檚 subsequent support for and warm relations with Iran, Saddam quipped, 鈥淪yrians have twisted minds 鈥 they are dubious 鈥 they are experts on hurting the Arab nation.鈥 A 1982 meeting revolved around another critical period in the history of the Iraqi Ba士th Party during the 1970s. Saddam and the Revolutionary Command Council reminisced about General Security Directorate head Nadhim Kzar鈥檚 failed coup attempt of 1973 against President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Saddam mentioned his growing suspicions of Kzar prior to this event and claimed to have warned Bakr not to accept any invitation to visit him in isolation.
Another tape from the 1980s is of about President Ronald Reagan鈥檚 speech addressing the Iran-Contra revelations, or 鈥淚rangate鈥 as Saddam and his advisers preferred to call the scandal. Turning to the role of the United States providing weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam mentions a private American company that allegedly offered Iraq mortar rounds, but went on to explain, 鈥淲hen the Americans wanted to establish new relations with Iraq, we were in deep need of weapons, but we never asked for their help. However, the Iranians have established their relations with the Americans based on an armaments deal.鈥
The final three tapes come from the years after Iraq鈥檚 defeat in the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Returning to more positive subjects, focused on the successful Iraqi military operations during the Iran-Iraq War鈥檚 final stages, including the recapture of the Faw peninsula, which had been occupied by Iran. A prominent voice in this meeting is that of Iraqi Army Chief of Staff Nizar al-Khazraji, . pertains to Iraq鈥檚 dealings with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) weapons inspectors, then led by Swedish diplomat Rolf Ekeus, whom Saddam colorfully referred to as 鈥淓keus and the forty thieves.鈥
Last but not least, was held in the wake of the April 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing, an attack that would on . After discussing the security threat of the militia movement in the United States, Saddam and Tariq Aziz turned to the subject of immigration and the U.S.-Mexico border. Saddam speculated that states on the land seized from Mexico during the 1846-1848 Mexican-American War would vote for succession from the United States and reunification with Mexico once a majority of the population in each originated from Mexico. Arguably both a more perceptive and enduring insight on U.S. politics was offered by Aziz when he stated, 鈥淭he center has become despicable. When one wants to become popular, he starts to attack the federal government. He attacks Washington, saying 鈥榃ashington is bureaucratic鈥, 鈥榃ashington is corrupt,鈥 and 鈥榃ashington is distant from the people's concerns.鈥 I mean, he attacks the federal government; thus, he gains popularity.鈥
Like previous installments in the , this release contains documents related to Ba士th Party policies and ideology. In , Saddam emphasizes the flexibility of the party to empirical reality, underscoring the importance of socialist adaptation in contrast to total collectivization and the resulting serious harm to national development. Drawing on Soviet history, he stated, 鈥渢hese experiments resulted in costly strangulation from the viewpoint of development and human loss; for example, these sacrifices, in addition to other factors cost Stalin approximately thirteen million human beings, and one third of the livestock wealth of the Soviet Union.鈥
In about the Ba士th Party鈥檚 view of religion, Islam, and Christianity, Saddam , stating that the party is neither atheistic nor Islamist, yet values the role of Arab culture, heritage, and spirit. He also states that Arab nationalism enjoyed a major advantage over Turkish and Iranian nationalism during the twentieth century in that it did not attempt to relegate the role of religion, especially Islam. In in November 1989, Saddam spoke with Iraqi officials and diplomats about the implications of the Cold War鈥檚 end on various countries, including the matter of increased migration of Soviet Jewry to Israel. A was a chorus of praise for Saddam鈥檚 decision to annex the country, paired with occasional mention of practical considerations related to absorbing the Kuwaiti population and economy.
The General Military Intelligence Directorate has been in to date. This batch contains reporting on developments from Iran鈥檚 western Khuzestan province in the wake of the Islamic Revolution. In contrast to Iraq鈥檚 official rhetoric and justifications for invading Iran in September 1980 after a year of rising tensions, the directorate鈥檚 leadership at this time was skeptical toward the more sensationalist human intelligence reports coming out of Iran. When Iraq鈥檚 military attach茅 in Tehran relayed that Arabs in southern Iran had taken over naval facilities and demanded independence, an intelligence officer surmised, 鈥淲e do not have enough information about the subject, and we think that it is exaggerated.鈥
Included among the records in this release is of President Bill Clinton鈥檚 policies toward Iraq. Perceptively noting the shift from balancing Iraq and Iran against each other to the strategy of dual containment 鈥渁imed at weakening and containing both countries,鈥 the report鈥檚 authors recognized that Clinton faced pressure from more hawkish critics, although he 鈥渄id not go along with the voices calling for the partitioning of Iraq.鈥
The final three records in this release all pertain to Hussein Kamel al-Majid, Iraq鈥檚 powerful head of the Military Industrialization Commission and Saddam鈥檚 son-in-law, who defected to Jordan in 1995. Married to Saddam鈥檚 daughter Raghad, Hussein鈥檚 brother Saddam Kamel was married to Saddam鈥檚 daughter Rana. As feuding escalated between the Kamel brothers and Saddam鈥檚 sons Uday and Qusay, the brothers fled to Jordan with their wives. After cooperating with international weapons inspectors and the Central Intelligence Agency while calling for his father-in-law鈥檚 overthrow, the highly tainted Hussein Kamel found little interest in him among the Iraqi opposition and potential foreign patrons.
The contains memos from the Iraqi Intelligence Service and General Security Directorate, along with the transcription of a recorded call between Hussein Kamel and unnamed individual, discussing the former鈥檚 bid to solicit political support in exile.
After these efforts fell flat, contains two handwritten letters from Hussein Kamel to Saddam Hussein, begging for forgiveness and requesting permission to return to Iraq. Eager to get his daughters back, Saddam acquiesced. However, upon their return to Iraq in 1996, the Kamel brothers were quickly separated from Saddam鈥檚 daughters, whom they were compelled to divorce.
The contains the documents of the commission established to report on what transpired next. Rushing to the sounds of an erupting gun battle, the personnel of the General Security Directorate arrived to find the house of the Kamel brothers surrounded, noticing Uday and Qusay, along with Ali Hassan al-Majid, among the attackers. Unaware of the attack plan, the General Security Directorate was contacted by the Special Security Organization and ordered to stand down from what was 鈥渁 tribal matter.鈥 By the time the shooting ended, the Kamel brothers were dead. Their house was demolished the following day.
Like the previous releases, this latest batch of records, largest by volume of documents, contains information on a wide range of subjects related to internal Iraqi and regional political history.
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