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Insights from the State Department's new FRUS volume on the 1953 coup in Iran

The State Department recently released that deposed Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq. This collection provides some interesting new details about the coup but leaves unanswered numerous questions that have vexed historians.

Most interesting are many new details in the collection about two important covert operations the CIA and its predecessor, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), were carrying out in Iran during the early 1950s: an anti-communist propaganda and political action operation codenamed ; and a 鈥渟tay-behind鈥� operation to assist guerrillas fighting against a possible future pro-Soviet government in Iran.

One of the appraises the 鈥済rave鈥� situation in Iran in March 1951 and proposes that the United States initiate various covert operations in response, including the propaganda, political action, and stay-behind efforts that later emerged. These operations would seek to undermine 滨谤补苍鈥檚 communist Tudeh Party and other extremist elements, including notably the populist cleric Ayatollah Mahmoud Kashani, though they also might include efforts to 鈥渂uy off鈥� Kashani. Covert operations also should be used to undermine and 鈥渟plit off鈥� members of Mosaddeq鈥檚 National Front, support factions that might contribute to stability in Iran, and prepare to support guerrillas fighting a Soviet-backed government.

State Department officials reviewed and approved this proposal, which was with National Security Council . The OPC had already begun implementing some of these measures and was sending several officers to Iran to oversee them in April 1951.

The new collection contains redacted versions of the CIA鈥檚 proposals for the and . The TPBEDAMN proposal called for OPC to back religious, political, and labor leaders to produce 鈥渁n organized and directed attack upon Communists in Iran.鈥� It would also foment anti-communist demonstrations and counter-demonstrations, organize anti-communist trade unions, manipulate 鈥渞eligious prejudice and fanaticism鈥� against communism, and encourage 鈥減ersonal enmity and competition among enemy leadership.鈥� This was to be done through an existing Iranian organization with 鈥済reat potential,鈥� which was almost certainly the network led by Ali Jalali and Farouq Kayvani (described ).

The stay-behind proposal called for OPC personnel to work with the powerful Qashqai tribe of southern Iran to develop parachute drop zones, landing strips, safe-houses, and overland supply routes for transporting supplies; identify sabotage targets for guerrilla attacks; map out 鈥渆scape and evasion鈥� routes for use by US and allied personnel in the event of war; and recruit Iranians to assist with these activities. Both proposals were approved in August 1951.

By October 1951, the head of CIA operations in the Middle East, Kermit Roosevelt, was . It had achieved 鈥渃onspicuous operational success鈥� in August, apparently in organizing violent demonstrations during a visit to Iran by US envoy Averill Harriman (as described in Roosevelt鈥檚 memoir of the 1953 coup). It also had recruited agents inside the Tudeh Party, undermined Tudeh influence over organized labor, mobilized religious leaders against the Tudeh, published a 鈥渂lack鈥� propaganda book depicting Soviet hostility toward Islam, and was buying printing presses for its propaganda operations.

OPC had begun to implement the stay-behind operation by , discussing it with their British counterparts, conducting field surveys, and eliciting cooperation from Qashqai tribal leaders. In November, US officials of using the stay-behind capabilities to support a 鈥渞ump鈥� government if the Tudeh seized power.

After severe rioting occurred in July 1952, Roosevelt suggested that these capabilities could be used to influence events if chaos or civil war emerged in Iran and proposed that weapons and ammunition be stockpiled in unspecified nearby countries for this purpose. On July 31, Secretary of State Dean Acheson approved this proposal. CIA officials quickly drew up an emergency plan for this effort, which was approved on August 28. The CIA had established a 鈥渓imited鈥� stockpile of appropriate supplies by November 1952 and a stockpile large enough to supply 10,000 guerrillas for six months by March 1953. US and British officials discussed stay-behind activities several times during this period and reached an agreement in February 1953 to conduct joint operations if the Tudeh tried to seize.

The TPBEDAMN operation continued in 1952-1953 as well. CIA officers apparently used it to 滨谤补苍鈥檚 in early 1952. In the summer of 1952, they tried to take an anti-communist line. A that while TPBEDAMN鈥檚 main Iranian operatives were useful in countering the Tudeh, they were very nationalistic and anti-British and therefore would not undertake operations designed to counter anti-Western sentiments.

In February 1953, a CIA memo stated that the Agency had been using nationalist and Islamic themes to discredit the Tudeh and had concentrated especially on exposing the Tudeh鈥檚 front organizations. It also had , trying to provoke him to take a stand either for or against the Tudeh. A indicated that TPBEDAMN鈥檚 main operatives were unwilling to run operations against Mosaddeq. A indicated that TPBEDAMN operatives had carried out 鈥渂lack鈥� Tudeh propaganda attacks on Ayatollah Boroujerdi, a highly respected cleric, and had taken actions that substantially reduced participation in the Tudeh鈥檚 May Day activities. Also in May, to 滨谤补苍鈥檚 monarch, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, that the United States had been supporting Khalil Maleki, a prominent democratic socialist leader, presumably through TPBEDAMN. Maleki probably did not know the true source of this support.

The refusal of TPBEDAMN鈥檚 main operatives to undertake operations against Mosaddeq, and the fact that Qashqai tribal leaders were strong supporters of the prime minister, posed a major problem for CIA officials as they began to plot against Mosaddeq in March 1953: none of their major Iranian assets seemed willing to participate in a coup against him. However, TPBEDAMN operatives did come to play a crucial role in the coup against Mosaddeq, and the Qashqai did not act to stop or reverse the coup. Unfortunately, the State Department documents do not explain what led these key actors to change their positions on this matter.