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Israel鈥檚 June 1967 victory reverberated well beyond the Arab world to the capitals of the radical states' patrons in the Warsaw Pact.  The socialist bloc, whose military equipment lay in ruins across the region, was shaken by the implications of their clients' defeat not only for their international reputation but for their own preparedness for armed conflict with NATO.

Warsaw Pact meeting records and military status reports in the weeks after the war show the socialist leadership still reeling somewhat.  , Leonid Brezhnev and his colleagues put the blame squarely on the Arabs, listing an array of 鈥渨eak points鈥� starting with an absence of 鈥減olitical unity鈥� on everything except a refusal to recognize Israel.  On a military level, problems identified included 鈥渘o real uniform command system,鈥� a failure to 鈥渕uster[] modern techniques,鈥� poor organization, and a general lack of 鈥渇ighting capability.鈥�  Brezhnev lamented the Arabs鈥� seeming inability to 鈥済rasp the situation realistically.鈥� 

Determined to be good allies 鈥� and to prove their reliability to the rest of the Third World 鈥� the Soviets acted quickly.  鈥淸W]e have expedited to the United Arab Republic, Iraq and Algeria, by air and sea, planes, tanks, artillery, rifles and ammunition to compensate for losses and strengthen their defenses.鈥�  They also planned to send top-ranking political figures (including President Nikolay Podgorny) and military brass, along with hundreds of advisers and plenty of economic aid.

But while J谩nos K谩d谩r, W艂adys艂aw Gomu艂ka, Anton铆n Novotn媒, Todor Zhivkov, and even Josip Tito praised Moscow鈥檚 actions, each leader drew a bright line against yielding to Arab pleas to go further.  None, for instance, was willing to see Soviet pilots (鈥渁llegedly volunteers鈥�) engage in direct combat.  鈥淲hy should we stand up to Israel with war?鈥� Brezhnev asked rhetorically, while Zhivkov warned about the risk of involving outside powers: 鈥淲e cannot expose our countries to a nuclear strike.鈥�

Looking purely at the stakes in the region, Brezhnev admitted that 鈥淸i]n terms of morality and prestige we suffer[ed] a defeat.鈥�  That applied at home as well as abroad.  鈥淣ot every one of our workers understands why 2 million Israelis defeated so many Arabs equipped with our weapons.鈥�  There was also the cost of rebuilding the Arab armies, the question of whether they could absorb so much modern technology, and the concern over the Pact itself being dragged into a conflict. As a result, opposition to existing Middle East policies among the alliance鈥檚 military establishments and the intelligentsia grew. 

But the war also bared another source of apprehension for the Warsaw Pact: the weaknesses in its own military preparedness and capabilities.

Brezhnev alluded to this at the July 11 meeting.  Convinced that the Americans and Israelis had jointly 鈥渨orked out a plan and were sure that a sudden attack would bring them success,鈥� he stressed the urgency of improving Soviet early warning capabilities. 鈥淏oth we and the Arabs have drawn conclusions from this. At our CC Plenary meeting we once again put forward the tasks before our military forces to intensify intelligence activity, duty hours, vigilance, etc.鈥�  After the June 5 attack, fears of a reprise were genuine.

A few months later, a more dire picture of Warsaw Pact shortcomings emerged.  At its October 17, 1967, meeting, the Bulgarian Politburo had just one item on the agenda: 鈥淪tatus of the Bulgarian Armed Forces in light of events in the Middle East.鈥�  At the core of the discussion was a bleak report from Defense Minister Dobri Dzhurov that drew directly from the Arab experience.[1]

Dzhurov covered a range of topics: 鈥渢he status of intelligence, combat and mobilization readiness, training of commanders, staffs and troops, and the political and morale status, discipline and logistical support of the Bulgarian Armed Forces.鈥� The reason?  It was 鈥渟erious failures in those areas [that] caused the defeat of the Arab countries.鈥�

To the Bulgarians鈥� chagrin, grave deficiencies appeared everywhere, but surprise attack was at the heart of their concerns.  Dzhurov revealed that the intelligence services had no sources that could penetrate 鈥渢he enemy鈥檚 intentions for unexpected invasion.鈥� 鈥淭aking into account the experience of events in the Middle East,鈥� that capability would be 鈥渙f paramount importance for the defense of the country.鈥� 

Moscow and its allies assumed that Washington and Tel Aviv had coordinated closely on June 5 and that NATO would adopt essentially identical tactics on a future European battlefield.  Warsaw Pact strategists therefore worried about much more than the humiliation of their Arab friends.  They had to reckon what their own odds might be in a direct conflict with the West.

[1] An excerpt of the meeting protocol and Dzhurov鈥檚 report appears in Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991, CEU Press, 2005, pp. 245-248.