A blog of the History and Public Policy Program
On February 22, 1972, the People鈥檚 Daily printed a picture of Chairman Mao shaking hands with Richard Nixon. How could Mao pull off such a stunt after two decades of intense anti-US propaganda?
This February marks the 50th anniversary of Richard Nixon鈥檚 1972 trip to the People鈥檚 Republic of China. The visit was . Although the Americans and the Chinese wrangled over many things for seven days, not least the status of Taiwan, ruled by the Republic of China, they eventually signed the , which stated that the two countries no longer considered each other an enemy. The Cold War in East Asia was coming to a close.
An American proverb goes: 鈥淥nly Nixon could go to China.鈥 Even with the same conviction as his 鈥 鈥溾 鈥 a Democratic president might not have been able to fly to China for fear of political repercussion. A well-known anti-communist, Nixon could do so without arousing too much conservative wrath. He even won a landslide victory during the 1972 presidential race.
If Nixon鈥檚 televised announcement of his trip to China dazzled Americans, the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Mao Zedong鈥檚 invitation to 鈥渢he most reactionary person in the world鈥 baffled Chinese.[1] Beijing鈥檚 propaganda machine had instructed the masses to hate US 鈥渋mperialists鈥 for more than twenty years. On February 22, 1972, however, the People鈥檚 Daily printed a picture of Mao鈥檚 handshake with Nixon, which must have confused countless readers.
The fundamental cause for this about-face was national security. The deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in the 1960s climaxed with the border conflicts of 1969. Sensing the imminent threat of Soviet invasion, Mao decided to improve Sino-American relations as a hedge. He struck a deal with the lesser evil to fend off the greater evil.
But how could Mao pull off such a deal after two decades of intense anti-US propaganda?
Historians point to the end of the Cultural Revolution, a nationwide political campaign instigated by Mao in 1966. Red Guards 鈥 revolutionary students who devoutly followed the chairman鈥檚 orders 鈥 wreaked havoc on both urban and rural China. When Mao found the movement getting out of control, he declared its conclusion in 1969. The unwinding of Mao鈥檚 last revolution enabled the chairman to shake hands with Nixon, something unimaginable just a few years before.
The handshake, however, also marked an important continuity from the previous decade.
When the Vietnam War escalated in 1964-1965, the 鈥淩esist America, Aid Vietnam鈥 campaign engulfed China, and 鈥溾 became a mantra that could be heard anywhere. The campaign lighted the fuse of the Cultural Revolution. Posturing as apostles of Chinese revolution, Red Guards pledged to fight in Vietnam once ordered by Mao.
Paradoxical as it may sound, this enmity toward US 鈥渋mperialists鈥 coexisted with affinity for American 鈥渇riends鈥 in the Chinese mind. With the Vietnam War threatening a showdown with the United States, Beijing tried to accentuate the distinction between the 鈥渞eactionary鈥 US government and the good American people who resisted it. Americans could be 鈥渇riends鈥 if they loathed US 鈥渋mperialists鈥 as vehemently as Chinese did.
Beijing made countless 鈥渇riends鈥 with antiwar protestors. They seemed to personify the Chinese pipe dream that Americans who were 鈥渁wakened鈥 would one day topple the government in a socialist revolution. When tens of thousands of young Americans picketed in front of the White House in 1965, the People鈥檚 Daily enthused: 鈥淔acts opened the eyes of the American people, making them realize鈥 that US monopoly capital and the US government serving it are the real enemies of the American people.鈥[2]
More explicitly 鈥渇riendly鈥 to China were militant African American civil rights activists who adopted Mao鈥檚 teachings in their armed resistance against white supremacists. Robert F. Williams, author of Negros with Guns, for example, lived in exile in Beijing between 1966 and 1969, publishing his newsletter The Crusader and extolling liberation struggles around the world, led by China. Inspired by Williams, members of the Black Panther Party waved Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong, or 鈥,鈥 near the University of California, Berkeley.
When Beijing began to allow more Americans into its territory at the beginning of the 1970s, it prioritized left-leaning individuals who could easily be 鈥渇riends.鈥 The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS), consisting of young scholars of Asian studies who criticized the academia鈥檚 reticence about US 鈥渋mperialism鈥 in Vietnam, was one of the first groups to be regaled in China. Their book, , documented life under Chinese socialism in positive light.
When the CCAS delegation visited the city of Tangshan in Hebei Province, the Chinese hosts held a banquet for the American guests. What stood out among many Chinese dishes was a special cake, with icing spelling out four Chinese characters: 鈥渄a dao Mei di,鈥 or 鈥淒own with US imperialism.鈥 Chinese 鈥渇riendship鈥 was glowing on the table.
This friendship, though largely imagined, warranted expanding contacts with Americans. At the 1971 Table Tennis World Championship in Nagoya, Japan, Beijing extended a surprise invitation to the American team for a tour of China, which was covered extensively by US media. 鈥溾 was a stunning success, which not only paved the way for Nixon鈥檚 trip, but also caused a sensation around the world. The Chinese were convinced that similar initiatives would further 鈥渕obilize the American masses.鈥[3]
Mao鈥檚 handshake with Nixon, therefore, did not take place in a historical vacuum. In Beijing鈥檚 logic, the handshake was a victory, not a defeat. It was not imposed by the Soviet threat as widely analyzed in the United States, but achieved by the 鈥渇riendship鈥 between Chinese and Americans who fought US 鈥渋mperialists鈥 together for many years. The gradual expansion of people-to-people exchanges that soon followed seemed like a natural extension of this trend.
If Nixon was welcome in China, so was anyone. Beijing even invited Americans they deemed 鈥渞ightists,鈥 including lawmakers, journalists, and business executives, vowing to turn as many of them as possible into 鈥渇riends.鈥 As it turned out, however, incessant propaganda alienated rather than impressed most of them. It was only after Mao鈥檚 death in 1976 that the Chinese, officials and non-officials, redefined 鈥渇riends鈥 as those willing to assist China鈥檚 modernization.
Nixon鈥檚 trip to China ushered in a new era, in which 鈥溾 鈥 now under heavy criticisms 鈥 guided US policy toward China. But the terms of the new bilateral relationship were disputed from the beginning because the Americans and the Chinese viewed the rapprochement differently. To unravel the origins of the problems facing US-China relations today, we need to understand why Mao shook hands with Nixon fifty years ago.
[1] Edgar Snow, 鈥淎 Conversation with Mao Tse-Tung,鈥 Life, April 30, 1971, 46-48.
[2] Commentary, 鈥淢eiguo renmin xingdong qilai le [The American people has swung into action],鈥 People鈥檚 Daily, April 19, 1965, p. 4.
[3] 鈥淶hongyang zhengzhi ju guanyu ZhongMei huitan de baogao [CCP Politburo鈥檚 report on the US-China summit],鈥 May 29, 1971, Chinese Cultural Revolution Database
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