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Today, the world appears ready for a new round of strategic diplomacy that could lead to realignments among major powers seeking to protect their interests amidst heightened international tensions. A similar period of statecraft and realignment occurred during the era of d茅tente in the 1970s, a process that followed a period of major Cold War tensions, spanned about a decade, and involved numerous agreements, treaties, and diplomatic maneuvers.

If the major powers today, including the United States, China, and Russia, are ready for a relief of tensions and a reset of their respective relationships, comparisons with the 1970s might help. Differences from the world of the Cold War are many, but lessons from the history of past events can inform our understanding of the strategies needed today.

A Response to Crisis

More than 50 years ago the United States and the Soviet Union went through a strategic policy pivot known as d茅tente. The US was emerging from the unpopular Vietnam War and facing economic difficulties. In China, the Cultural Revolution had not officially ended, but parts of the leadership sought an end to diplomatic isolation and were ready to explore economic change. The Soviet Union was close to reaching a nuclear parity with the US but was burdened by costs that policy brought. At that point, Moscow was weary of the nuclear standoffs of the 1960s. It sought access to Western technology and was open to trade for its oil and gas to earn much needed hard currency.

All three powers had strong internal reasons for seeking to ease tensions and move beyond the darkest moments of the Cold War. President Richard Nixon鈥檚 administration saw an opportunity in this and noticed a deepening rift between the two communist powers, the Soviet Union and China, which Washington could exploit.

Moscow and Beijing parted ways during the 1950s because Mao Zedong considered Nikita Khrushchev鈥檚 denunciation of Stalinism a betrayal of Marxism-Leninism. After World War II, the Soviet Union and China had built one of the closest alliances possible, effectively forming a political and military bloc. However, ideological disagreements escalated into open hostility, leading to  between the USSR and China and even threats of nuclear confrontation.

Since the early 1970s, the US managed to establish and maintain two separate tracks for relations with the Soviet Union and China. This approach cooled tensions with the former and paved the way for the latter鈥檚 economic miracle. The global communist system effectively became a house divided against itself. China came to rely on the West for trade and technology, which turned out to be a historic asset for China but a fatal liability for the international communist system, as history witnessed in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

This period also brought the Helsinki process to its conclusion with the Helsinki Final Act. The negotiations secured international recognition for the territories the Soviets gained after WWII, but it also required the Soviet Union to commit to observing basic human rights. These commitments went unfulfilled, ultimately  the Soviet government's legitimacy in the eyes of its own citizens. The d茅tente of the 1970s thus played a crucial role in setting the stage for the end of the Cold War and ensuring the West鈥檚 economic and political success in the following decades.

As a result, both Russia and China have learned a valuable lesson. Had it not been for the Sino-Soviet split, the two powers would not have found themselves in mutual confrontation, nor would they have faced the West individually, each fighting both the Cold War and each other. Neither side wishes to repeat that mistake, regardless of the immediate political or economic changes occurring in each country.

Lessons from the Helsinki Process

Whenever China or Russia discusses potential external challenges, they immediately mention the other. For instance, China's foreign minister Wang Yi, while addressing recent US pressure and the broader international landscape,  China's "resilient" ties with Russia. He also warned the United States that Beijing would resolutely respond to any attempts by Washington to contain Chinese development. Similarly, after his second inauguration, when Trump criticized Putin for "destroying Russia" through his war against Ukraine and threatened sanctions, Putin highlighted a recent phone conversation with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Putin noted that Sino-Russian relations were stronger than ever, based on "friendship, mutual trust, and support," despite external pressures.

All of this suggests that Moscow and Beijing value their relationship as a strategic asset and would not relinquish it easily. However, some comments imply that driving a wedge between Russia and China might be a strategic goal of the Trump administration's apparent rapprochement with the Kremlin.

The Nixon administration's decision to engage China and bring it out of isolation 50 years ago was not an isolated event. Instead, it was part of a broader policy framework that included d茅tente. This framework encompassed the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the Helsinki process, the US-Soviet space cooperation, Nixon's 1972 visits to Beijing and Moscow as well as Leonid Brezhnev鈥檚 later visit to Washington, agreements between East and West Germany, and several other agreements and negotiations.

There are many similarities with today, but many differences as well. Today's US and Russia are weakened by their involvement in wars, and there are realities on the ground that Moscow dreams of recognizing. More importantly, China and Russia have switched places. China is now the 鈥渟econd pole,鈥� a role that the USSR played in the early 1970s. Washington may indeed be ready to bring Russia out of diplomatic isolation, even return its president to a renewed G8 in exchange for a cooling in relations with Beijing鈥攂ut Russia really needs to be a part of a broader frameworks of deals.

D茅tente ultimately proved successful, although not immediately, because it established a new paradigm of engagement among the major powers of the time. It did not merely exploit differences between the Soviets and China鈥攊t reinforced other US strengths, including diplomatic and economic. Today, the question is whether Washington can identify opportunities for mutually beneficial realignments that would help break those ties that it views as harmful.

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.