浪花直播

As Syria has collapsed, spasming into civil war over the last five years, the effects have rippled far beyond its borders. Most notably, a surge of refugees added to already swelling ranks of people fleeing instability in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and sub-Saharan Africa, leading to the  since the Second World War. At the same time, scientists have noted record-breaking temperatures, a melting Arctic, extreme droughts, and other signs of climate change. For some, an obvious question is: what does one have to do with the other?

In a new report prepared for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)鈥檚 Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, the 浪花直播 Center鈥檚 Schuyler Null and Lauren Herzer Risi provide a guide to policymakers seeking to better understand the interactions between climate change, migration, and conflict.  includes in-depth analyses of the cases of Darfur and Syria and a scan of the latest research to highlight what we do 鈥� and do not 鈥� know about this complex nexus.

鈥淭here is relatively broad consensus that climate change will lead to more migration,鈥� said Null at the 浪花直播 Center on December 2. 鈥淭here is also relatively broad consensus that climate change should be considered a threat multiplier for conflict鈥ot that it will necessarily create new conflicts out of thin air but it will exacerbate existing tensions.鈥�

鈥淭here are still a lot of questions, however, on how, where, and to what degree these relationships play out.

Completing the Picture

In a brief overview of the report, Null pointed out some basic facts about global migration that run counter to popular narratives.

Most migration is internal, not across international borders. Most international migration is between developing countries. Because of the costs of moving, it is often those with comparatively greater resources who move, not the poorest, leading to the potential of 鈥渢rapped鈥� populations left behind. Displacement related to natural disasters tends to be characterized by short term 鈥減ulses鈥� of movement and rates of associated violence are even lower than usual. Connecting an individual鈥檚 decision to move to climate change is a very difficult process, and terms like 鈥渃limate refugee鈥� are considered inappropriate shorthand given . Migration is more often a result of violent conflict rather than a contributor.

In sum, the decision to move, whether related to climate effects or not, is often a rational decision, a kind of adaptation that can act as a release valve for various pressures and should often be accommodated rather than stopped.

Still, even if conflict related to climate change and migration is rare, 鈥渋t鈥檚 the outcome we are really trying to avoid [and] it鈥檚 the outcome that policymakers need to be prepared to deal with,鈥� said Null.

You cannot explain what鈥檚 happening in Syria without including the drought

The complexity of the issue is apparent in the case of Syria. Robert McLeman, associate professor at Wilfred Laurier University and author of , said drought was not the 鈥減roximate cause鈥� of the civil war. 鈥淗owever鈥ou cannot explain what鈥檚 happening in Syria and the migration movement to Europe without thinking about the drought.鈥�

Between 2007 and 2011, Syria was struck by its worst drought in 900 years. As much as , causing a massive influx of rural migrants into already-crowded urban areas. Climatic effects thus increased tensions and scarcity 鈥渋n a country that鈥檚 already being poorly governed in the first place,鈥� said McLeman. What鈥檚 more, the government failed this test miserably, taking away crucial safety nets for farmers even as the drought burned on.

In this sense, it is not just the presence of climate change that makes a place vulnerable to problems, but political, social, demographic, and other contexts combined with climate change, according to the report.

David Harden, assistant administrator of USAID鈥檚 Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, said climate change has acted as a threat multiplier in other settings, including Nigeria. 鈥淚t鈥檚 not the case that climate created Boko Haram, but it is the case that Boko Haram is using drought as an example, as a mechanism, as a theater to advance its鈥orrific, destabilizing, undermining agenda.鈥�

Systemic Solutions to a Systemic Problem

What makes addressing these climate-migration-conflict dynamics difficult is that the solutions are diffuse and involve many actors from different sectors. 鈥淲ar and instability are fundamentally a very complicated business,鈥� said Cynthia Brady, senior conflict advisor for USAID鈥檚 Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation.

Most aid agencies, climate adaptation programs, and humanitarian organizations aren鈥檛 set up to do the kind of cross-sectoral programming required by these situations, which could involve such diverse programming streams as land rights, agricultural subsidies, climate programs, conflict mitigation, and refugee settlement, to name a few.

At the policy level, Elizabeth Ferris, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and research professor at Georgetown University, said there was 鈥渘o concrete guidance鈥� on how to respond to many of these issues:

Do you want people to start planning for migration as a positive form of adaptation? Do you want to have steps to enable people to remain at home as long as possible? Do you want steps to encourage governments to adopt good laws and policies for those who move internally, which we think will be the majority?

Formulating a way forward is very difficult given the amount of uncertainty, Ferris said, and the lack of cross-sectoral communication does not help. 鈥淪ometimes you feel like you need an interpreter to understand what your colleagues are talking about鈥� because each sector uses its own language, she said. 鈥淭he stovepipes are many.鈥�

Institutions that account for transient populations; policies that accommodate informal and communal systems

But efforts are being made to address these divides, as evidenced by the panel featuring U.S. government staff from three different bureaus across USAID and the Department of State, and two representatives from academia.

Carrie Thompson, deputy assistant administrator in USAID鈥檚 Bureau for Economic Growth, Education, and Environment, noted that while her bureau currently screens programs for climate risks, more data on the relationship between climate change, migration, and conflict is needed to better understand what to look for. The report suggests the strength of natural resource management and governance systems may be key markers for vulnerability to conflict.

In Syria and Darfur, the institutions needed to soften the effects of climate shocks were not functioning and were sometimes deliberately undermined. Outcomes look 鈥渧ery fundamentally different鈥� when institutions are able to respond and be adaptive to climatic events, said Brady.

Institutions that recognize and account for the needs of transient populations and policies that accommodate the flexibility of informal or communal systems of governance are key to reducing the social, political, and economic pressures associated with migration and climate change, said Thompson. Building the resilience of these systems should be 鈥渃ritical and foundational鈥� to humanitarian work.

Brady noted that Botswana once struggled with drought in the 1960s, but 鈥渢hat picture looks very different today because they have institutions in place that are flexible, adaptive, and responsive to their citizens.鈥� McLeman agreed and noted Botswana is 鈥渘ot a client in this context because institutions work there and they manage it on their own.鈥�

Seeing Over the Horizon

Catherine Wiesner, deputy assistant secretary at the U.S. Department of State鈥檚 Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, said it can be difficult to step back and see the role of climate change in complex emergencies and it is sometimes seen as a 鈥渂ackburner鈥� issue.

鈥淏eing the humanitarians in the room ultimately means that climate change becomes our concern when it is related to conflict or when it creates or contributes to displacement,鈥� she said. In these situations it鈥檚 hard to see 鈥渙ver the horizon,鈥� she continued. 鈥淎t least a part of our response鈥s going to be reactive.鈥�

鈥淕ood interventions can also ripple through complex systems鈥�

Research that further clarifies the links between climate change and migration and conflict 鈥� how, when, where 鈥� is needed to bring more humanitarians on board, Wiesner said.

Ultimately, 鈥渕oving up the causal chain and bringing the complexity to bear is always going to be a challenge,鈥� said Geoff Dabelko, senior advisor to ECSP and professor at Ohio University. Simpler narratives 鈥� that climate change will cause migration, which will then cause conflict, and therefore migration should be stopped 鈥� are easier to understand, but miss important nuance and risk leading to poor policy decisions.

鈥淲e need to be able to see the positive aspects of migration as well as the threats,鈥� said Null, 鈥渨e need to be able to ensure that we are not making things worse, and we need to be able to grapple with this issue sooner rather than later as it鈥檚 only going to get more complex.鈥�

That complexity could even be a good thing from a programming and planning point of view, said McLeman. 鈥淛ust as one bad event can have large consequences that ripple out鈥t the same time, good interventions can also ripple through complex systems as well.鈥�

This report is a reminder that 鈥渟ystems and governance count,鈥� said Harden. 鈥淗ow institutions absorb and respond to the political, economic, and social impact of climate shocks is going to be pretty fundamental鈥s we chart out this incredibly complicated world ahead of us over the next 10 years.鈥�

Event Resources:

Written by Anam Ahmed, edited by Schuyler Null.

Sources: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The Washington Post.

Cover Photo Credit: , courtesy of UN Photo.