浪花直播

From Sea Denial to Nuclear Deterrence

India鈥檚 Quest for a Nuclear Submarine

In July 2009, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh unveiled India鈥檚 first nuclear submarine, INS Arihant, catapulting India into a select group of countries possessing naval nuclear prolusion technology. Contemporary commentaries and popular historical narratives often assign the desire for a nuclear deterrent to the entire history of India鈥檚 submarine program. Instead, scholar Yogesh Joshi argues that the 础谤颈丑补苍迟鈥檚 historical trajectory contradicts any such retrospective reasoning鈥攖he program appears evolutionary and the rationale, shifting.

India鈥檚 quest for a nuclear submarine began with an interest in nuclear propulsion as a 鈥渢echnology of future鈥� in late 1960s, but the strategic rationale soon shifted to 鈥渟ea denial鈥� against extra-regional powers operating in the Indian Ocean. Joshi will argue that until the end of the 1970s, there is no evidence available that India was planning to develop its submarine program into a platform for its nuclear weapons. While India鈥檚 submarine program gained speed during the 1980s with help from the Soviet Union, the program was configured around the Soviet Charlie-II class submarine, an attack submarine. Moreover, the collapse of the USSR meant that the promise of Soviet technological assistance never materialized in full.

Joshi will argue that the program鈥檚 shift towards ballistic missile submarines began after the nuclear tests of 1998, but his research also suggest that the strategic inertia of 鈥渟ea denial鈥� continued to have heavy influence on the program, as seen through India鈥檚 official pronouncements and internal documents. Using declassified materials from the British, Indian, US, and Russian archives, interviews with key decision-makers, and open sources, this seminar will explore the process through which 鈥渟ea based nuclear deterrence鈥� became a part of India鈥檚 strategic calculus.