Jim Bridenstine, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
鈥淲hen we talk about national power, a lot of people think about military power. When you go through joint professional military education, the 鈥楳鈥 in 鈥楧IME鈥 comes out a lot (DIME is an acronym that outlines the elements of national power: diplomatic power (D); information power (I); military power (M); economic power (E)). Where NASA does not play: we don鈥檛 play on that military side, we are not a defense organization, we鈥檙e not tasked with fighting and winning wars in space. But I鈥檒l tell you we benefit from security in space. Space is becoming very competitive and very congested and we need to make sure that we as a nation are leading the world in a process whereby space can be preserved for generations to come and NASA plays an important role there.鈥
鈥淭he goal is as we work on the International Space Station day in and day out, we鈥檙e making an effort to commercialize all of these capabilities so that the private sector will capitalize and move forward and NASA can again be a customer and have numerous providers that compete on cost and innovation. The goal here is sustainability [鈥. The goal here is a robust public-private partnership so that NASA can use its resources to go places where there isn鈥檛 yet a commercial marketplace, namely the moon, but always seeking to retire the risk so that commercial will eventually take that over.鈥
鈥淚f we find life on another world, it鈥檚 going to fundamentally transform how we think about exploration going forward [...]. On the moon, we鈥檝e found hundreds of millions of tons of water-ice which is life support, it鈥檚 air to breathe, it鈥檚 water to drink, it鈥檚 rocket fuel, but the other thing is the moon is a scientific capability unlike any other [...]. From an astrophysics perspective, it's tremendously valuable. From a solar system perspective[...], the moon is a repository of data and science information of the early solar system. It鈥檚 also the launching point to get to Mars so all of that is necessary from our eventual Mars mission."
鈥淲e're going to the Moon, this time sustainably. We're going to stay at the Moon. We're going to learn how to live and work for long periods of time, we're going to have the ability to use the resources of the moon鈥撯 hundreds of millions of tons of water ice, which represents air to breathe and water to drink, and hydrogen, H2O, that's hydrogen鈥 Hydrogen is rocket fuel, it's available in hundreds of millions of tons on the surface of the moon... We take all of that knowledge and we're going to go to Mars. Now Mars is... that's the horizon goal and the whole world wants to go to Mars. In fact, the whole world wants to go to the moon. Another area where we see so much diplomatic engagement: we had a meeting the other day, invited countries that wanted to be part of the Artemis Program, and we had 26 nations show up. A good chunk of those nations don't even have space programs but they want to be part of Artemis. They want to see the first woman on the moon and they want to be able to say they were a part of it -- another amazing tool of diplomacy. But we go from the Moon to Mars. This is American leadership at its finest.鈥
Panel 1
Jamie M. Morin, Executive Director of the Center for Space Policy and Strategy, The Aerospace Corporation
鈥淭here's an enormous amount of activity going on in space right now. And we hear a lot about the challenges and the threats but it's also important to note this is a moment of immense opportunity鈥 In the last decade, I think U.S. commercial companies have made enormous progress as part of a burgeoning space industry around the world, but there are real challenges and I tend to loop them into a set of three broad observations that relate to the classic 鈥淐鈥檚鈥 that we hear about space. So we see space is increasingly crowded, we see it as contested or conflictual, we also see it as increasingly democratized and that's the one I would focus in on here, because the number of actors that are playing in space and the basis from which they operate is dramatically different than where we were in the Cold War. It's not just a U.S. and Soviet Union world. It鈥檚 not just a world dominated by governments, even though our overarching governance for space still requires national authorization for private space activity. But that democratization, the fact that there are many more nations playing and there are sub-national actors of real influence means we cannot solve the problems of sustainability and security in space unilaterally or just by signing policy documents. We need, as the U.S., we need to lead collaboratively and construct a set of norms that will help us succeed in the long run in space.鈥
鈥淚n a moment of change, how do we address the challenges coming from China? The challenges coming from Russia? The challenges coming to U.S scientific and economic leadership, as well as military leadership from this dramatic democratization of the domain and the new players? And above all, how do we harness this moment of opportunity, because we've got extraordinary bases of national power.鈥
鈥淭he military and civilian leaders who were charged with setting up the space force... I think it's fair to say they went into the congressional debate on the creation of a new military service assuming that they would be asked to stand something up on the order of 18 months or two years lead time before they were required to kind of function in the Pentagon environment as an independent military service. That's not what the law in the end said. The law in the end said essentially, effective immediately, and so the analogy, if you remember the old ad, of the guys building a plane in mid-flight鈥撯 that is absolutely what they were asked to do. And they were also directed to do it without any additional resources, without increasing the manning of the organizations and with a pretty modest initial stand-up budget. So this is a tough challenge.鈥
鈥We should not lose sight that norm development is not a one way street and probably the biggest current norm that is taken so much for granted that it's almost invisible to us is that even military and intelligence reconnaisance satellites are allowed to do what prior to the space age, we would have called 鈥渙verflying another nation's territory.鈥 The Outer Space Treaty and understandings of what it meant evolved over the time of superpower practice. And we now have treaty agreements separately with the Russians that protect that overflight right for what we euphemistically call national technical means. But that norm, that understanding, actually doesn't have to exist forever. It's possible that some of the developments that are going on and some of the military discussions about weapons in space to include concepts of weapons that could produce effects on earth from space (that seem today almost like science fiction), but are being discussed in military journals and so forth. Is the U.S. prepared to accept a world in which other nations can field orbital weapons that could produce effects on the earth and potentially kinetic effects on the earth, then that they will overfly U.S. territory every day, multiple times? Those are hard discussions.鈥
Jessica West, Senior Researcher, Project Ploughshares
鈥淥bviously, the mantra of the Space Force is focused on warfighting in space and having a warfighting mission. But to me, I think that the threat environment is much wider and from an international perspective, a global peace perspective, I think we face a situation where there are a number of states who are actively preparing for the potential of conflict in space. But we don't have a good basis of knowledge for understanding what that looks like and for understanding how can we make that compatible with all of the wonderful things that Jim Bridenstine just told us about that are happening in space. How do we do warfighting in space, but also create an environment that is sustainable and stable for commercial operators and scientific operators and peaceful exploration? How do we contain conflict from escalating to the point where we cause damage to the environment or where we cause damage to other operators in space?鈥
鈥淚n some ways, there's a lot going on and in some ways there's not a lot going on. Do we need a new Outer Space Treaty at the current moment? I mean, I don't think so. I'm currently doing a lot of research to unpack the existing legal and normative landscape in outer space鈥 What's reassuring is that we have a lot of rules in space. We have fairly clear international principles in space with a coherent agreement around those and we have some room to grow in space. So I think we have a pretty good basis for going forward. But we're stuck and we've been stuck for a long time. International diplomacy on this file has really been stuck for decades. So how do we move forward beyond this moment? I think we need to have new and different conversations and that includes collaboration. So when I said there's a lot happening and not a lot happening, I think there is activity happening at a bilateral level and certainly the military to military level between the United States and core allies on space on making sure that there's cooperation and starting to think through what this warfighting mandate might look like. We don't see a lot of activity happening is more broadly across, say, non-allies or possible competitors in space. And it's really important to start having that conversation about what does the future look like and how do we make it simple? What do we want to see happening in space? What do we absolutely not what you see happening in space? What makes us really uncomfortable and might trigger unintended reactions or escalation in space?鈥
鈥淭here is a new initiative being pursued by the United Kingdom this year, at the United Nation鈥檚 First Committee. This is exactly that kind of conversation that they're trying to have. They're trying to have a broad, open, bottom up conversation about what makes us feel unsafe in space and I think it's a great place to start. I'm hoping a lot of states contribute to it and get faith and really try to have a frank conversation鈥 my concern is that it will degenerate into finger pointing. My experiences at the United Nations the last couple years have been interesting鈥撯 there's been a bit of an erosion of diplomacy, it's been dominated by a lot of back and forth accusations and finger pointing between a few key states and I鈥檓 hoping that an initiative this year to have a really frank conversation can maybe move us beyond that point and start thinking about, you know, common security and how to stabilize the situation.鈥
鈥淲e're certainly seeing the beginnings of a space, I would say a global arms race, in which space plays a key role. So thinking a bit more broadly than space, when we're talking about arms racing and arms escalation. Obviously, arms control is my file and it's a hard file, arms control is not a topic that is popular these days. I really hope for a revival. We provide deterrence as a key strategy and I think it's time that we start reviving concepts of arms control as a security measure, rather than arms control as a concession as well. It's something we can use to identify and prevent the worst types of activities from happening. How do we do it? I would say how we've been doing it hasn't been working, we've really gotten nowhere. Some of the problems that are highlighted with space arms control are the difficulty of identifying what a weapon in space would be or use of a weapon would be and verification鈥 I think these are challenges that really pervade all arms control discussions.鈥
Brian Weeden, Director of Program Planning, Secure World Foundation
鈥淭here's a lot of research and development going on, there's even some operational testing going on and so there's quite a bit of concern that, as these capabilities get developed and as they come out and sort of become more operational, are they going to be used in a future conflict? 鈥 You know some of these weapons, particularly the more destructive ones鈥撯 we've already seen them be used in the testing. I'm thinking back to the 2007 Chinese antisatellite test that created a whole lot of orbital debris. That has presented a challenge for all space actors for the last decade since the test and will for the future. So if there is a future conflict, and someone is going to use these capabilities, that could have huge challenges for everyone.鈥
鈥淭he question going forward is how many more countries are going to decide that they need to join in this competition and develop their own capabilities and then what does that mean for the proliferation of these technologies and capabilities around the world?鈥
"I think thankfully, most of what happens in space is not a partisan political issue or at least it has not been in the past. So again, I鈥檒l just summarize by saying I think there's good reason to think that at least the substance of what has happened last few years will continue under whatever happens to be the next administration.鈥
Panel 2
Kendra Horn, Congresswoman (D-OK 5th District); Chairwoman, House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
鈥淭he question that we need to ask ourselves is what鈥檚 the right combination? What鈥檚 the right balance to preserve our leadership in space and continue development in our national interest and scientific advancement discovery and also encourage a burgeoning commercial market? What we know from the history of the U.S. civil space program is that commercial entities, commercial businesses, and contractors have been a critical part of this whole process working with NASA but it鈥檚 really been our national interest of investing in our space program that allowed some of those commercial discoveries to come out as a result of the investment that we as a nation made in space and exploration. It has had amazing benefits and we鈥檝e seen this commercial marketplace change the way that we live and interact in the world and I think there are many benefits to that [...]. It鈥檚 really what鈥檚 that balance and what is actually commercial versus what is government contracted, led, and directed.鈥
鈥淲e need to continue to develop our inherent capabilities and our industrial base and encourage more providers but something that is in the nation鈥檚 interests whether its national security or its exploration and discovery and science, what should be inherently governmental? Those are the questions that I really think that we have to wrestle with, and I think there is still space. I think it鈥檚 sometimes framed as a commercial versus government but that鈥檚 not the way I see it [...]. To me, it鈥檚 about finding the right balance and asking different questions rather than assuming something is commercial or governmental. It鈥檚: what is that correct balance?鈥
鈥淥ne of the reasons that we find ourselves here is because of stops and starts and changes in direction between different administrations, changes in how we鈥檙e approaching things. That鈥檚 one of the reasons that we need a long-term plan and policy that spans administrations and congresses because space is inherently difficult. To go back to the moon (I know we鈥檝e been there), it鈥檚 with a new generation of scientists and engineers and a workforce that wasn鈥檛 there 50 years ago. Building that capability is a new pathway and it鈥檚 inherently difficult. We need consistent guidance, and the stops and starts are part of the problem.鈥
Therese Jones, Senior Director of Policy, Satellite Industry Association
鈥淭he question about whether there will be rules implemented right away is another issue. I think that there are a lot of industry players and government working to come up with best practices. But one of the major domains where we鈥檙e really lacking right now (and the Office of Space Commerce has already sort of stepped in) is on the data side in creating some sort of 鈥榦pen architecture鈥 data repository where you鈥檙e getting better data not just from the U.S. government on where these objects are in space but also being able to input things like plan maneuvers of your satellites and getting better data even from commercial operators and fusing this data. Right now, there鈥檚 not much transparency coming out of the data from DOD [...] and that鈥檚 caused communication issues in terms of should someone maneuver, should they not? That's where a lot of cooperation needs to happen before we can really get strict space traffic management rules.鈥
鈥淚 think [the recommendation of buy what you can, build what you must] has become more and more integrated into the DOD and intelligence community thinking where they recognize that all of these wonderful commercial capabilities are coming online and that they should really try to figure out how to utilize them better, not just technologically speaking (in terms of having capabilities at cheaper costs than they might get otherwise in the military) but also from a resiliency perspective and having a diversity of assets on orbit that they can rely on should any of the government assets be attacked.鈥
