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**The Warsaw Pact and Nuclear
Nonproliferation**

1963-1965

by

Douglas Selvage

Working Paper No. 32

**THE COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT
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During the Cold War, political scientists engaged in a debate about the nature of the Warsaw Pact. Although they agreed that it was not an “alliance” in the traditional sense of the term—i.e., a free association of sovereign states whose members were free to leave at will—some considered it to be a mere transmission belt for communicating Moscow’s foreign policy directives to the European socialist states.¹ Other analysts, pointing to signs of increased autonomy in the 1960s, especially on the part of Romania, argued that the Warsaw Pact was on the path to becoming a true alliance and its members “junior allies” (Zbigniew Brzezinski) of the Soviet Union.²

At the time, the unavailability of sources meant that analysts were forced to use foreign-policy deviance as the only yardstick for measuring autonomous behavior on the part of the socialist states. This led to a near-exclusive focus on the “obviously deviant” case in foreign policy—i.e., Romania. Such a focus, as Edwina Moreton pointed out, ignored the possibility that some of the socialist states might have had shared interests with the Soviet Union on certain foreign-policy issues (e.g., Poland and the GDR on German policy); that they might have been able to influence Soviet policy through bargaining and negotiations within the Eastern alliance; or that events or policy concerns of the socialist states might have had a general modifying influence on Moscow’s actions.³

Newly available evidence from the archives of East Central Europe has made it possible to go beyond the “obviously deviant” case and examine the actions of more orthodox members of the Warsaw Pact during the 1960s. This paper will examine the attitudes of three Warsaw Pact states [Romania, the People’s Republic of Poland, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR)] with regard to U.S.-Soviet negotiations on a nuclear nonproliferation treaty during the mid-1960s. Influenced by their own, independently-defined interests with regard to nuclear nonproliferation, Poland and the GDR opposed West German access to nuclear weapons in any form, including access through NATO’s planned multilateral nuclear force (MLF). In contrast, Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev seemed willing in his last year in power 1963-64, that would willingly concede West German access to nuclear weapons through NATO as the price for a

² Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, 2nd Revised and Enlarged Ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 433; J.F. Brown, “Relations Between the Soviet Union and Its Eastern European Allies: A Survey,” *Rand Report R-1742-PR* (November 1975), 11-12; Robin Alison Remington, *The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution* (Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press, 1971), 6, 8; David Holloway, “The Warsaw Pact in Transition,” in Holloway and Sharp, *The Warsaw Pact*, 19.

³ Moreton, “Foreign Policy Goals,” 146-47. On the “obviously deviant case,” see Gitelman, “Toward a Comparative Foreign Policy,” 144.

The initial signs of deviation by Khrushchev on German policy, however, did not involve the Polish border, but the question of West German access to nuclear weapons—a key issue for the Polish communists. Since the late 1950s, Warsaw had been leading the struggle “to keep the German finger off the nuclear trigger.” In 1957, it had announced with the “Rapacki Plan”: a proposal for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, including the two German states, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The initiative had provoked a great deal of debate in the West, but it had failed to prevent NATO from stationing tactical nuclear weapons in the FRG.⁵ By 1963, the U.S. was planning to allow its NATO allies, including Bonn, joint control over a few strategic nuclear weapons as part of a so-called “multilateral force,” or MLF. The goal of the project was to reassure Washington’s allies that its “nuclear umbrella” remained intact, despite Soviet advances in nuclear weaponry.⁶ The West Germans, forbidden by the Paris Treaties from developing their own nuclear capability, strongly supported the MLF. They feared becoming a second-class member of NATO at a time when Great Britain and France had their own nuclear forces.⁷ Not surprisingly, the Warsaw Pact—especially Poland and the GDR—immediately denounced NATO’s plans and Bonn’s conspicuous role in them.

It was against this backdrop that Gomułka received a memorandum from the Soviet foreign ministry at the beginning of October 1963 about Moscow’s ongoing talks with the U.S. over a nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Moscow, he was shocked to learn, intended to drop its demand that the treaty include a clause prohibiting the establishment of joint nuclear forces. The Soviets were willing to settle for a mere commitment from the United States—in the treaty or elsewhere—not to allow nuclear weapons to come under the FRG’s direct command. Such a compromise, the memorandum read, would still serve the Warsaw Pact’s larger goal of denying Bonn access to nuclear weapons.⁸ Clearly rattled, Gomułka did not agree that Moscow’s plans conformed to the common “line of the socialist community in the international arena.”⁹ The proposed concession, he feared, would lead the West to conclude that the Warsaw Pact was no longer opposed to the MLF. Gomułka also worried about the nonproliferation treaty’s impact upon Sino-Soviet relations; he opposed Khrushchev’s increasingly confrontational stance towards the Chinese. Beijing’s reaction to the limited test ban suggested that a nonproliferation

⁵ On the Rapacki Plan, see Piotr Wandycz, “Adam Rapacki and the Search for European Security,” in *The Diplomats, 1939-1979*, ed. Gordon A. Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

⁶ Glenn T. Seaborg, *Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years* (Lexington, MA: Lexington

treaty would lead to a final breach between Moscow and Beijing.¹⁰ If the Soviets signed a treaty that did not prohibit the MLF, it would confirm that they were more interested in forestalling a Chinese nuclear capability than in preventing West German “access” to nuclear weapons.¹¹

As soon as he received Moscow’s memorandum, Gomułka sprang into action. He called an emergency politburo meeting and obtained unanimous support for his stance that any nonproliferation treaty should prohibit joint nuclear forces. Immediately thereafter, he phoned Khrushchev and asked the Soviet leader to convene a Warsaw Pact meeting to discuss the apparent shift in Moscow’s nonproliferation policy. In the meantime, Gomułka said, he would submit a letter to Khrushchev explaining his objections.¹² When Khrushchev demanded to know the letter's contents, Gomułka replied that it had to do with the Chinese and German questions. Khrushchev snapped: Send it to the Chinese. Gomułka responded: It would not be pleasant for Moscow if such a letter ended up in Beijing. In the second week of October 1963, the Soviet leader reluctantly received an emissary with Gomułka’s letter.¹³

Gomułka’s letter, dated 8 October 1963, consisted of two parts. First, the Polish leader warned Khrushchev that a failure to prohibit joint nuclear forces in a nonproliferation agreement would be a “unilateral concession” to the West with grave political consequences for the entire Warsaw Pact. The U.S. and West Germany, he wrote, were the only NATO members who truly supported the MLF. While the U.S. considered it a tool for preserving its hegemony in Western Europe, the FRG saw in it a tool for carrying out its “revanchist policies.” If Moscow conceded

Gomułka was appalled by what he read. In the margins of the memo he wrote: “Who is Kennedy trying to fool -- Bonn or us?” Despite Poland’s opposition, he concluded Gromyko had been willing to sign a nonproliferation treaty with the U.S. that did not explicitly ban joint nuclear forces.¹⁸ Although the Americans had rejected the offer, for now¹⁹ what would happen to Warsaw’s concerns if they revisited Gromyko’s proposal at a later date?

At the beginning of January 1964, Gomułka and Khrushchev met in secret in eastern Poland to air their differences.²⁰ The meeting ended in acrimony. First, Khrushchev seemed to accept the Americans’ argument that the MLF would prevent other Western countries, including the FRG, from developing their own nuclear weapons.²¹ Second, on the subject of China, Khrushchev told Gomułka that there was no turning back. The Chinese were already massing forces along the disputed Sino-Soviet border. If they crossed it, Khrushchev threatened to order a nuclear strike.²² Third, Khrushchev informed Gomułka that he wanted to reach a *modus vivendi* with Bonn. When Gomułka opposed the idea, an argument broke out, and Khrushchev reminded Gomułka that his hold on power was not eternal.²³ Relations between the two leaders had reached a new low. Gomułka’s suspicions seemed to be confirmed. Khrushchev was more interested in improving relations with Bonn than with Beijing.

The GDR also ex

Ulbricht and Gomułka, the East German leader insinuated that inter-German contacts—and thus recognition of the GDR—were to take priority over regional disarmament.²⁹ The Soviet Union also opposed the Gomułka Plan. In an interview with *Izvestiia*, Gromyko rejected the idea of a nuclear freeze in Europe because it would revive “the thick icy frost of cold war.”³⁰

Unlike Gomułka, East Germans did not become truly concerned about Khrushchev’s “Rapallo policy” until the end of March 1964, when the Western press reported that the Soviet leader had invited West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard to Moscow.³¹ Worried about the potential consequences of a Soviet-West German summit, Ulbricht petitioned Moscow to conclude a friendship treaty with the GDR. Such a treaty, Ulbricht wrote the Soviets, would raise the GDR’s international standing and refute Bonn’s claim that only the FRG could negotiate with Moscow on the German question.³² The Soviets approved the idea, and Ulbricht arrived in Moscow at the end of May to sign the treaty.³³

During Ulbricht’s visit, it became clear that he and Khrushchev had different interpretations of the treaty’s significance. In public statements throughout his visit, Ulbricht sought to make official talks between the two German states a precondition for any improvement in Soviet-West German relations.³⁴ On the eve of the treaty’s signing, Khrushchev disabused Ulbricht of such a notion. The friendship treaty, he explained, was “not least of all a point of departure for his normalization campaign towards West Germany [Kosthorst].” The Soviet leader listed a series of upcoming contacts between Moscow and Bonn, including a visit by his son-in-law, Alexei Adzhubei, the editor-in-chief of *Izvestiia*, to Bonn. Khrushchev was even hoping to visit Bonn himself. When Ulbricht objected to the proposed contacts, Khrushchev

²⁹ Letter, Ulbricht to Gomułka, 25 January 1964, in AAN, KC PZPR, p. 128, t. 102, pp. 9-8396ti J55>14439(GoÖ)12. b a

stood his ground. One should not avoid contacts, he lectured Ulbricht, because “avoidance means fear.”³⁵

* * *

Alexei Adzhubei, known for his drinking and talking, was an unlikely emissary.³⁶ When he traveled to Bonn in the summer of 1964, Polish and East German intelligence kept close track of his movements.³⁷ He turned out to be a fount of information. His private comments suggested that Khrushchev was willing to forego the longstanding security interests of both Poland and the GDR—including the prevention of West German access to nuclear weapons—for the sake of a *rapprochement* with Bonn.

The highlight of Adzhubei’s tour was his meeting with Chancellor Erhard on 28 July 1964. The two politicians spent most of their time discussing a potential visit by Khrushchev to Bonn and reiterating longstanding positions on the German question. Adzhubei strayed from the official Soviet line only once, when he conceded that Bonn and Moscow might discuss “humanitarian improvements” in the GDR.³⁸ Although his statement would not have pleased the East Germans, it was far from a sellout of the GDR.³⁹

More troublesome for the GDR and Poland were Adzhubei’s “private” conversations with West German elites: journalists, politicians, and businessmen. Polish and East German intelligif

trip, he was constantly warning the West Germans about the 'yellow peril.'⁴⁰ China, he declared at one point, would be Moscow's "first front" from now on. In order to have a free hand for dealing with the Chinese, Moscow was seeking a *modus vivendi*

less enthusiastic about Moscow's plans to expel China from the world communist movement. Ulbricht tried—unsuccessfully—to mediate between Moscow and Beijing, lest the Soviets be tempted again to reach an understanding with Bonn at East German expense.⁵¹

Gomułka doubted that the new leaders in the Kremlin, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Premier Alexei Kosygin, would alter Moscow's policy on nonproliferation and the MLF. In a meeting with Hungarian First Secretary János Kádár in October 1964, Gomułka complained that the Soviets in general—not just Khrushchev—were underestimating the danger posed by the establishment of joint nuclear forces in NATO. A Sov-16(y)20(dosds)-1(2du7d 2du7d 2dr76(nB4(

successful explosion of a nuclear device on 16 October 1964—two days after Khrushchev’s fall from power—obviated the need for Soviet concessions to the West on nonproliferation. The Chinese communists could no longer claim—as far as Gomułka was concerned—that a nonproliferation treaty was directed against them.⁵⁴ On 15 November, the Soviets released a declaration condemning the MLF and the conspicuous role that Bonn was playing in its development. The MLF, they admonished the West, was incompatible with a nonproliferation agreement.⁵⁵ On 7 December, Gromyko attacked the MLF from the rostrum of the UN General Assembly. Its establishment, he warned the West Germans, would further delay any possibility for German reunification.⁵⁶

For Gomułka

synonym for nuclear proliferation. It was not enough, he said, to condemn Bonn's gaining access to nuclear weapons, as the Romanians had suggested. Rather, it was also in the Warsaw Pact's interest to prevent any other NATO members from gaining access. The Chinese, he added, could not claim that a nonproliferation treaty was directed against them because they had already demonstrated their own nuclear capacity.⁶⁴ Since China's proposed ban on nuclear weapons would be difficult to realize, intermediate steps needed to be taken first.⁶⁵ There was no reason, Gomułka concluded, why the Chinese would oppose linking the MLF to the issue of nonproliferation. The Romanians however, were unimpressed with the Polish view. Comrade Maurer retorted: "You, Comrade Gomułka, have expended a great deal of energy and employed good logic to demonstrate that the Chinese comrades—and not only—they will support your point of view. It seems to me that it would be simpler just to discuss the matter with them."⁶⁶

Ulbricht was less diplomatic than Gomułka and focused on issues that were closer to home. He argued—quite predictably—that the "fundamental danger" to the Warsaw Pact was the U.S.-West German "atomic bloc;" lesser considerations, such as China, should be ignored. The Warsaw Pact could not wait, he asserted, until Bonn had access to nuclear weapons to voice its support for a nonproliferation agreement. If the passage linking the MLF to a nonproliferation agreement were stricken from the draft communiqué, Ulbricht reasoned, "this would mean that we are not against the West Germans obtaining atomic weapons." Like Gomułka, he could not see why the Chinese would oppose such a formulation. At any rate, the Warsaw Pact could not consult outside countries about every decision that it made.⁶⁷ The other First Secretaries at the meeting—Antonín Novotný of Czechoslovakia, János Kádár of Hungary, and Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria—supported the clause linking the MLF to a nonproliferation treaty, although Novotný criticized the East Germans for viewing the nonproliferation issue too narrowly (i.e., only in terms of Bonn).⁶⁸

Brezhnev, for his part, told the Romanians that the Eastern alliance could not wait to discuss the matter with China because it would lose the initiative on a nonproliferation treaty to the imperialist powers. A number of nonproliferation proposals, he noted, were already pending at the United Nations. For the Soviet Union, he said, it was a question of prestige [He accused Bucharest of merely echoing China's nonproliferation rather than taking a principled stance of its own]. Since Romania's obstruction would prevent the Warsaw Pact from preparing a common draft, Moscow could and would present its own draft nonproliferation treaty to the UN. The

⁶⁴ Ibid. Gomułka was apparently referring to the declarations from the meetings of the international communist movement in Moscow in 1957 and 1960. Brezhnev also referred to these declarations.

⁶⁵ Gomułka's statement was in keeping with Moscow's stance. On 28 December, 1963, Kosygin had responded positively to China's call for a world summit to ban the use of nuclear weapons, but he had also used the occasion to reiterate Moscow's support for measures short of a universal ban C

other socialist states, Brezhnev said, could decide on an individual basis whether to support it. Thus calling for a nonproliferation treaty that banned joint nuclear forces was dropped from the draft declaration, and the final communiqué from the meeting, published on 20 January, made only passing reference to the nonproliferation issue: “A multilateral nuclear force—no matter in what form—would be a proliferation of nuclear weapons and would mean in particular putting these weapons into the hands of the West German militarists.” The declaration diplomatically

nuclear nonproliferation with proposals that they knew would be unacceptable—viz., universal nuclear disarmament. “They (and the Chinese comrades as well),” he asserted, “are in favor of the largest number of capitalist states possessing nuclear weapons. This [they believe] will undermine the unity of the capitalist camp and weaken the hegemony of the United States.”⁷² Although Gomulka would not give up hope that Moscow and Beijing might someday resolve their differences, he would never again be as critical of Soviet policy towards China as he had been in the final year of Khrushchev’s rule.⁷³

The disputes within the Warsaw Pact over nuclear nonproliferation in the years 1963-65 demonstrate that the Sino-Soviet rift contributed to divisions within the Warsaw Pact not only through the ideological differences that it spurred, but also through its impact upon Soviet security policy. Khrushchev’s ham-fisted attempts to reach a *modus vivendi* with West Germany, in order to strengthen the Soviet position for a potential confrontation with China brought Moscow into conflict with two of its most loyal allies, Poland and the GDR. Khrushchev’s confrontational co /P <</MCID 1 >>BDC -15.1 -1pon ttte0t(-e6n)-2onfron4(onfar34d(t)-2(upom5c)-6(e)4(s

DOCUMENTS

Document 1

Memorandum (Translation from the Russian by Douglas Selvage; Gomułka's marginalia, from the Polish. AAN, KC PZPR, sygn. 2639, pp. 335-37.)

Based on these considerations, the Soviet Government has reached the conclusion that it is expedient to announce to the Americans our readiness to conclude an agreement on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons even in the case that the agreement will not contain a statement prohibiting outright the creation of multilateral nuclear forces in NATO, but either in the same declaration or in some other form, the Americans [will have to] take upon themselves the obligation not to permit a situation in which West Germany might obtain the possibility of being in charge of nuclear weapons.

We believe that an agreement on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons would still be advantageous to the socialist states even in this case because the main goal would be achieved: placing a serious obstacle in the path of the West German revanchists' accomplishing their dangerous plans to take possession of nuclear weapons. It goes without saying that the socialist states, as before, will remain opponents to the plans for establishing multilateral or in general any other sort of unified NATO nuclear forces and will continue its struggle against the establishment of these forces. As long as the West German revanchists' hands would be bound with regard to nuclear weapons by an agreement on nonproliferation, our struggles against the creation of NATO nuclear forces will be waged from a more advantageous position.

It can be expected that China and likely

Document 2

Letter, Gomulka to Khrushchev, 8 October 1963.

Dear Comrade Khrushchev!

This letter is closely related to the phone conversation we had on 2 October. At that time, I expressed a desire to meet with you personally to discuss directly the matters that were the theme of our phone conversation. In the conversation, I also asked you to consider the usefulness of convening a conference of the First Secretaries of the Central Committees of the [East European] Parties, with the possible participation of representatives of the governments of the

4) Omitting the question of NATO multilateral nuclear forces in the proposed [nonproliferation] treaty ... would be a unilateral concession on the part of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist camp to the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the other imperialist countries—a fundamental concession that would inevitably bring serious harm to the entire socialist camp.

For a number of years we have struggled against the FRG's gaining access to nuclear weapons in any form. This issue continues to be a fundamental link in our general political line towards the imperialist states. For a number of years the Bonn government has persistently strived for and publicly demanded that the *Bundeswehr* be armed with nuclear weapons. Given the situation, what would it say to the peoples of the socialist states if their governments were to sign a [nonproliferation] treaty ... that did not forbid the creation of multilateral nuclear forces in NATO, along with other forms of proliferation ...? How could we explain our signatures upon such a treaty in a situation in which the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the other NATO states are making a concrete decision on how to organize multilateral nuclear forces? How can we fight against [such forces] if we voice our silent consent to their establishment in the treaty? It is not difficult to foresee what harm such a treaty would cause for our countries and our parties, especially in the case of Poland, and to an even greater degree for the German Democratic Republic.

The idea of renouncing the treaty in the event that NATO should create multilateral nuclear forces is the worst possible way out. A treaty should not be concluded if one can see in advance that it might be quickly renounced.

Also unacceptable is the proposal of the United States—known to me from previous information—that both the NATO and the Warsaw Pact states have the right to organize multilateral nuclear forces. We cannot conclude a treaty that would stimulate and legalize the arms race; moreover, in contrast to the NATO states, multilateral nuclear forces would not bring any advantages to the Warsaw Pact countries.

5) Only the USA and the FRG are interested in [the creation of] multilateral nuclear forces in NATO. The USA sees in them a method to stave off the ... decay and collapse of NATO and to maintain and preserve its hegemony in Western Europe. The FRG, for its part, sees in multilateral nuclear forces an important instrument serving the goals of its revanchist policy—first of all, liquidation of the GDR.

Bonn understands that the unification of Germany lies in the interest of neither France nor Great Britain, and thus it cannot count on their real support in its efforts to liquidate the GDR. It can receive such support only from the USA, because the unification of Germany does not directly threaten the interests of the USA and is even in keeping with its anti-communist line.

upon the unity of the socialist camp. We must be fully aware of this fact. We must be aware of the consequences that would arise from a split in the socialist camp.

It does not change anything, nor does it excuse us—that is, the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union], the PZPR [Polish United Workers' Party] and other parties—when we say that the Communist Party of China is splitting the unity of the socialist camp. In the name of maintaining the unity of the socialist camp, we must reach an understanding with the Communist Party of China. The socialist camp numbers over one billion people. Let's not forget that for even a moment, and let's appreciate the importance of the fact that the Chinese are almost two-thirds of this population. Without the People's Republic of China, nothing can be achieved in terms of the socialist camp's international policy. We should seek a compromise and move towards the conclusion of a compromise in the debate with the Communist Party of China and the People's Republic of China.

At the root of the divisions with the Communist Party of China lies “in my opinion” the fact that the People's Republic of China was denied the possibility of participating in the making of decisions with regard to important international matters. It will never consent to this. It is too great of a state, with great future possibilities, to permit itself to be cut off from the settlement of various world problems. The United States, seeking to isolate it from international life and in keeping with its goals of struggle with the entire socialist camp, has cut it off from this up to now; it has not established diplomatic relations with it; it has closed off its entry to the United Nations Organization, has established Taiwan as its own Chinese “state,” etc.

In this situation, the People's Republic of China can insure its influence over decision making with regard to various international questions only through the socialist camp, or speaking more precisely, through the Soviet Union, from whom it demands that it consult with [China] on its political initiatives in the international arena and in its relations with the imperialist states. When it turned out that the Soviet Union did not always consider it proper to take into account the reservations of the People's Republic of China in its policy, there began to

controversial issues. We must voice our views in a positive form, without polemics with other parties, and even more without attacking other parties, whether by direct or indirect means. The likelihood exists that over time the differences will diminish or become outdated, and this will permit a return to ideological unity.

I do not believe that any attempt or form of mediation on the part of a party that does not share the CCP's ideological views will be positive for improving relations between the CPSU and CCP. It would be best if the CPSU itself would present a concrete initiative on this matter.

Dear Comrade Khrushchev,

In this letter, I have presented you with my thoughts, which have grown out of my deep

Document 3

Excerpts from discussion between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasili Kuznetsov and the SED Politburo, 14 October 1963.

... [Comrade Kuznetsov] then turned to the question of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The USA and the Soviet Union have already exchanged views on this matter for some time. In response to the pressure of the socialist countries, world public opinion, and especially a relevant resolution from the UN General Assembly, negotiations have moved forward. The USA is proceeding from its own motives on this topic. A certain role is played by

1. No transfer of nuclear weapons to other states, and also no information about their production.
2. Countries that do not yet dispose of nuclear weapons will not obtain them and will also not receive any technical data.
3. The transfer of nuclear weapons through military alliances to states that do not yet dispose of nuclear weapons is also forbidden.

In response to further exertions, the USA moved a step forwards. On 12 April 1963, they distributed a draft declaration and an aide memoire, which was given to the Warsaw Pact member-states for their information. With regard to points 1 and 2 from August 1962, the question of military alliances was added. States possessing nuclear weapons would undertake the obligation not to transfer any sort of nuclear weapons—directly or indirectly through military alliances—into the national control of states that do not dispose of such weapons, and not to give these states any assistance in the production of such nuclear weapons; states that do not possess any nuclear weapons should undertake the obligation not to produce nuclear weapons or to seek national control over any nuclear weapons—directly or indirectly through military alliances—and also not to receive or seek any assistance from other states in the production of such weapons.

This new proposal of the USA does not hinder West Germany's access to nuclear weapons. The debate in NATO itself over the creation of united nuclear weapons forces continues. Many proposals have been made that are still far away from the reality. The main goal of the Soviet Union is, to begin with, to bind West Germany's hands, to prevent it from obtaining nuclear weapons. Other capitalist countries that dispose of the economic potential to produce nuclear weapons should also have their hands bound. Smaller states must also be prevented from increasing the danger of nuclear wars.

The question for now is how should the negotiations move forward. Should one strive for an all-embracing treaty? This is probably impossible for now, because the USA has committed itself as far as possible with its proposal for united nuclear weapons forces. Should one exclude these questions from an agreement, while maintaining our position? Even if the second American variant were accepted, this would not mean that one would have to give up the struggle against the creation of united nuclear weapons forces in NATO. The possibilities for such a struggle would be even better. In this regard, Com. Kuznetsov refer2(ve)4(3(e)4(f)01d()-2(e)(n i)-2(f)3110(ggne)4(t)-2(s)

1. No transfer of nuclear weapons directly or indirectly through military alliances into the national control, including into the possession (disposal) of states that do not yet have of nuclear weapons at their disposal, and also not into the control of a military unit or individual member of the military, who belongs to the unified armed forces of the military alliance.

2. No transfer of information and no help in the production of nuclear weapons for states that do not yet possess them.

3. The states that do not possess nuclear weapons will undertake the obligation not to produce nuclear weapons; to not seek national control or possession (disposal) of nuclear weapons—either directly or indirectly through military alliances, or through the control of one of its unite or a member of its armed forces within NATO. They will undertake an obligation not to obtain or seek help, information, etc. regarding such weapons.

4. The agreement will not expire, but it will be possible to leave it.

The Soviet proposal was worked out on the basis of old Soviet proposals while taking into account the opinions of other socialist countries, especially the German Democratic Republic.... But the Soviet proposal goes farther:

1. It does not have to do with national control, but with the possession (disposal) [of nuclear weapons], which the Soviet proposal also forbids.

2. The Soviet proposal also forbids the transfer [of nuclear weapons] to individual military units or military personnel who are members of a unified military alliance.

3. The Soviet proposal more clearly defines “national control.” The U.S. proposal says nothing about a ban on transferring scientific-technical data, while the Soviet proposal forbids their transfer.

4. The American proposal does not provide for leaving [the agreement], while the Soviet proposals maintain the right to leave. In this way, the possibroposet a

to gain access to nuclear weapons. The attention of the nations of the world in this regard would increase. The argumentation of the USA—that if one does not make concessions to West Germany in this or some other form, it cannot be kept away from nuclear weapons—will be invalidated by the proposed agreement. The struggle against the creation of unified nuclear weapons units under the aegis of NATO will be easier for the socialist states to carry out and will be expanded. The agreement would also create a barrier to the transfer of data from France to West Germany. One must take into account here that West Germany declared a very great interest in de Gaulle's proposal to set up united nuclear weapons units for Western Europe.... If

Comrade Kuznetsov thanked [the SED] for the exchange of views and declared that nuclear weapons must be prevented from falling into the hands of West Germany. The analysis presented by Comrade Walter Ulbricht is clear and conforms to the thoughts of the Soviet comrades. A common standpoint exists that nothing should be left untried in preventing the creation of unified nuclear weapons units in NATO so that West Germany will not get ahold of nuclear weapons. We must move forward and continue the negotiations in order to achieve as much as possible on the basis of the Soviet proposal. He agrees that it will not be easy to achieve and that the public must be mobilized. The reports of the capitalist press agencies were

DOCUMENT #4

“Memorandum from the Discussions of the Heads of Delegation who Came to Warsaw for the Session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact Member States,” n.d. [20 January 1965]. **Excerpts.**

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[Gheorghe Gheorgiu] De⁷⁹: Please allow me to say a few words, although I will not say anything new that I have not already said at our meeting. It has to do above all else with the idea of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and the inclusion of a relevant formulation in the Communiqué [from the meeting]. We already spoke of our position regarding the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. It is true that today many countries, including the USA, are coming for-

... Right now, the government of India is expanding its efforts. We have expressed our regret about this, and it is an unpleasant surprise that the Indian government is undertaking such efforts. Why is it not so sensitive, for example, with regard to the MLF, the question of prohibiting nuclear weapons, or the arms race? Nevertheless, it wants to create a scandal at the UN out of the Chinese matter. This will lead to a worsening of relations between China and India and—it cannot be ruled out—to other unpleasant things. For both the former and the latter country are beginning to engage each other in this way. We have to think out what we should do, [and] we have to appeal to the governments of other countries, in order to calm [the situation] and to approach sensibly the ... resolution of controversial problems....

... I would like to declare with total conviction that we will be making a mistake if we include in the communiqué such a formulation [i.e., supporting nonproliferation]. The government of India will not fail to exploit it, and we will not be able to oppose it....

Ulbricht: We have to be guided by the fundamental danger. And the fundamental danger now is the USA-FRG atomic bloc. In this regard we must take into account that the Bonn government is the only one putting forward revanchist demands. This does not concern India or any other states. That is, the danger of proliferation of atomic weapons lies in the fact that the FRG will receive such weapons, which it will use for its revanchist goals. That is where the main danger lies that we should come out against.

The Romanian comrades, however, are trying to skirt the problem and turn attention to India's initiative. [Dej tried to respond at this point.]

Let me finish, Comrade Dej, I did not interrupt you.

The attempt to skirt the fundamental problem represents a great danger for the countries of the Warsaw Pact because it would mean that they are not coming out against the proliferation of atomic weapons. The FRG will receive the right to jointly decide upon the use of nuclear arms, and we are supposed to just declare that we are in favor of a treaty on the non-use of such arms?⁸²

Currently, the fact of possession of nuclear arms creates a concrete situation in itself, and leads to certain activities. This is a very complex problem. We believe that the most realistic move is to strive for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

The USA possesses nuclear weapons and the most important question now is in what way and under what conditions it will give the Federal Republic of Germany access to them, how broad of a right the FRG will have to use these arms. In this lies the main danger.

I am certain that the Chinese comrades will support our stance. They told us that they are against multilateral nuclear forces among the NATO countries, that they are against the proliferation of nuclear weapons by the USA and their transfer to the FRG, and I believe that this is the most proper point of view. I do not doubt that we will easily be able to agree with the Chinese comrades, because this is not a matter that is open to discussion.

Dej: If the Chinese comrades respond in the affirmative, then I will carry out a self-criticism not only before you, but also before the Chinese Comrades.

⁸² At the meeting, the Romanians were supporting a Chinese proposal calling for a universal pledge not to use nuclear weapons as a first step towards a treaty on universal nuclear disarmament.

Ulbricht: But we have come together here as the countries of the Warsaw Pact to talk about a concrete enemy. We cannot consult about all our resolutions in advance with every country. After all, we have a treaty that was concluded by certain states. In signing it, we agreed to a particular order that we have to abide by.

We believe that the formulation on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons must be added to the communiqué. If we do not include this formulation, it will mean that we are not against the West Germans receiving atomic weapons.

If we come forward only later—after the FRG receives these weapons—with a proposal forbidding the use of these weapons, it will not be any policy. The Chinese comrades will not do that, they will not sign.

I ask you, Comrade Dej, are you in favor of our going on record in the communiqué that we are against the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the form of the MLF—which would mean that the West Germans will receive the right to participate in the use and concentration of these weapons or, to put it bluntly, will mean the joint atomic armament of the USA and the FRG?

Should we go on record in the communiqué in this fashion? What do you think?

Dej: We completely agree that it be recorded in the communiqué that we all believe that the Germans should not achieve access to nuclear weapons. But we cannot link this idea with the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. For that is a much broader idea. We can link it to the regime established in Germany on the basis of the treaties concluded after the Second World War.

Ulbricht: You speak of the Germans—which Germans do you mean?

Dej: The Federal Republic of Germany.

Novotný: We should specify certain things. The Americans, for example, also assert that the FRG cannot receive nuclear weapons. We do not want that—they say—and for that very reason we are organizing joint nuclear forces.

For us, it has to do with the West Germans not receiving nuclear weapons in any form.

Dej: We should write in the communiqué that the FRG cannot receive nuclear weapons in any form.

Novotný: Such a situation has now developed that we must take a stance. Either accept it as it is, or work to change the situation. And the question here does not apply just to Germany.

Gomułka: Clarifies the Polish stance regarding the MLF.⁸³ We assess the multilateral nuclear forces as a proliferation of nuclear weapons to states that do not yet possess them. That is why we are coming out against these forces, without limiting the question to the FRG and the NATO states.

⁸³ In the original.

The Romanian comrades—and as Comrade Dej assert—also the Chinese Comrades speak only of the FRG and NATO.

Dej: It has to do only with the FRG and preventing it from gaining access to nuclear weapons.

Gomułka: For us the term “MLF” is a synonym for the term “proliferation.” Tell us yourselves: If German units join the multilateral nuclear forces under an American command that receives nuclear weapons—is that not a proliferation of nuclear weapons? And 25 battleships?

After all, these are only the first steps. Schooling German units in the USA and preparing them to handle nuclear weapons—is that proliferation?

Maurer: Of course.

Gomułka: For me it is a matter of not dividing these matters, that the MLF be treated as a proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are against that. The Romanian comrades agree with us in our assessment of the MLF, and if they agree—they should also come out against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

But you, Comrades, apply this only to the FRG and not to all the NATO countries. I think that you would also not want other NATO countries—e.g., Turkey, Belgium, Holland, etc.— to possess nuclear weapons. You should also specify this.

If we proceed only with that proposal—that will be our weakness, because when they ask us about other countries, we will have nothing to say.

Second, for some reason, Comrade Dej has not taken into account the fact that the current situation is somewhat different than several months ago. Before the experimental detonation of an atomic weapon in China, the idea of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons was also leveled directly against the Chinese Republic. Now, this problem no longer exists. China counts itself among the nuclear powers, and we are not coming out against China. This means that there is a different situation.

Let us see now what the intentions of the Chinese comrades are in this regard, to which countries the People’s Republic of China would like to proliferate nuclear weapons. I do not know which [countries], and I think that the PRC absolutely does not want to proliferate these weapons. But the danger lies in the fact that such countries as Japan and India—i.e., the very two countries that are coming out against the PRC—can produce atomic weapons with relative ease. If every state accepted a treaty banning nuclear weapons, that would also lie in the interest of People’s China and the entire socialist camp. That is the second matter that Comrade Dej should take into consideration.

Third matter: we can find many documents—our declarations and statements, adopted together with the Chinese—in which we expressed our coordinated stance regarding the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Those are declarations from the Warsaw Pact and from the international conferences of the communist and workers’ parties.

We all stand in favor of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and under new conditions we are reaffirming our old declarations.

The fourth matter that I would like to touch upon is linked to the communiqué. In our discussions, Com. Dej came out in opposition to the draft treaty that Com. Ulbricht proposed to bring before the UN in the name of the socialist countries. That matter is closed. [The question] no longer has to do with whether the members of the commission can argue about the text of the

treaty. There will not even be time for precise study of all of its provisions.

danger of nuclear war on the part of West Germany. Com. Ulbricht's entire speech, as well as all of your speeches, mainly had in view this same goal, and that is normal....

Statement from the Moscow conferences of the international communist movement of 1957 and 1960 that we should strive for disarmament by various means, including the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. We all signed those documents then, including the Chinese comrades.

On this question, there are no differences between us. Another matter, and this is already a separate issue, should we add such a formulation to the communiqué?

In our opinion, repeating and accumulating all our old positions in a document does not strengthen the document. The document should be short, sharp...

representatives of all the member countries, which received the necessary mandate from their countries' governments. In this way, the Political Committee was created as the forum that signed the treaty.

In the Political Committee, government delegations participate. That can be ministers of foreign affairs, other ministers, or special representatives. Nothing prevents the ministers of foreign affairs from gathering when the need arises. But why do we need to create yet another organ—beyond the Political Consultative Committee—with a permanent character that would give orders to other representatives[?].

Gomułka: The ministers possess the powers granted to them by their governments. A meeting of ministers is not a permanent organ that would replace the Consultative Committee. For example, in preparation for our current conference, the deputy [foreign] ministers gathered earlier....

Dej: Nobody is preventing our ministers from gathering and exchanging views. Why is a special statute necessary for this matter?

Brezhnev: In order to give expression to our unity and our striving for more consolidated work.

Dej: Neither the ministers of foreign affairs nor their deputies will define the policy of our countries; they will carry out the directives they receive.

Dej: We would ask that these issues be left aside because we want to have time to reflect upon the text of the communiqué.

Gomuka: I want to be precise. You are opposed to approving a statute regarding regular meetings of the [foreign] ministers?

Dej: Yes, we are opposed to a statute....

AAN, KC PZPR, sygn. 2662, pp. 152-190.

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Dr. Douglas Selvage is an independent historian. He has received numerous academic grants and fellowships, including a Fulbright Scholarship, a Mellon Fellowship in the Humanities and grants from the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), and the Bradley Foundation. Most recently he was a Research Scholar in East European Studies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. Currently he is working on a book manuscript, *The Warsaw Pact and the German Question, 1955-1970: Poland, the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union*.