Hamas faces an uncertain future post-ceasefire, grappling with leadership losses, declining foreign support, and strained relations with Palestinian factions. Amid pragmatic concessions and resistance rhetoric, its role in Gaza鈥檚 governance and broader Palestinian politics hangs in the balance.
Reaching a ceasefire and a potential end to the fifteen-month Gaza war, a weary and more pragmatic Hamas is facing an increasingly uncertain future.
Isolated, besieged, without foreign backers, and its core leadership assassinated by Israel, Hamas鈥 show of strength with military rallies and policing the streets in the first days of the January 2025 ceasefire-hostages release agreement did little to mask the doubt surrounding the militant Islamist movement鈥檚 near- and long-term future in Gaza and beyond.
With Iran鈥檚 axis on the decline and Arab states unwilling to host or engage the movement, Hamas finds itself geopolitically adrift as its popularity remains in the West Bank and dips in Gaza.
January鈥檚 ceasefire agreement culminated in an increasingly pressured and pragmatic Hamas attempting to stake out its post-war future. In talks in Cairo and Doha from November 2024-January 2025, the post-Yahya Sinwar Hamas has shown willingness to work with its rival , cede control of Gaza, and make concessions to Israel in hostage-ceasefire.
Yet the question of disarming and its refusal to abandon armed resistance鈥攁long with its toxic international reputation after the October 7 attacks鈥攈as left the movement with few allies abroad or Palestinian factions willing to engage it in post-war Gaza governance and reconstruction.
The decisions Hamas makes next during the six-week ceasefire may determine whether it can transition into a Palestinian political movement taking part in a wider political process or will be reduced to an armed insurgency group in Gaza.
The ceasefire came one month after concessions Hamas made in December, when it agreed to an Egyptian for a committee of independent community leaders to govern the post-war Gaza Strip, with the coordination of the Palestinian Authority and rival Fatah.
Pivotal to agreeing to a ceasefire, a key turning point for Hamas came on October 16, 2024 after Israel鈥檚 killing of its political and military leader Yahya Sinwar, architect of the deadly October 7 attacks.
Mr. Sinwar鈥檚 , along with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu鈥檚 refusal to agree to anything more than a temporary ceasefire, reportedly prevented breakthroughs in multiple rounds of ceasefire-hostage release talks throughout 2024. Palestinian sources say Sinwar鈥檚 refusal to grant concessions also hindered separate Egypt-brokered talks on post-war Gaza governance with the Palestinian Authority and rival Fatah.
Mr. Sinwar鈥檚 killing in October shifted the power base in Hamas鈥 decision-making from inside Gaza to its more pragmatic politburo abroad; this shift coincided with multiple concessions made by the movement. Although Hamas has not named new leaders of the movement鈥檚 political and military branches to protect the individuals from assassination, it is widely believed that the movement鈥檚 arm abroad is making key decisions.
In December ceasefire talks, reportedly for the first time, Hamas expressed willingness to accept Israeli military presence in Gaza in the first round of a ceasefire-hostage and Israeli control of key corridors trisecting the Strip until the final day of the first phase. Even without guarantees the ceasefire will enter the second phase and lead to a full Israeli withdrawal and cessation of hostilities, Hamas agreed to the deal.
The ceasefire came one month after concessions Hamas made in December, when it agreed to an Egyptian for a committee of independent community leaders to govern the post-war Gaza Strip, with the coordination of the Palestinian Authority and rival Fatah.
After months of refusal, the movement agreed to the proposed governing committee falling under the Authority鈥檚 auspices鈥攅ffectively allowing the Fatah-dominated Authority鈥檚 return to the Strip鈥攁 previous red-line for Hamas. By February 3, talks over the ceasefire鈥檚 second stage and post-war Gaza governance are due to begin鈥攁nd the Egypt proposal remains Hamas鈥 preferred scenario.
Yet there are signs that Hamas鈥 pragmatism and concessions have come too little, too late. The Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), the umbrella organization comprising all Palestinian factions sans Hamas and Islamic Jihad, have both rejected the Egyptian proposal for a governing committee. Instead, the Authority announced on January 17 that it was prepared to 鈥渢ake full responsibility for the 鈥 alone. Arab states have begun to urge the US to press Israel to allow the Authority to govern Gaza.
In the early days of the Israel-Hamas war in 2023, the PLO offered an exit ramp for Hamas: disarm, officially accept the two-state solution on 1967 borders, agree to its signed treaties with the international community and Israel and join the Organisation. A PLO-led political reconciliation was reoffered in in July 2024. The PLO is now firmly against any association with Hamas.
With the prospect of an open-ended Israeli military occupation and growing among Gazans with the destruction wrought by the war, there is a sentiment among Fatah and the Authority in the West Bank that they are now in a stronger position. There is awareness among the PLO and the Palestinian Authority that any cooperation with Hamas will hurt their standings with the international community and the US, particularly with the incoming Trump Administration. With talks on phase two of the ceasefire and Gaza鈥檚 post-war future to begin by early February, Hamas has been sidelined in post-war governance and reconstruction plans.
Another topic of contention as the ceasefire moves towards its second phase is the question of Hamas鈥 arms.
Hamas has stated it does not wish to wage a guerilla insurgent war in Gaza against whatever post-war governing entity comes in鈥攂ut will do so if the entity is not Palestinian, comes 鈥渙n the back of an Israeli tank,鈥 or is seen as being controlled or influenced by Israel.
In April 2024, Khalil Al-Hayya, the hardliner Sinwar deputy, said in an interview Hamas would disarm, lay down its and agree to a truce if a Palestinian state was founded on 1967 borders.
In a July 2024 interview, Basem Naim, a member of Hamas鈥 politburo abroad, said would not lay down its arms as there were no guarantees Israel would not attack it and the Strip again. Yet Naim had also expressed Hamas鈥 willingness to reconsider its commitment to against Israel as part of a national Palestinian consensus or vote on the best path forward鈥攁nd agree by large majority that non-armed resistance should be the future of the Palestinian struggle.
There are strategic reasons for Hamas鈥 unwillingness to disarm; its Al-Qassem Brigades have proved to be its largest leverage over Israel and rival Palestinian factions.
Despite various Israeli estimates of , Hamas retains fighting forces in North, Central and Southern Gaza. In early January 2025, Hamas launching rockets into Israel and a resurgence of its units in the north intensified on Israeli forces in the days leading up to the ceasefire, despite a two-month-long devastating Israeli military operations designed to clear the north鈥攕parking concerns in Israel that it may face an endless 鈥渨ar of .鈥 In January, Secretary of State Antony Blinken shared US estimates that Hamas recruited 鈥渁lmost as many new as it lost,鈥 replenishing its decimated ranks.
Hamas officials still consider the independent governing committee proposed by Egypt as its preferred option for post-war Gaza. It envisions a two-to-three-year reconstruction period, followed by for a new national Palestinian government governing the West Bank and Gaza.
In this scenario, Hamas would facilitate the independent committee鈥檚 work but not take part in governing or decision-making鈥攁llowing the movement to rebuild and, potentially, rebrand.
Post-war, the movement will likely attempt to convert the political capital it believes it had earned among Palestinians by withstanding the Gaza war and its commitment to armed resistance. By playing up its resistance credentials, contrasting its militantism with the Palestinian Authority鈥檚 insistence on negotiations with Israel and inability to protect Palestinians from deadly settler attacks, Hamas may attempt to launch itself from a Gaza-based movement to a position of power in the West Bank.
With an impasse over Gaza's governance and a lack of allies abroad, Hamas may remain a leading but weakened armed actor in Gaza.
Hamas鈥 future will also be shaped by the loss of the lynchpin of Sinwar鈥檚 strategy: support from Iran and its axis. Sinwar was one of the Hamas leaders who pushed for stronger ties with Iran, focusing on their shared enemy of Israel to heal a Hamas-Tehran rift over Bashar Al Assad in Syria.
With Iran鈥檚 axis of resistance disintegrating, Hezbollah degraded, and the weapons-smuggling link of Syria gone with the collapse of the Assad regime, relying on a weakened and inward-looking Iran is a less strategically viable option for the movement now than on October 6. Sinwar, the lead facilitator of Hamas鈥 tilt towards Tehran, is no longer alive.
Yet no other state or external power has stepped forward to extend its hand to Hamas.
Among Arab countries, only Egypt and Qatar have diplomatically engaged with the organization to end the conflict. No country has been willing to host its leadership outside of Qatar鈥檚 tenuous interim hosting of select Hamas leaders as part of an arrangement with the US, which reportedly ended in November. Doha has stated it will no longer host Hamas鈥 political office. No Arab country has made a gesture or statement to bring Hamas into the Arab fold.
Turkey, a NATO ally, has denied interest in the movement, amid warnings from the US. Rather than inviting conflict with Israel, Ankara has been preoccupied with projecting its power into Syria.
With an impasse over Gaza's governance and a lack of allies abroad, Hamas may remain a leading but weakened armed actor in Gaza. Despite Hamas鈥 attempts to extend its influence beyond Gaza with its October 7 attacks, it is in the Strip where its future will likely be decided.
The views expressed in this piece are those of the authors and do not reflect an official position of the 浪花直播 Center.
浪花直播鈥檚 Middle East Program serves as a crucial resource for the policymaking community and beyond, providing analyses and research that helps inform US foreign policymaking, stimulates public debate, and expands knowledge about issues in the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Read more
