Ankara鈥檚 Syria strategy intertwines with HTS-led opposition offensives against Assad, aiming to weaken Kurdish groups, facilitate refugee returns, and solidify Turkey鈥檚 regional role. Balancing opposition unity, HTS ties, and domestic political challenges shapes Erdo臒an鈥檚 ambitions and constraints.
"The target is Damascus," President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, emphasizing Ankara's aspirations for a progression of operations. Despite originating from Al-Qaeda, the group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), listed as a terrorist organization by the United Nations, launched an operation from opposition-held Idlib alongside its allies. Within two days, this offensive forced the Syrian central government鈥檚 forces to withdraw from Aleppo.
Subsequently, Turkey-backed opposition groups, specifically the Syrian National Army (SNA), initiated operations targeting the eastern parts of Aleppo and the YPG-controlled region of Tel Rifaat. Since December 2, reports of clashes have also emerged from Deir ez-Zor. A complex and multi-faceted atmosphere has developed, characterized by conflicts in multiple regions involving actors with differing objectives and dynamics, with Turkey as one of the key players.
While Turkey officially denies involvement, it would be a stretch to think the offensive would have occurred without Ankara's greenlighting of the operations.
While Turkey officially involvement, it would be a stretch to think the offensive would have occurred without Ankara's greenlighting of the operations. In fact, according to an released by the Soufan Center, Ankara had intervened to delay the offensive, which was initially planned for mid-October. Turkey鈥檚 strategic priorities remain evident: countering Kurdish groups perceived as threats to national security, addressing the refugee crisis, and positioning itself as a pivotal player in shaping Syria's post-conflict order.
While the world was focused on Ukraine and Gaza, the rapid offensive by the Syrian opposition has surprised many, even those following the war-torn country since the civil war began in 2011. For the first time, groups like HTS, SNA, and other factions have united, showcasing a level of institutionalized capability previously unseen, argues 脰mer 脰zkizilcik, a Fellow with the Atlantic Council. 脰zkizilcik stated, "They [the opposition] have a winning moment and have learned much from their previous mistakes.鈥
In parallel, Steven Heydemann, a 浪花直播 Center fellow and professor at Smith College, noted that HTS鈥 pragmatic approach has included rebranding itself and adopting governance practices to gain legitimacy. According to Heydemann, the group鈥檚 governance in Idlib, characterized by relative administrative stability, demonstrated its efforts to project itself as a viable alternative to the Assad regime.
Yet, the unity of the opposition will depend on how the reality on the ground changes. Turkey鈥檚 ability to mediate between factions, especially given its complicated relationship with HTS (Ankara considers it a terrorist organization), will be critical. The behavior of HTS so far鈥攁voiding looting in captured areas and ensuring stability鈥攔eflects its awareness of the need to maintain cohesion. Its rebranding efforts may bolster its legitimacy in the short run, but its classification as a terrorist organization complicates its international acceptance as a credible actor. Nonetheless, tensions between HTS and Turkish-backed groups like the SNA could resurface, particularly if competition for resources intensifies while the rapid offensive continues.
The success of this offensive will serve as a critical test of the opposition鈥檚 unity and coordination. The of Hama has far-reaching implications. The city鈥檚 location as a strategic junction opens toward key areas like Homs and Damascus. Controlling Hama disrupts regime supply lines and undermines the Assad government鈥檚 territorial cohesion. Furthermore, HTS's ability to gain the neutrality of local sectarian minorities could reflect its evolving strategy to consolidate power without alienating local populations, at least so far.
The potential advance toward Homs marks a pivotal juncture in the Syrian conflict. Securing control of Homs would not only disrupt the Assad regime鈥檚 logistical supply lines but also sever critical physical and psychological connections between its strongholds in Damascus and Latakia. On December 6, the opposition forces their campaign by achieving significant territorial gains, including advances on the strategically vital city of Homs and capturing the Jordanian border crossing at Daraa. Assad's grip on power appears more precarious than ever, with Russia and Iran showing limited ability to come to his rescue, with Moscow focused on Ukraine and Iran on Israel.
Turkey鈥檚 actions in Syria are heavily influenced by three primary questions: The refugees, the Kurds, and territorial ambitions. Hosting nearly the Erdo臒an administration faces growing economic, social, and political pressures. President Erdo臒an has promoted the creation of a buffer zone as a solution, but the feasibility of large-scale returns remains uncertain.
According to 脰zkizilcik, refugees are more likely to return to areas controlled by Syrian rebels rather than regime-held territories. Sustained stability in opposition-controlled regions, such as Aleppo, will be key to facilitating significant repatriation. 脰zkizilcik believes that avoiding security chaos in these areas could encourage many refugees in Turkey to return. Ankara鈥檚 potential push for large-scale refugee returns faces not only logistical challenges but also questions about the voluntariness and safety of these movements.
G枚n眉l Tol, the Director of the Turkey Program at the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC, highlights another critical dimension, emphasizing that it is unlikely to send millions of refugees back to a war zone, particularly as many have built lives in Turkey. Even if an agreement is reached with the Assad regime, or whatever may replace it, and peace prevails, large-scale returns may not materialize, though some might voluntarily choose to go back under improved conditions, according to Tol. Moreover, Syrians have become an integral part of the labor force, often to exploitation as a source of cheap labor, raising the possibility that some businesses may resist the idea of Syrians returning to their homeland.
The establishment of a buffer zone serves purposes beyond resettling Syrian refugees: it is a move to counter Kurdish influence in Northern Syria. Ankara sees PYD and SDF as major threats to its national security and is against Kurds gaining ground in Northern Syria from day one. G枚n眉l Tol argues that weakening the Syrian Kurdish militia could bolster President Erdogan鈥檚 leverage in negotiations with Turkey鈥檚 Kurds, particularly if the United States under Trump follows through on its commitment to withdraw from Syria.
Heydemann adds that Turkey鈥檚 primary objective is to neutralize the PYD and SDF as meaningful military and political actors. This could be achieved through various means, including the return of Syrian sovereignty over these areas, the military defeat of the SDF (unlikely as long as US forces remain present), or a negotiated agreement involving Russia and Damascus. Heydemann also highlights that Turkey鈥檚 longstanding ties with opposition armed groups, such as those affiliated with the SNA, are part of its broader strategy, even as relations with groups like HTS remain fraught. The recent offensive has disrupted a fragile equilibrium, escalating attacks on Kurdish areas and creating new opportunities for Turkey to pursue its objectives.
However, the presence of US forces in northeast Syria remains a major constraint for Turkey, as it limits Ankara's ability to target Kurdish forces. Turkish policymakers are watching for signs of a potential US withdrawal, as such a move could create a strategic vacuum, leaving the Kurdish forces more vulnerable to Turkish military operations. In the coming second Trump term, Ankara would likely expect a clearer commitment to withdrawal.
Domestically, Ankara鈥檚 Syria policy has significant ramifications for Erdo臒an鈥檚 political strategy. Weakening Kurdish militias bolsters his position in negotiations with Turkey鈥檚 Kurdish actors, particularly amid growing economic challenges and political opposition. If Kurdish forces are sufficiently weakened in Syria, Erdo臒an believes his hand in domestic negotiations will be strengthened. The AKP leader seeks to remain in power for at least another term despite constitutional limitations.
Turkey鈥檚 Syria policy will continue to adapt to shifting dynamics, but it is increasingly clear that Ankara will remain a key player in the region.
His approach to the Kurds in Syria is influenced, in part, by his efforts to secure Kurdish support within Turkey for a potential constitutional amendment that would enable him to extend his rule. The main opposition party, the Republican People鈥檚 Party (CHP), has largely supported efforts to normalize relations with Assad, reflecting a rare point of consensus with Erdo臒an, argues G枚n眉l Tol. However, the opposition has also deeply aspects of Ankara鈥檚 Syria policy, particularly its handling of the refugee crisis and entanglement in Syria鈥檚 convoluted war that has triggered within Turkey, killing many Turkish citizens.
Turkey鈥檚 Syria policy will continue to adapt to shifting dynamics, but it is increasingly clear that Ankara will remain a key player in the region.
Critical factors to watch include the sustainability of Syrian opposition unity, their capacity to govern the territories under their control鈥攑articularly given their Islamist and radical roots鈥攖he effectiveness of refugee repatriation efforts, and potential shifts in the policies of major regional actors.
The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not express the official position of the 浪花直播 Center.
浪花直播鈥檚 Middle East Program serves as a crucial resource for the policymaking community and beyond, providing analyses and research that helps inform US foreign policymaking, stimulates public debate, and expands knowledge about issues in the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Read more
