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Castro鈥檚 endorsement of the Warsaw Pact's suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968 led to an incremental improvement in Cuba鈥檚 relations with the Soviet Union. Still, resolving differences between Cuba and the socialist states was a slow process that took over three years. 

This process consisted of bursts of delegations and exchanges at expert and Party levels. During this visits, both sides sought to align their views, even as socialist diplomats had considerable criticisms of the Cuban leadership鈥檚 adventurous economic policies, which culminated with the risky and unrealistic sugarcane harvest plan of 1970. Such exchanges helped the East to understand that establishing closer trading cooperation with Cuba might help make that country鈥檚 economic development plans more pragmatic and predictable.

One of the most salient but contentious points in Cuba鈥檚 relations with the East in 1969, , was Havana鈥檚 participation as an observer at the Communist and Workers鈥� Parties meeting in Moscow. In explaining the Cuban decision to participate in the conference, Carlos Rafael Rodr铆guez, the Cuban delegate, shared with the Polish ambassador in Havana Leonid Brezhnev's urgent plea for Fidel Castro to attend the gathering. To Moscow, the PCC鈥檚 participation at the conference was a key symbolic gesture placing Cuba on the Soviet side of the Sino-Soviet split, which was important given Havana鈥檚 formal non-involvement in this dispute.[1] 

However, as we learn from another , Cuba鈥檚 attendance seemed insufficient to impress the Soviet Ambassador Soldatov, who expressed his regrets to Fidel Castro that the PCC could not fully participate in the conference at a crucial moment for the communist movement.[2] 

Furthermore, in early 1969, problems between the East and Cuba continued not only at a diplomatic but also at a party level. Following the bitter January 1968 PCC Central Committee plenary meeting and the Soviet Bloc鈥檚 open disagreement with Cuba鈥檚 foreign policy in Latin America, Havana refrained from sending delegations to the East German and Polish party congresses in East Berlin and Warsaw, following the lackluster reception of the Cuban foreign policy positions at a Bulgarian congress in Sofia. 

As it was customary for such party summits to be used to exchange views on international relations, the Cubans believed that their delegations should not attend the congresses only to deliver their greetings and not be able to explain their policy perspectives fully, .[3]

By 1969, the worsening state of the Cuban economy became the key factor in the relations between Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the East European states. For example, Bulgarian experts visiting Havana in August 1970 appeared unimpressed by Cuban obstinacy. , Sofia informed Budapest that the Cuban economy continued to lack real planning strategies. According to the Bulgarians, the essence of planning remained 鈥渧ery foggy鈥� to the Cubans, although it figured in Cuban leaders鈥� narratives. The explanations of their actions were equally 鈥渧ague鈥� as they refused to accept the notion that it was impossible to build a new society without scientific planning.

A turning point in the Cuban economy came during the 1970 sugar harvest - the audacious attempt to produce a record-breaking 10 million tons of sugar, known as the Zafra de los diez millones (鈥渢he sugarcane harvest of the ten million [tons]鈥�). The attempt mobilized the country鈥檚 full attention. Soviet Bloc representatives and guests were also involved in the massive undertaking. For example, the that Sofia sent students to take part in the harvest.[4]

However, the zafra failed. Due to the 1969 drought, Cuba could harvest only 8.5 million tons of sugar in 1970, despite the colossal effort. The harvest, involving Cuba鈥檚 entire workforce, nearly wrecked the national economy, as all available resources were concentrated on the sugarcane harvest, seriously neglecting the service sectors and industry, essentially negating previous attempts at balancing agriculture with other sectors of the economy, as stated in a .[5] 

While the Cuban people behaved 鈥渓ike heroes鈥� in this production battle, as Fidel Castro noted, the country鈥檚 leadership saw the missed zafra target as the revolution's first failure, . Fidel even went as far as offering to resign, something the crowds in Havana vehemently rejected.[6]

The Bulgarians believed that in all areas of Cuban economic development, the socialist states had to extend additional help to stabilize the country and make it a showcase for socialism in Latin America. Sofia also stressed that the East European states should do everything possible to convince Havana that it was time to gradually align its perspective plans and integrate its economy with the socialist states. Therefore, in the Bulgarians鈥� view, the East European states needed to develop a comprehensive, long-term program to broaden their political, economic, and cultural relations with Cuba.[7] 

Improvements in party relations were high on the agenda as well. At the PCC鈥檚 invitation, a Hungarian party and government delegation traveled to Havana for the national holiday on July 26, 1970. During the meetings, the interim organizational secretary of the PCC鈥檚 Central Committee, Major Jesus Montan茅 Orpaesa, addressed the need to improve relations between the Cuban Communist Party and the Hungarian Socialist Workers鈥� Party. Eventually, based on the authorization of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Party, the delegation agreed to start sending party delegations each year to exchange experiences with its Cuban counterparts.[8]

Prague鈥檚 envoys also praised the Cuban withdrawal from its strategy of fomenting rebellion in the Western Hemisphere. , stated that the second half of 1971 was the most crucial period in normalizing Cuban relations with Latin America. He thought that while the Castro regime had experienced serious political and economic failures at the end of the 1960s, 1971 would be the year it began pursuing more realistic policies in all spheres. Likewise, the Czechoslovak intelligence representative in Cuba reported that many Latin American countries were considering the possibility of returning Cuba to the Commonwealth of Latin American States.[9] 

The meaning of the winding process of rapprochement between Cuba and the East was well summarized by the Bulgarians, who in 1970 saw it as a chance for the East to help the Cubans acquire a broad understanding of the experience of the socialist state that would help guide them on their Leninist path of development.[10] The numerous exchanges of visits at expert and party levels between 1969 and 1972 helped bring Cuba and Eastern Europe closer together and allowed Havana to tackle acute issues in economic and regional policies. The fact that critical East European views gave way to growing praise reflected the positive direction of development in relations between the partners. This improvement climaxed with Fidel Castro鈥檚 month-long visit to the Socialist states in 1972 - which I will discuss in the next blog post and which proved crucial in Cuba鈥檚 embark on socialist 鈥渋nstitutionalization,鈥� helping bring about its 鈥渁ccommodation鈥� with the East.

Connected Sources

[1] Strza艂kowski to Jele艅, Cipher No: 6247, 4 June 1969, AMSZ, D.VI-1969, 37/75, W1, p. 1.

[2] E. Noworyta, "Stanowisko KP Kuby wobec narady partii komunistycznych i problemom mi臋dzynarodowego ruchu rewolucyjnego" [The position of CP Cuba on the council of Communist parties and the problems of the international revolutionary movement, 3 September 1968, AMSZ, D.VI-1969, 36/75, W-2, p. 1.

[3] Notes on conversation, Stefan J臋drychowski [Polish Foreign Minister] - Flores Ibarra [Cuban Ambassador to Warsaw], 12 February 1969, AMSZ, D.VI-1969, 36/75, W2, pp. 2-3.

[4] Memcon, Todor Zhivkov - Gust谩v Hus谩k, 17 February 1970, TsDA, f. 1B, op. 60, a.e. 36, p. 31. The importance of the zafra and the participation of Eastern countries was well understood in Cuban criticism towards the Hungarians who failed to send a reed-cutting brigade to Cuba, which the local leaders perceived as an important expression of solidarity.

[5] On the attempts to balance the Cuban economy in the mid-1960s, see Memcon, Mehmet Shehu - Wilfredo Rodr铆guez, 28 November 1964, DPA, f. 14 , l. 5, d. 1, p. 5 [6].

[6] 鈥淧谩rt- 茅s korm谩nyk眉ld枚tts茅g眉nk kubai 煤tj谩r贸l /袗 k眉ld枚tts茅g jelent茅se/鈥� [On the trip of our party and government delegation to Cuba (Report of the delegation)], 9 September 1970, MNL, M-KS, 288f. 11/2964 枚.e, pp. 5-6 [7-8].

[7] [Information on BCP CC visit to Cuba], MNL, p. 9 [111].

[8] 鈥淧谩rt- 茅s korm谩nyk眉ld枚tts茅g眉nk kubai 煤tj谩r贸l /袗 k眉ld枚tts茅g jelent茅se/,鈥� p. 2 [4].

[9] Ota Jirou拧ek, "Ke vztah暖m Kuba - Latinsk谩 Amerika - USA v druh茅 polovin臎 r. 1971" [On relations Cuba - Latin America - USA in the second half of 1971], 28 January 1972, NA膶R, KS膶-脷V 1945-1989, Praha - Gust谩v Hus谩k, k. 379, p. 1.

[10] [Information on BCP CC visit to Cuba], p. 8 [110].