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In early 2025, a Russian think-tank recognized Georgia鈥檚 official communication strategy as 鈥� to Russia. But the reality of the bilateral relationship is rather different: The two countries have no diplomatic relations and parts of Georgia鈥檚 internationally recognized territory have been occupied by Russia since the 2008 war. Most tellingly, 69 percent of Georgians  Russia as an enemy and blame Moscow for derailing this South Caucasus country鈥檚 path to joining the European Union.

Georgian Dream (GD), the ruling party, has firmly established itself as a pro-Russian political group, but Moscow views GD as more of a client than a partner. For example, the Kremlin insists that Tbilisi implement Russia-friendly policies such as 鈥渇oreign agents鈥� legislation modelled on Russian law that targets NGOS, but offers little in return. 

In the lead-up to the October 2024 parliamentary elections, GD politicians  public opinion by insinuating that its rapprochement with Russia might lead to Georgia regaining control over the Russia-occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia鈥攔egions that formally declared themselves independent and are recognized by a handful of countries such as Nicaragua and Venezuela. In reality, Russia has been  that Georgia formally demarcate the administrative border with the territories, underscoring the futility of GD鈥檚 pro-Russian course. 

Russia has been trying to create the illusion of a partnership since 2023, when it resumed air traffic between the two countries and  regime for Georgian citizens. Russia is actively  diplomatic relations with Georgia, which the latter severed in the wake of Russia鈥檚 invasion in 2008. In February 2025, the Russian Foreign Ministry  that they were 鈥渞eady to go as far as the Georgian side is ready to go.鈥� However, the Georgian government is hesitant to restore the ties, fearing public anger, given that of Georgians view Russia as their country鈥檚 main enemy.

Kremlin鈥檚 influence over GD, however, is limited. For example, GD refuses to abolish the law on the occupied territories of Georgia, which  Russia as the occupying force. GD鈥檚 own propaganda presents Russia as a permanent threat, rather than as a good neighbor. GD鈥檚 message for staying in power is that Russia is Georgia鈥檚 main adversary, and only GD鈥檚 leadership can protect Georgia from Russian attack. If you oppose us, they imply, you are inviting Russia to invade.

That said, GD avoids direct criticism of Russia and follows Moscow鈥檚 lead on policies, rather than public opinion. Last year, Vladimir Putin personally GD for passing the Russian-style 鈥淔oreign Agents鈥� legislation and for its policies and statements aligning with Russia鈥檚 opposition to liberal values 鈥嬧�媋nd the West.

GD exaggerates the economic benefits of rapprochement with Russia while ignoring the risks of growing economic dependence on Russia. According to official  Russia accounts for  of Georgia鈥檚 foreign trade and ranks as the third-largest trading partner after United States and Britain. The trade surplus favors Russia and is growing. Georgia  oil and wheat from Russia, for which alternatives are available. Previous Georgian governments pursued a policy aimed at minimizing the nation鈥檚 dependence on Russia. 

Russian natural gas exports to Georgia have been growing since 2019. In 2024, Georgia purchased  million worth of Russian natural gas. Meanwhile Azerbaijan has the ability to fully meet Georgia鈥檚 needs. 

GD claims that easing tensions with Russia is beneficial to Georgia鈥檚 tourism industry. In 2024, Georgia emerged as one of the top  tourist destinations for Russians, when almost  visited Georgia. Meanwhile, the number of tourists from the European Union has been decreasing. The trade-off is not good: according to statistics, the typical EU visitor spends approximately  in Georgia, while visitors from Russia spend only. 

Russia鈥檚 attractiveness for Georgian workers has been decreasing. In 2024, remittances coming to Georgia from Russia , constituting only $540 million out of a total of $3.4 billion. Overall, the importance of Russian money to the Georgian economy is declining. There was a brief surge of Russian money into Georgia in 2022-2023, thanks to trade that aimed to avoid international sanctions against Russia and a wave of Russian citizens fleeing to Georgia to escape mobilization. The mass influx of Russian citizens into Georgia began in late February 2022, after the Russian Federation attacked Ukraine. Some Russians have remained in Georgia for long-term residence and work. The Georgian Dream government has failed to disclose the exact number of Russian citizens living in Georgia.

Russian migrants have generated a lot of economic activity in Georgia. Since 2022, they have established  companies, including medical practices, private schools, restaurants, and caf茅s. Russians opened thousands of bank accounts in Georgian banks. In 2024, Georgia  after Thailand in the ranking of real estate purchases by Russians abroad. Foreign citizen deposits in Georgian banks now total  Georgian lari ($3.3 billion), with  of those belonging to Russians. Yet the National Bank of Georgia  Russian deposits as unstable capital that can be transferred abroad at any time. 

Despite these numbers, the influx of Russians and Russian capital into Georgia arguably has not improved intercultural relations. In fact, the growing Russian community in Georgian society has fueled substantial suspicion and anxiety. One outcome has been public and political demands to re-introduce a visa regime for Russian citizens.

Reports have shown that Georgia鈥檚 current government led by GD is likely involved in helping Russia circumvent international sanctions. For example, despite Georgia lacking oil resources of its own, according to a recent , 99,000 tons of 鈥淕eorgian oil鈥� were sold to Spain in 2023-24 for a total of 49 million euros. 

There are also indicators that Georgia is helping Russia import items including light vehicles, computer equipment, and boats. In 2024,  of yacht exports to Georgia was recorded鈥攁n unexpected result for a country with modest incomes. In February 2025, the first  from Moscow to the Sukhumi Airport in occupied Abkhazia took place. Official Tbilisi did not react to this illegal move, which  local observers to conclude that the restoration of the airport鈥攁fter 30 years of disuse鈥攎ay have resulted from an agreement between the Kremlin and GD to use this infrastructure and bypass international sanctions to upgrade the site.

Georgia is technically still at war with Russia, as no peace agreement has been signed. The current rapprochement is based on the immediate interests of Georgia鈥檚 ruling elite and has little to do with Georgian public opinion or the nation鈥檚 long-term interests. Moreover, this 鈥減artnership鈥� is fragile and can end in the event of a change of power in Georgia鈥攐r a shift in Russia鈥檚 stance.

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.