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鈥淭he most important thing is to have peace, and not war,鈥� a middle-aged woman tells me in a caf茅 in central Tbilisi as the sound of mid-90s European pop music plays loudly in the background from a nearby concert supporting the ruling Georgian Dream party. We are seated on a side street off Rustaveli Avenue, the city鈥檚 central thoroughfare. 

This statement reflects the narrative promoted by the ruling party, which aims to divert attention from the Russia-West divide that has preoccupied Georgia since the onset of Russia鈥檚 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The upcoming election on October 26, in which 3.5 million Georgians are eligible to vote, is framed as a historic choice between alignment with the West or a future oriented toward Russia. What initially took shape as a struggle between a Western or a Russian orientation, however, has evolved into a more existential contest, a choice of war or peace. 

At the heart of Georgian Dream鈥檚 electoral strategy is a delicate balancing act that involves appearing pro-European while maintaining policies that align with Russian interests. According to a  by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Russia views Georgia as a critical piece in its strategy to maintain influence over former Soviet states it considers within its sphere of influence.

The De-Sovietization Agenda

In these countries, de-Sovietization policies have sought to erase remnants of Soviet rule, both physically, through the removal of statues and Soviet symbols, and culturally, by adopting pro-Western, democratic norms. For Georgia, this de-Sovietization process has been interlaced with the memory of its own territorial struggles and the unresolved status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where Russia maintains a military presence and de facto control.

The trauma of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, the narrative of occupation, are reinforced in museums, public spaces, and the discourse surrounding the legacy of former president Mikhail Saakashvili, whose administration embraced aggressive de-Sovietization policies and de-integration from Russia, and sought rapid integration with the West. Even today, opposition groups echo this sentiment, arguing that alignment with Russia threatens the very sovereignty that Georgia has fought to secure since its independence.

Adding to the mix is the recent influx of Russian migrants into Georgia following the invasion of Ukraine. Thousands of Russians have fled their country to escape repression and military conscription. While the Georgian government has been relatively welcoming, viewing the influx as an economic boon and not imposing any regulations on the newcomers, the Russian presence has fueled resentment among Georgia鈥檚 pro-European youth. Graffiti condemning Russian migrants and outlining 鈥渞ules of behavior鈥� for Russians in some bars reflect the growing frustration. This sentiment has intensified pre-election tensions, particularly in Tbilisi, where opposition to Russian migration is strongest.

Despite its experience of Russian occupation, Georgia remains economically entangled with Russia. While many post-Soviet states have diversified their economies, Russia remains one of Georgia鈥檚 largest trading partners, particularly in the energy sector. Russia鈥檚 continuing occupation of 20 percent of Georgian territory, including Abkhazia and the so-called Tskhinvali region (South Ossetia), serves as a constant reminder of Moscow鈥檚 influence and complicates the country鈥檚 path toward full European integration. 

The ISW report further highlights how Russia leverages Georgia鈥檚 economic dependence to maintain influence. Despite the outward projection of pro-European aspirations鈥攄isplayed in campaign imagery featuring the European Union鈥檚 flag鈥攖he underlying reality, according to the opposition, is that Georgian Dream鈥檚 policies have deepened economic ties with Russia rather than lessened them.

Yet Georgian Dream avoids direct association with Moscow and positions itself as the guarantor of stability in an increasingly volatile region. The party鈥檚 recent campaign rhetoric鈥攑romising to guide Georgia to Europe 鈥渙nly with peace, dignity, and prosperity鈥濃�攊s aimed at appealing to a populace still haunted by memories of war, according to the news site .

The War and Peace Agenda

According to the ISW report, Georgian Dream鈥檚 approach reflects a broader trend of soft power influence from Russia. Russia relies on its economic and political leverage to subtly influence outcomes in its favor. Georgian Dream has passed laws that resemble Moscow鈥檚 policies, such as the controversial foreign agent law and anti-LGBTQ+ legislation, which signal a deeper alignment with Russian governance models. These laws are not just local political maneuvers. They are symptomatic of a broader strategy by Moscow to prevent Georgia鈥檚 further integration with the West.

Polling ahead of the election reflects a divided nation. A report by the pollster  places Georgian Dream at 33 percent support, while opposition coalitions command a collective majority of 55 percent. This sharply contrasts with the results of a , which give Georgian Dream 59.5 percent of the vote. The polarization of polling results reflects not only the internal divides within Georgian society but also the degree of external influence on public opinion. Moscow鈥檚 efforts to manipulate media narratives and support pro-Russian political actors, even indirectly, have had a significant impact on voter perception, as highlighted by Civil Georgia.

Despite this, Georgian society has increasingly gravitated toward the West over the past decade. As the ISW report notes, public opinion remains firmly in favor of Western integration, with nearly 80 percent of Georgians supporting EU membership and around 67 percent in favor of joining NATO. A National Democratic Institute (NDI) survey confirms that support for these institutions has been consistently high, though some erosion of support for NATO has occurred owing to fear of antagonizing Russia. 

Russia鈥檚 military aggression in Ukraine has heightened fears of similar confrontations in Georgia, leading some voters to prioritize stability over deeper Western integration. This is a narrative that Georgian Dream has carefully exploited. By framing its opponents, particularly the United National Movement, as warmongers willing to risk Georgia鈥檚 stability for NATO membership, Georgian Dream has positioned itself as the protector of peace in a time of regional instability.

Georgian Dream鈥檚 stance is not just an electoral strategy, it is a reflection of Moscow鈥檚 interests in preserving the status quo. The party鈥檚 narrative subtly aligns with Russian talking points even as it outwardly presents itself as committed to Georgia鈥檚 European future.

Beyond De-Sovietization

For many Georgians, the promise of peace is deeply appealing. Yet, as opposition parties have pointed out, peace at the expense of Western integration could lead Georgia into a new form of dependence on Russia, one that mirrors the hybrid political regimes in other post-Soviet states.

As election day approaches, the stakes for Georgia鈥檚 future have never been higher. The choice voters face is not only about governance, it is about Georgia鈥檚 very identity as a nation. Georgia may continue its slow drift toward the West or, under the guise of peace and stability, may move further into Russia鈥檚 orbit.

If Georgia leans toward a pro-Russian route, we might witness a mass migration of young, pro-European youth to the West. We might also see the rise of youth-driven political movements, leading to further mobilization and politicization within Georgia. 

One important feature of this campaign is a shift away from the de-Sovietization platform, once central to freeing societies from Russia鈥檚 influence. The potential failure of de-Sovietization as a dominant narrative in national identity construction is highlighting the need for the opposition to develop a new agenda to secure more votes.

In all former Soviet republics, entire new generations have grown up without firsthand Soviet experiences. Societies historically and geographically linked to Russia are now finding more relevant agendas when shaping their independent foreign policies in relation to Russia and other major powers. Regardless of what analysts may say about the Georgian Dream鈥檚 perceived opportunistic stance, in Georgia, a move away from the old Soviet鈥揳nti-Soviet framework is underway. 

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.