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This summer, the return of the historically pro-China Rajapaksa family鈥擲ri Lanka鈥檚 on-and-off again leaders with an authoritarian bent鈥攚as reinforced with a resounding victory in the August 2020 parliamentary elections to follow up on their November 2019 presidential win. Acquiring , the Rajapaksa-led government of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and his brother, former President and now Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa, have an opportunity to potentially in after a four year hiatus. However, this authoritarian turn is not necessarily good news for China. Despite some arguments that the Rajapaksas鈥� return to power for to  with Sri Lanka, signs point in a different direction: the new Rajapaksa government is rebalancing towards India and emphasizing neutrality.

Sri Lanka鈥檚 new balancing act demonstrates the difficult realities facing China鈥檚 attempt to acquire allies and military basing in South and Southeast Asia. Considering the lack of desire and popular will among regional actors to , combined with the People鈥檚 Liberation Army鈥檚 inability to adequately project power in the region, China cannot practice the gunboat diplomacy or provide the security guarantees that would enable it to truly add countries to its camp beyond its immediate periphery, a dynamic that allows for some optimism about the United States and its allies鈥� ability to contest Chinese influence in South and Southeast Asia.

China and Sri Lanka鈥檚 Warm Period

Starting in Mahinda Rajapaksa鈥檚 term as President from 2005 to 2015, China and the Rajapaksa clan entered into a close relationship. Generally, although Beijing has demonstrated an ability to work with any type of government it encounters, China over more unpredictable democracies. To that end, Sri Lanka-China relations were considerably close under the notably authoritarian Rajapaksas. during the final, bloody stages of Sri Lanka鈥檚 civil war versus the Tamil Tigers, as well as against the and 鈥� accusations of widespread human rights abuses. Upon his ascension as paramount leader, Xi Jinping escalated the relationship with personal diplomacy. In 2014, he to express his hope of enhancing ties even further, and to visit Sri Lanka. Xi even tied his 鈥淐hina Dream鈥� to Rajapaksa鈥檚 鈥淢ahinda Chintana鈥� (Mahinda Vision) in an . This engagement included billions of dollars of loans and foreign direct investment and culminated in the 2017 signing of for the Chinese-developed port of Hambantota to a Chinese firm. Perhaps signaling China鈥檚 ambitions for future naval basing in the Indian Ocean, a Chinese nuclear submarine .

With China investing and fostering ties to the Rajapaksas, [India] began fearing that China would turn Sri Lanka into another 鈥淧earl鈥� in the so-called 鈥淪tring of Pearls,鈥� or Chinese naval facilities in the Indian Ocean.

This pro-China approach in Sri Lanka ended abruptly with a coalition of opposition parties鈥� victory in 2015 and Indian diplomatic intervention. The 2014 visit to Colombo by a Type-039 nuclear sub triggered deep-set fear of Chinese encroachment into the Indian Ocean on the part of the Modi administration in India. For much of the post-independence period, India viewed Sri Lanka as within its sphere of influence鈥� before backing off following the 1994 assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. With China investing and fostering ties to the Rajapaksas, it began fearing that China would turn Sri Lanka into another 鈥淧earl鈥� in the so-called 鈥淪tring of Pearls,鈥� or Chinese naval facilities in the Indian Ocean. This concern that was not likely assuaged by Xi Jinping鈥檚 direct reference to Sri Lanka as a 鈥溾�橮earl in the Indian Ocean鈥欌�� in his 2014 op-ed.

The 2015 electoral contest featured the Tamil and Muslim minority-supported opposition facing down the Sinhalese-majority Rajapaksa government. Difficult to prove allegations abound of by and in favor of the opposition and Rajapaksa respectively, so much so that Indian intelligence was accused of interference and the Chinese embassy in Colombo issued a of a New York Times report on the issue. Regardless of outside support, the fact that India clearly favored the opposition soon became clear in the aftermath of the opposition鈥檚 .

Sri Lanka鈥檚 Brief Pro-India Stance

With Rajapaksa out, the new government of President Maithripala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe began and embracing India. Modi quickly demonstrated India鈥檚 preference for the new regime with formal visits in and . The Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government largely returned the favor to a warmly-receptive India, especially early on in its tenure. Clearly indicative of the security-element in India鈥檚 concerns, the opposition-led Sri Lankan government by a Chinese submarine in 2017.  The Indian government even offered to purchase the economically-struggling and debt-ridden Hambantota airport at In 2019, a to invest $3.85 billion USD into an oil refinery near the controversial port at Hambantota in a deal that surpassed the $1.4 billion USD China-financed land deal in Colombo, which was the largest foreign direct investment prior to the refinery.

However, given the amount of Chinese investment and a to avoid a catastrophic alienation from the new government, Sri Lanka was not . The Chinese worked carefully to smooth over the new regime鈥檚 antipathy. For instance, in 2016 that 鈥淐hina-Sri Lanka relations were affected due to government transition in Sri Lanka. With joint efforts of both countries, the transition period has come to an end and this page has been turned over.鈥� Two years later, China provided Sirisena鈥攁 defector from the Rajapaksa regime and clearly less willing than Wickremesinghe to drop China鈥攚ith a $295 million USD development grant. Additionally, the country鈥檚 enormous debt burden forced the handover of a majority stake in the  to a Chinese firm. Regardless of China鈥檚 outreach, however, the new government contrasted itself with the Rajapaksas in its embrace of India and relative coldness to China.

Within a day of Wickremesinghe鈥檚 ouster, the Chinese ambassador visited Rajapaksa to 鈥渃onvey congratulatory wishes from Chinese President Xi Jinping...鈥�

In perhaps the clearest sign of China鈥檚 unwillingness to lose access to Sri Lanka, it wholeheartedly supported a sudden and shadowy constitutional crisis that shook up Sri Lanka鈥檚 political scene in 2018. Shortly after Prime Minister Wickremesinghe鈥檚 , President Sirisena abruptly dismissed parliament and Wickremesinghe to Mahinda Rajapaksa as Prime Minister (now currently serving as the elected Prime Minister in 2020). Within a day of Wickremesinghe鈥檚 ouster, the Chinese ambassador visited Rajapaksa to 鈥渃onvey congratulatory wishes from Chinese President Xi Jinping,鈥� as documented in a . The Chinese Foreign Ministry initially but soon with the new government. India, for its part, chose not to intervene but did hoping that 鈥渄emocratic values and the constitutional process will be respected.鈥� Although Mahinda Rajapaksa鈥檚 return in 2018 proved short-lived after the Supreme Court found Sirisena鈥檚 actions unconstitutional, China displayed strong signs of its preference.

The political damage to the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government, as well as the fallout of the 2019 Easter Sunday terrorist bombing, paved the way for Mahinda Rajapaksa鈥檚 brother, Gotabaya, to in November 2019. This was followed by a commanding win the August 2020 parliamentary election.

Rebalancing Towards India

Despite the previously close Rajapaksa-China relationship, the new regime has continued the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government鈥檚 approach and publicly moved towards Modi and away from Xi on several fronts. Most prominently, Gotabaya Rajapaksa to the Hambantota port deal to ensure greater local control. It also promised to review 鈥�.鈥� Throughout the campaign, the Rajapaksa鈥檚 and appeared to desire stronger ties with India. Following a visit to India, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa : 鈥淲e genuinely want to strengthen our relationship. I have always said that we don鈥檛 want to do anything which will jeopardize the security of India or act against the concerns of India in any way. This is genuine.鈥� Modi by being first leader to call and congratulate now Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa after his victory in the August 2020 election. India has also presented Sri Lanka with a $400 million USD currency swap facility and a currently proffered $1.1 billion USD agreement to pay off Sri Lanka鈥檚 debt. also drive the Sri Lanka-India convergence.

It is important to note, however, that this is not to say that the new Rajapaksa regime aims to completely jettison its previous pro-China approach or reach out to the West. For one, the pro-India approach by the two brothers does not indicate an , as the previous government did, but a the authoritarianism that defined the 2005 to 2015 period. Nor does it mean a total rejection of China and its during , as of China against opposition allegations of widespread corruption by Chinese companies and the Defense Minister鈥檚 . In an interview with Sri Lankan media, the new Foreign Secretary, Admiral Professor Jayanath Colombage, : 鈥淐hina really understands it. I have not seen China pushing for strategic things. But, China is pushing for commercial things.鈥� For its part, China has that it is the new government鈥檚 request on Hambantota.

[Sri Lanka's] new, balanced foreign policy in Sri Lanka reflects two impetuses: popular and elite wariness of outside interference and China鈥檚 current lack of power projection capabilities.

Overall, the new Sri Lankan government looks to be adopting a more neutral foreign policy that avoids leaning too sharply towards one side or the other in the region鈥檚 emerging great power competition. As indicated in an from President Gotabaya Rajapaksa following a visit from U.S Secretary of State Pompeo: 鈥淪ri Lanka will always maintain a neutral stand in foreign policy and will not get entangled in struggles between power blocs.鈥� If China does indeed hope to turn Hambantota into an active military facility over the long-term, or acquire a client in the Rajapaksas similar to Prime Minister Hun Sen in Cambodia, then this can be considered a geopolitical setback. Given the Rajapaksa鈥檚 previously close relationship to China and their shared authoritarianism, the question remains: why this shift in foreign policy towards balance between India and China? Upon analysis, this new, balanced foreign policy in Sri Lanka reflects two impetuses: popular and elite wariness of outside interference and China鈥檚 current lack of power projection capabilities.

Why a Rebalance?

As with other Belt and Road countries, such as , Myanmar, and in the Indo-Pacific, Sri Lanka remains concerned about losing autonomy and being caught up in great power competition. In the aftermath of the 2017 Hambantota deal, over that Sri Lanka鈥檚 sovereignty was infringed upon. Moreover, the opposition in Sri Lanka has long that are corrupt and dangerous. In a sign that Sri Lanka鈥檚 reticence to outside interference is general and not restricted to China, the United States has more recently come under fire in the country. The Trump administration鈥檚 meant to improve U.S. military access to Sri Lanka, a renewal of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and a logistics-focused Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), . Both agreements were negotiated during the previous government鈥檚 tenure, and the current Rajapaksa administration has the formal approval of the SOFA. Furthermore, a $480 million USD Millennium Challenge Corporation grant鈥斺�攈补蝉 . With the electoral contests of the past year centering on nationalism, .  Despite a symbolically positive visit by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in October 2020, . Overall, Sri Lanka鈥檚 Rajapaksa government appears to avoid undue entanglements.

Beyond a desire to defend its sovereignty, perhaps the most important driver of Sri Lanka鈥檚 shift lies in the security realm. The fear of Indian military intervention looms large in Sri Lanka given the extensive history of India鈥檚 involvement during the Civil War and its ties to Sri Lanka鈥檚 Tamil minority. As Nilanthi Samaranayake for the United States Institute of Peace: 鈥淸South Asian] leaders are well aware of the Indian military鈥檚 operational reach into their countries鈥攚hether invited or uninvited鈥s a result of their fundamentally asymmetric relationship with India, [South Asian] countries do not have the political will or capability to meaningfully cross this rising power. This includes providing military basing access to China.鈥� Certainly, the fear exists in the family鈥檚 mind: Mahinda Rajapaksa for his ouster in 2015. , the new Foreign Secretary explicitly addressed Indian fears of China: 鈥淚n 2015, India feared that we had moved towards China too much. Probably, India wanted that regime to be changed鈥e actually made India jittery during the period between 2015 and 2019. But India is comfortable with President Gotabaya Rajapaksa.鈥� Hoping to avoid any unwanted Indian intervention, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa immediately after coming to power in late 2019.

Fundamentally, China in 2020 lacks the military capabilities to truly challenge India for the allegiance of smaller South Asian nations.

The reason that India weighs far more heavily on the Rajapaksas鈥� minds than China lies in the issue of power projection. Fundamentally, China in 2020 lacks the military capabilities to truly challenge India for the allegiance of smaller South Asian nations. Although a Chinese sub visited Sri Lanka in 2014, the Indian Ocean against the United States, operating out of Diego Garcia, and India. Until China can successfully overcome the so-called 鈥淢alacca Dilemma鈥� via strategic Belt and Road Investments such as and or establish a defensible naval basing presence in the region, in the Indian Ocean. As James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara argue in their chapter of , a permanent Chinese base in the Indian Ocean constitutes a red line for India. Even the vaunted Gwadar Port investments in Pakistan 鈥�will not necessarily have utility as a base in a wartime scenario,鈥� as 浪花直播 China Fellow Isaac Kardon argues. Paradoxically, China needs greater basing and logistics facilities in the Indian Ocean in order to improve its power projection capabilities enough to adequately maintain a strong presence and acquire the option of pressuring autonomy-minded partners into acquiescing to its interests, but it currently cannot guarantee security to those same partners if they cross one of India鈥檚 red lines.

In the end, China can offer economic and diplomatic support, as well as surreptitious backing for friendly authoritarians, but it lacks the real muscle to intervene and defend its interests beyond the first island chain. 鈥淚t is difficult to convert economic influence into military access without either some degree of willingness on the part of the recipient鈥攁s was the case in Djibouti鈥攐r an outright invasion鈥hinese basing ambitions can succeed in countries with few economic alternatives and low elite turnover鈥擟ambodia fits this bill, and perhaps Pakistan鈥攂ut are unlikely to succeed elsewhere, regardless of debt.鈥� Beijing likely understands these limitations, and a sense of precariousness in China鈥檚 position can be interpreted in prior to the Secretary鈥檚 October visit. At this time, China can only offer economic and diplomatic incentives but no security guarantees or military coercion. True gunboat diplomacy remains a bridge too far for the PLA in 2020.

China鈥檚 Reach Exceeds Its Grasp

Many analyses of Chinese geopolitical ambitions highlight the Hambantota Port facility as a . Unlike in Cambodia, , Sri Lanka remains well-within the military reach of India and must act accordingly. Sri Lanka may provide the promise of massive鈥攁nd strategic鈥擝elt and Road investment for Xi Jinping鈥檚 China, but local actors prize their autonomy in a neighborhood replete with competing great powers. China may also prefer fellow authoritarians, and the Rajapaksas clearly hold their ties to and patronage by the Chinese dearly, but India and the United States continue to outclass China beyond its immediate periphery and the first island chain. With the addition of a China鈥檚 efforts in the Indian Ocean seem at times to be counterproductive.

While China continues to swiftly and dramatically modernize its naval forces and expand its economic influence, it lacks anywhere near the same power projection capabilities as the United States and India in the Indian Ocean. This weakness, along with significant local opposition, raise serious questions about the reality behind China鈥檚 much vaunted naval access to Hambantota and client-friendship with the Rajapaksa family. Until the Chinese military develops the power projection capabilities to credibly maintain a regular presence, or addresses the concern its influence arouses in popular opinion, its 鈥淪tring of Pearls鈥� and, more importantly, growing list of the partner countries supposedly beholden to Chinese interest are more a distant goal than actual reality.

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The views expressed are the author's alone, and do not represent the views of the U.S. Government or the 浪花直播 Center. Copyright 2020, Asia Program. All rights reserved.