浪花直播

BY LUCIAN KIM

Russian president Vladimir Putin has made a grave miscalculation, the magnitude of which we are just beginning to understand.

Putin is still trying to package his pitiless assault on Ukraine as a preemptive strike to take out a rival that would one day threaten the existence of Russia. But the longer it goes on, the more Putin鈥檚 war will pose new dangers to Russia鈥攁nd the survival of his own regime.

Putin has forbidden Russians from calling his war a 鈥渨ar,鈥� ordering them to use the euphemistic term 鈥渟pecial military operation鈥� under penalty of imprisonment. The former KGB officer lives in a world of conspiracies and subterfuge, where stealth and lies win the day.

Eight years ago, Putin denied that Russian troops were occupying Crimea until they had delivered the entire Ukrainian province to the Kremlin at gunpoint. Putin鈥檚 agents then tried to instigate a violent uprising in Ukraine鈥檚 Russian-speaking regions in the expectation that the whole country would crumble on its own. Instead, the Kremlin got two rump statelets鈥攖he self-proclaimed, unrecognized Donetsk and Luhansk 鈥減eople鈥檚 republics鈥濃�攖hat would have collapsed without the clandestine intervention of the Russian army. In 2015, Putin personally dictated the terms of the so-called Minsk agreements, stopping the heaviest fighting鈥攁nd leaving Kyiv with an unresolvable, festering conflict in eastern Ukraine.

Putin may have had Ukraine in a headlock, but he did not have Ukraine.



It鈥檚 telling that when Putin massed his military on Ukraine鈥檚 border under the guise of exercises this winter, he did not fool the United States but managed to bluff his own people, from the top of his entourage to the rank-and-file soldiers who suddenly found themselves in the line of fire. The secrecy with which Putin made his fateful decision was embodied by , who in a televised meeting in February showed a complete lack of knowledge of Putin鈥檚 designs on Ukraine.

Putin has lived in a bubble throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, isolating himself from even his closest confidants. His choice of long or short tables in meetings with world leaders and cabinet ministers was a cause of mirth in the lead-up to the attack. That of shaking his defense minister鈥檚 hand demonstrates his level of paranoia.

In advance of International Women鈥檚 Day, Putin did choose to have , who presumably first had to quarantine before the staged meeting. Putin reassured the flight attendants that everything was going 鈥渁ccording to plan,鈥� falsely asserted that conscripts were not being sent into battle, and blamed Ukraine鈥檚 stubborn resistance on nationalists and neo-Nazis.

How much Putin knows or doesn鈥檛 know is open to debate. But there is plenty of evidence that Putin convinced himself that the Russian forces would swiftly decapitate the Ukrainian government and install a puppet regime. Clearly, things are not going to plan, and the implications are deeply troubling: Either Putin believes his own propaganda that Ukraine is run by drug-addled neo-Nazis; or Russia鈥檚 intelligence services are so incompetent that they totally underestimated Ukrainians鈥� fighting spirit; or Putin鈥檚 generals knew the true situation on the ground but were too scared to tell him.

Defeat is not an option for Putin, as he portrays the battle for Ukraine as an existential fight to keep the country out of NATO. It is a bizarre fixation, since the last U.S. president to support Ukraine鈥檚 NATO membership was George W. Bush. When Putin first attacked Ukraine in 2014, Ukrainians had just taken to the streets to demonstrate for closer alignment with the European Union鈥攏ot NATO. In fact, before the annexation of Crimea, , and Ukraine鈥檚 nonaligned status was enshrined in law. At the time, Ukraine barely registered on the foreign policy agenda of the Obama administration, which was busy 鈥減ivoting鈥� toward Asia and from Germany.

Besides Ukraine's 鈥渘eutrality,鈥� as 鈥渄enazification鈥� and 鈥渄emilitarization," denying any plans to occupy the country. Given the level of Ukrainian resistance, what is Putin鈥檚 exit strategy? When does the Kremlin declare victory and bring the troops home? There are no clear or good options.

Putin鈥檚 colossal intelligence failure lies in his inability to grasp the country that Ukraine has become in thirty years of independence. Despite their closeness to Russia in language, culture, and religion, Ukrainians as a people, regardless of their ethnic roots, have forged a distinct civic identity. Three people-power revolutions鈥攖he 1991 independence movement, the 2004鈥�05 Orange Revolution, and the 2013鈥�14 Revolution of Dignity鈥攈ave taught Ukrainians to stand up for their rights and take their fate into their own hands. When Putin first unleashed the dogs of war on eastern Ukraine, ordinary Ukrainians volunteered not only to fight but to supply and sustain their army. Ukraine鈥檚 central government may be weak, but the solidarity within Ukrainian society only grows stronger in the face of adversity.

The fundamental difference between Ukraine and Russia today is that Ukrainians have become citizens of their own country, while Russians remain subjects of their ruler.

Putin鈥檚 misreading of Ukrainians as agents of their own destiny will lead to defeat. Morally, he has already lost the war, and a victory on the battlefield will prove to be Pyrrhic. Even with a massive occupation force, Putin will never be able to impose his will on Ukraine.



Meanwhile, the blowback from the war is only starting to reach Russia.

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the authors and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.