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Russia has successfully implemented long-term strategies to capture and influence intellectual elites in Latin America, using media outlets, educational institutions, and think tanks to shape public opinion and policy. This effort, which includes turning media outlets such as RT Actualidad and Sputnik Mundo into popular and widely followed outlets, is reminiscent of Soviet-era tactics. It seeks to promote Moscow's narratives and counter Western influence, often blurring the lines between genuine intellectual diversity and the co-optation of elites. 

This strategy has had a lasting impact in the past. For instance, many Latin American students who  in Soviet universities later returned to influential positions in their national political and educational systems. Moscow also actively engaged intellectuals who were seen as capable of promoting Soviet narratives in their home countries. These individuals played a role in shaping policy and educating future leaders. A similar dynamic is unfolding today. 

Intellectual Elite Capture

A lot of what is going on in media and on campuses in Latin America can be described as 鈥渋ntellectual elite capture,鈥� where a society鈥檚 resources, benefits, and cultural and educational processes are controlled or influenced by a specific influential group. This group pursues its own interests, which may not align with or benefit the broader population. This convergence may arise from ideological synergies and shared worldviews regarding social order. At other times, it can be driven by the agendas of deliberate co-optation and influence by one elite group over another. It is essential to make distinctions between the two: between solid but dissenting local intellectuals and locally based enablers of Moscow鈥檚 narrative. 

It goes without saying that Western and Latin American intellectuals can provide genuine analyses that differ significantly from the official positions of their governments. Contrary to the image of a uniform and homogenous 鈥� often painted by the Russian government and government-controlled media, the reality is much more complex and diverse, enriching our understanding of today's global changes. But while this complexity is evident to the scholarly community, it is not always as apparent to journalists and the broader public.

For example, the anchors of Spanish-language programs from the German broadcaster Deutsche Welle often  their guests who reproduce Moscow鈥檚 tropes such as 鈥渁dministrative frontiers of the Russian Federation鈥� (Russian propagandistic euphemism suggesting that the borders of Russia-occupied Ukrainian regions are actually Russia鈥檚 borders) or at least point out that according to international law, Russia is occupying Ukraine鈥檚 sovereign territory. 

Another example is France 24鈥檚 Spanish-language content widely consumed by Latin American audiences. While aiming to provide diverse perspectives on Russia-related topics, some shows end up giving a platform to Moscow鈥檚 influencers who echo the Kremlin's official narratives. Examples include Russia鈥檚 2022 withdrawal from parts of Ukrainian territory as a 鈥済esture of goodwill,鈥� justifying the invasion as a defense of the Russian population in Donbas, and questioning the legitimacy of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. 

The issue becomes more concerning when Russia-linked influencers hold academic titles and prestigious university positions, which grant them credibility and recognition. It鈥檚 even more troubling when they author textbooks used in classrooms or can otherwise reach large student audiences. 

Moscow鈥檚 Official Narrative in Universities

A recent example of this alarming trend is a  published in Mexico. It is intended as a standard resource for Mexican international relations students. But while many chapters offer valuable, independent analysis by Mexican and international scholars, the chapter on Russian foreign policy does not. 

Written by a graduate of Russia鈥檚 Friendship University, the chapter asserts that 鈥渢here was direct U.S. intervention in Ukraine to orchestrate a coup, displacing the Europeans in February 2014鈥� (p. 287). It claims that 鈥渋nitially, the conflict seemed likely to be quickly resolved, but as the U.S. and EU began sending weapons to Ukraine, it escalated into a NATO-Russia confrontation fought on Ukrainian soil鈥� (p. 287). Needless to say, these are all standard Russian propaganda lines that do not reflect reality. The chapter also avoids using the term 鈥渨ar鈥� to refer to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, relying instead on phrases favored by Kremlin propagandists鈥斺�渟pecial military operation鈥� and 鈥渃onflict.鈥� This approach allows Moscow鈥檚 official narratives to appear under the guise of academic analysis. Furthermore, the textbook lacks a chapter on Ukrainian foreign policy to counterbalance the one on Russia, a significant deficit of critical perspective in a resource meant for young Mexicans.

Another example is the University Program for Studies on Democracy, Justice, and Society (PUEDJS) at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), the largest Spanish-speaking university globally in terms of student population, budget, and research output. Despite Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russian influence in this program increased, including a  of Kremlin-affiliated media representatives. The program鈥檚 head, backed by substantial national budget resources and extensive outreach to students and the public, , echoing Moscow: 鈥淭he conflict in Ukraine signifies the end of Pentagon-led unilateralism, and the West鈥檚 censorship of RT [Actualidad] represents the end of unilateral control over public opinion by dominant media outlets.鈥� Additionally, RT  at the program鈥檚 annual conference, discussing fake news and media manipulation鈥攅ssentially putting the fox in charge of the henhouse.

Failing to Distinguish Between Dissent and Propaganda

It is crucial to understand that the academic freedom standards approved by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Organization of American States (OAS) are nonexistent in today鈥檚 Russia. In contrast, the autonomy of Latin American researchers and institutions funded by Western counterparts is evident鈥攆or example, in the systematic criticism of US and European governments by entities like the Latin American Council for Social Sciences (), the largest social sciences network in the region. 

Russia and its regional influencers take advantage of the fact that it can be difficult to tell the difference between authentic support of intellectual diversity and the instrumentalization of intellectuals for specific political objectives. Russia鈥檚 intellectual enablers in Latin America offer 鈥渁nalyses鈥� that echo Moscow鈥檚 official narratives without questioning them. They fail to criticize the Russian government and repeat Russia鈥檚 propaganda narratives, while tailoring their presentations to the media outlet or educational space they engage with. 

It is crucial to distinguish between genuinely independent intellectuals鈥攚hose diverse views are grounded in solid and objective analysis鈥攁nd those who constitute captured elites. Failing to make this distinction can have serious consequences. In Latin America, even major and well-established media outlets and educational institutions often confuse the narratives of Russian enablers with those of independent experts in their efforts to present diverse viewpoints. This confusion creates an opening for Moscow鈥檚 grand narratives to be presented as legitimate analyses. 

This situation highlights an urgent need for critical evaluation of information sources, a responsibility we all share in combating the capture of intellectual elites. One way to spot agents of influence is to look for subtle but telling linguistic alignments, such as referring to the invasion of Ukraine as a 鈥渟pecial military operation鈥� or characterizing troop withdrawals as 鈥済estures of goodwill.鈥� Furthermore, their narratives often shift in lockstep with Moscow鈥檚, and their claims frequently fail to hold up against verifiable facts鈥攕uch as the assertion that Russian troops entered Ukraine to protect civilians when the conflict in Donbas was already de-escalating.

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.