浪花直播

BY VLADIMIR (ZE'EV) KHANIN

From the start, the Russian invasion of Ukraine instantly went beyond the level of subregional clashes to a restructuring of relations among the major world powers鈥攖he United States, the EU, Russia, and China. It has also greatly influenced relations among Middle Eastern countries, where it has triggered the strengthening of various geopolitical and strategic alliances.

One alliance in particular that has been bolstered is the Jerusalem-Baku partnership, which in recent years has become a full-fledged military-strategic alliance, with Azerbaijan as Israel鈥檚 main energy supplier and source of intelligence about Iran and an important buyer of Israeli technology. As the swirl of unexpected consequences from the Russian-Ukrainian war engulfs region after region, this alliance is being pulled into the vortex and is turning into a de facto actor in the war.

What Is at Stake

From the time it first introduced a Russian military contingent into Syria in 2015 and continuing through the summer of 2022, Moscow has tried to maintain a balance of relations with Israel and Iran鈥攁n embodiment of what at the 2013 meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club was identified as the Kremlin鈥檚 version of a 鈥渂alance-of-interests鈥� doctrine, described as 鈥渟tanding in the Middle East on two legs.鈥�

The understanding that was reached between Jerusalem and Moscow in that period included a relative freedom of action for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) against Iranian and pro-Iranian forces in Syria and a suppression of arms supplies to Hezbollah and other Islamist groups, in exchange for Israel鈥檚 noninterference in Russian regional interests.

The Russian-Ukrainian war changed that arrangement. Large-scale losses have forced Russia to redeploy to the Ukrainian front some of its forces from Syria and the South Caucasus.

One actor ready to step into the vacuum left by Moscow鈥檚 partial withdrawal鈥攚ith Moscow鈥檚 blessing鈥攊s Iran. The reported massive Iranian of drones, missiles, and engines needed to supply the Russian army testify to this change. If this is, in fact, a new trend, then it seems to suggest that Moscow is departing from its balance-of-interests approach in the Middle East and transitioning to a direct military-strategic alliance with Tehran.

The decline of the Russian deterrence of Iranian and pro-Iranian forces in Syria presents a danger to Israel and serves as a new source of difficulties. At the same time, it allows Israel more freedom of action鈥攚hich, if media reports are to be believed, the IDF to take advantage of.

Second Front in the Caucasus

In Syria, Iran can do little to counter Israel and actions attributed to it, such as the targeted assassination of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps鈥� Sayyad Khodai, who served in the IRGC鈥檚 foreign operations unit. Instead, Iran could target another sensitive place for Israeli interests鈥攖he South Caucasus. Here, its prime goal would be an attempt to strike Azerbaijan.

Iran's motives here are clear. The rapidly developing economic and military Azerbajian-Israel partnership threatens Iranian interests. After , Israel鈥檚 relations with Turkey, Baku鈥檚 other strategic partner, are gradually warming up. (Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev has played a critical role in this reconciliation.)

Iran is also interested in filling the niche vacated by Russia in the demarcation zone between Azerbaijan and Armenia under the guise of protecting Armenia's interests, whose security Tehran recently declared it regards as 鈥渢hat of its own.鈥�

Additionally, Iran wants to 鈥渢ake revenge鈥� on Israel and to 鈥渨arn鈥� other regional actors from entering into a strategic partnership with Israel by inflicting maximum damage on Azerbaijan as a key ally of the Jewish state. In June, Iran to glorify the imprisoned Muslim Unity movement head Taleh Bagirzade, presenting it as a response to the May 22 assassination of IRGC officer Hassan Khudayi by Mossad in Tehran and a series of that followed. The campaign ultimately led to conflicts within Iran's security services, as a result of which IRGC intelligence chief Hossein Tayyib was removed from his post.

Finally, Iran wants to dampen the ongoing antiregime demonstrations by mobilizing Iranian society against an 鈥渆xternal enemy.鈥� It is doing so by actively spreading propaganda that the unrest is the result of covert operations launched by Mossad from Azerbaijan. The media have been actively circulating statements to this effect by Iranian politicians, clergy, leaders of public organizations, and heads of security agencies.

On October 21 the commander of the Iranian Army, Abdulrahim Musavi, directly Israel and the United States of instigating mass disturbances by means of influencing the ethnic and religious minorities and youth. A issued by an unnamed intelligence officer claiming that Mossad was cooperating with other organizations in the region (a transparent hint at the intelligence agencies of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain) 鈥渋n order to destabilize the Islamic Republic鈥� was in a similar vein.

Declarations like these also seek to appeal to Iranians鈥� nationalistic feelings. In an October 21 by a high-ranking IRGC officer and addressed to Azerbaijan (which, the officer alleged, was 鈥渟et to change borders to damage the routes of Iran's commercial ties with Europe鈥�) reminded that country that in the past, its territories were part of the Persian Empire.

These statements were less intended to evoke media coverage in advance of future actions that Iran might take against Azerbaijan and Israel than they were an attempt to justify those actions after the fact. On October 17鈭�19, large-scale IRGC exercises took place on the southern border of Azerbaijan, during which Iranian forces appeared to be just a step away from invading Azerbaijani territory.

During the IRGC maneuvers, Iranian TV channels broadcast to the effect that the maneuvers were aimed at Israel first and Azerbaijan second. The maneuvers, , were meant to show that Tehran would not tolerate 鈥淚sraeli intelligence鈥� on its border.

Plans for the Present

Two projects appear to be on Iran鈥檚 South Caucasus agenda today. The first is ripping away from Azerbaijan its autonomous exclave, the Nakhichevan, located directly to the north of the Iranian border. With this goal in mind, Iran foments ethnic and religious-sectarian separatism to try to destabilize the country from within and overthrow the 鈥�.鈥�

On October 22 the Iranian army in the province of West Azerbaijan, during which it practiced airborne drops, night raids, and urban warfare. In parallel, numerous propaganda projects flooded social and conventional media, mobilizing supporters for the transition of Nakhichevan to Iranian control. For example, on October 21 the Telegram channel 陌ran谋n Nax莽谋vani Xalq H蓹r蓹kat谋 , in the name of the previously unknown Iranian Nakhchivan People's Movement, that 鈥渢he dream of the people of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic is to become part of the Islamic Republic of Iran.鈥�

The Iranian Azerbaijani language propaganda channel S蓹h蓹r Az蓹ri 鈥渢he formation of a popular movement for the return of Nakhchivan to Iran.鈥� And channels such as MiranPress have been propaganda claiming that Nakhchivan residents have grown weary of 鈥渞acial discrimination鈥� and wish to 鈥渞eturn to Iran.鈥�

The matter is not limited to Nakhichevan, however. There is evidence of attempts to stir separatism among the Talysh people in southern Azerbaijan鈥攊n this case, in favor of Russia. For instance, an appeal by an anonymous Avar activist, on a separatist Tolish Media website, calls on the 鈥淩ussian world鈥� to support the independence of the 鈥淒agestan peoples鈥濃�擫ezgin and Avars鈥攍iving in the northeast and northwest of Azerbaijan. These actions must also be viewed as an effort to frustrate the Baku-Ankara plans to create a Zangezur corridor through Armenia鈥檚 territory that would connect Azerbaijan and Turkey.

There is no denying the authoritarian nature of Ilham Aliyev鈥檚 regime and its problematic human rights record. On the other hand, not a few of Aliyev鈥檚 critics and opponents ostensibly umbrella to promote radical Khomeinist agenda in the secularist Azerbaijan. Over the past two decades, Azerbaijan has consistently made pro-Western foreign policy choices. It has demonstrated impressive economic growth and built stable diplomatic relations with regional and global powers while avoiding, more or less successfully, explosions of separatism. Most recently, it has as a solution to Europe鈥檚 energy crisis. The changes engendered by the launching of Russia鈥檚 war on Ukraine are now posing hard challenges to its stability, and possibly even survival, ginned up by the Iranian regime.

Critics of the current Azerbaijani leadership often argue that the Iranian threat could have been avoided had Aliyev鈥檚 government toned down its strategic partnership with Israel. But that country's leadership doesn鈥檛 share that perspective. It seems that, similar to Israel鈥檚 new Abraham Accords鈥� Arab partners, Azerbaijan views an alliance with Israel as a solution to its problems, not their cause.

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.