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Moscow鈥檚 unexpected decision not to prop up Bashar al-Assad鈥檚 regime in Syria this time, followed by the regime鈥檚 collapse, resonates with Russia鈥檚 Cold War鈥揺ra geopolitical legacy. For decades, Syria was the linchpin of a network of Soviet-backed and Soviet-aligned regimes in the Middle East鈥攁 crucial foothold and strategic asset in Moscow鈥檚 global rivalry with the West. With Assad鈥檚 fall, the last remnant of that Cold War鈥揺ra network may be on the verge of disappearing.

The future of Russia鈥檚 military bases in Syria remains uncertain, but Moscow has already begun efforts to secure some foothold in the region鈥攚ith or without Assad. If Russia manages to maintain a presence, it will likely be under a new power structure dominated by regional players such as Turkey, significantly diminishing Moscow鈥檚 once dominant role. Russia鈥檚 naval and airbases in Syria are for Moscow鈥檚 capacity to assert its influence across the Middle East and Africa, where it is involved in distant conflicts spanning Libya, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Mali, and Niger.

Failed Attempt to Revive the Cold War Playbook

Russia鈥檚 military intervention in 2015 was a calculated attempt at a revival of its Cold War strategy, aimed at reasserting influence in the Middle East. Under the pretext of combating terrorism, Moscow deployed its air force, special forces, and military advisers, reshaping the course of the Syrian civil war. This intervention entrenched Russia鈥檚 presence in the eastern Mediterranean, securing a naval base in Tartus, leased for forty-nine years in 2017, and the Khmeimim airbase in Latakia鈥攕trategic footholds echoing Soviet-era military deployments. The mission to Syria bolstered Russia鈥檚 image as a global power, and was for years viewed as a foreign policy issue by the average Russian than the conflict in Eastern Ukraine or relations with the West.

The then US administration, while critical of Russia鈥檚 intervention, responded cautiously but acknowledged that both nations shared an interest in defeating ISIS, a stance for which it was at the time. That limited cooperation consisted largely of the establishment of deconfliction channels to prevent accidental clashes and coordinate airspace operations.

In December 2017, Vladimir Putin struck a triumphant tone. Speaking at Khmeimim, he that Syria had been preserved as a sovereign and independent state. He also announced the of Russia鈥檚 main military operation in the country. 鈥淚f the terrorists raise their heads again, we will deal unprecedented strikes unlike anything they have seen.鈥� In 2024, nothing of the kind happened. In the lead-up to the capture of Damascus, Russian bombers to slow the rebel advance but fell far short of the intensive  seen in 2016鈥�2017. The United States鈥檚 cautious approach seems to have proven strategically sound and ultimately justified.

鈥淎xis of Resistance鈥� Severely Weakened 

Official Moscow鈥檚 shift on Assad has been striking. In an ironic about-face, Russian officials abruptly stopped the advancing forces 鈥渢errorists鈥� and, on the day of Assad鈥檚 fall,  as the 鈥渙pposition鈥� instead. Meanwhile, Russia鈥檚 embassy in Damascus has continued to operate. In Moscow, a group of men at the Syrian embassy a day after Bashar al-Assad鈥檚 government fell. 鈥淭oday, the [Syrian] embassy opened and is functioning normally under a new flag,鈥� an embassy representative Russia鈥檚 state news agency TASS on Monday.

Russia鈥檚 state-controlled media have quickly adapted, offering a platform to former Assad officials who have become his fiercest critics overnight. 鈥淭he shameful and humiliating escape of the head of this system under the cover of night, without any sense of national responsibility to the country, confirms the need for change and awakens hope for a better future,鈥� Syrian Ambassador to Moscow Bashar al-Jaafari said of Assad's flight from Damascus in an  with RT Arabic.

Days before Sunday, speculation mounted that Moscow was preparing to abandon Assad. According to a citing a source close to the Kremlin, by last Friday Russia had no plan to save Assad and saw little chance of one emerging as long as the Syrian president鈥檚 army continued retreating from key positions. At the time, the Russian embassy in Damascus advised Russian citizens that commercial flights were still available for those wishing to leave.

That same day, Iran鈥檚 Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi declared Tehran鈥檚 readiness to support Assad 鈥渢o the extent necessary,鈥� though he offered no specifics. Previously, Iran had only promised to 鈥渃onsider鈥� requests for troop deployments鈥攁 tepid assurance from a nation that considers Syria a central pillar of its so-called axis of resistance against the West. Iran鈥檚 restraint may have been influenced by its direct and indirect clashes with US-backed Israeli forces.

Assad鈥檚 growing desperation became evident when reports surfaced that he had to US President-elect Donald Trump, first through the UAE and later through Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orb谩n, in a last-ditch effort to secure support.

Remembering the Old Soviet Axis

Syria played a central role in the Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the West, particularly through its conflicts with Israel. The Soviet Union provided extensive military aid to Syria during the Six-Day War in 1967, the War of Attrition, and the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Soviet advisers trained Syrian military officers, while Damascus became a key recipient of Soviet-made tanks, fighter jets, and missile systems. For nearly four decades, until the late 1980s, Syria Middle East recipient of Soviet economic, military, and political support.

A landmark endeavor was the construction of the Tabqa Dam on the Euphrates River. Initiated in 1968 and completed in 1973, this earth-fill dam created Lake Assad, Syria鈥檚 largest reservoir, significantly enhancing the country's hydroelectric capacity and irrigation systems. This combination of military and economic support underscored Syria鈥檚 strategic importance to Moscow during the Cold War, particularly as a front-line state in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Apart from Syria, the Soviets鈥攁t various times and to varying degrees鈥攚ere involved with several key states across the Middle East and North Africa. In Egypt, in the late 1950s and 1960s, Moscow had a with Gamal Abdel Nasser, supplying arms, funding major infrastructure projects such as the , and supporting his pan-Arab socialist agenda. In Iraq, Soviet ties strengthened after the Ba鈥檃thist Party seized power, with Moscow  to successive regimes, including Saddam Hussein鈥檚 in its early years.

South Yemen became the only Marxist state in the Arab world, serving as a key ideological outpost with a bonus of privileged access to the port of Aden. In Libya, Muammar Gaddafi鈥檚 radical socialist government cultivated close ties with Moscow, receiving advanced weaponry and military training. Algeria, after winning its independence from France, also a significant Soviet partner, benefiting from arms deals and economic assistance as it pursued a socialist development model.

The remnants of the old Soviet-backed order in the Middle East have now all but disappeared. Egypt pivoted westward after the 1970s; South Yemen ceased to exist as a separate state in 1990; Iraq fell to a US-led invasion in 2003; Libya descended into chaos after Gaddafi鈥檚 ouster and assassination in 2011. A cooperation with Algeria does . 

Assad鈥檚 regime, hollowed out by war, economic collapse, and international sanctions, depended increasingly on Russia and Iran, whose interests were never fully aligned. Russia sought geopolitical leverage; Iran pursued regional dominance through its proxy nonstate actors such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Houthis. Unlike the oil-rich monarchies of the Gulf or emerging powers with diversified economies, Assad鈥檚 Syria rested on a fragile foundation of military rule, foreign support, and repression鈥攅lements that crumbled once its two key backers chose to withdraw their support.

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the authors and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.