浪花直播

The law banning the promotion of 鈥渘ontraditional sexual relationships鈥� in Russia a few days ago. Together with the , this document forms the policy of the Russian state aimed at turning swaths of Russian citizens into legalized 鈥渙thers,鈥� second-class citizens partly deprived of their rights.

The new laws expand previously existing bans and broaden the persecution鈥檚 scope. The language the Kremlin uses in its legislation will sow mistrust and violence within Russian society. People partly deprived of their rights can become a target for those Russians who trust propaganda, or those criminals who are simply looking for an easy victim.

It is now against the law to openly declare nonheterosexual orientations, to 鈥渃elebrate鈥� LGBTQ couples, or to imply that such relationships are 鈥渘ormal.鈥� Anything published on the internet, in media or books, or appearing in movies and ads is now under official scrutiny. Some publishers have started to check published work on 鈥淟GBTQ propaganda,鈥� while at least one has parts of their books.

The new foreign agents legislation (鈥淥n the Control of Activities Carried out by Persons under Foreign Influence鈥�) expands the circle of its potential targets indefinitely. Foreign funding, real or perceived by authorities, is no longer required to qualify as a 鈥渇oreign agent.鈥� It is enough to fall 鈥渦nder foreign influence鈥� while engaging in politics or being a public figure. Influence is as to permit virtually any kind of interpretation (鈥渟upport and (or) influence on an individual, including through coercion, persuasion, and (or) other means鈥�).

鈥淔oreign agents鈥� are now banned from taking part in political campaigns, holding public office, or teaching. There are around twenty prohibitions in total. They include: being employed by government agencies; being a member of an electoral commission; conducting independent anticorruption reviews, donating to candidates, organizing public events, teaching at schools and universities, and producing any informational content intended for children.

Those who supposedly 鈥減romote nontraditional relationships鈥� are facing a similarly broad discrimination list that is implied rather than openly stated in the 鈥淟GBTQ propaganda鈥� law.

Discrediting entire swaths of the citizenry as 鈥渙utsiders鈥� or 鈥渁bnormal鈥� is not the only goal the Russian authorities are pursuing. By creating 鈥渙utsiders,鈥� the Kremlin is creating its ideal, imaginary 鈥渋nsiders,鈥� its loyalists of choice. By labeling some as 鈥渁bnormal,鈥� the authorities are trying to shape ideas about the norm. By labeling some behaviors as 鈥渘ontraditional,鈥� they are claiming to be the judges of what is tradition.

The principle of strengthening the circle of one鈥檚 own by demonizing the supposed outsiders is as old as social life itself. The set of distinctions that leaders and rulers use to build a system of loyalty around themselves is also old. They discriminate against people on the basis of sex, ethnicity, religion, sexual preference, and the 鈥渨rong鈥� alliances with people and other groups.

In many countries, differences of this kind are still stigmatized and are punishable by social exclusion or outright persecution and prosecution. Some ancient religious norms, when included in civil law, may produce this effect, as is the case in many predominantly Muslim societies. Some legacy norms introduced a century or more ago as part of colonial legislation often affect today鈥檚 citizens鈥� everyday lives. For example, whose past is linked to British colonialism, the criminalization of homosexual relations persists in one form or another.

Apart from rare exceptions, those are legacies of the past. Over the past decades, the process of repealing discriminatory laws has been ongoing, at differing speeds, in all cultures and on all continents. Russia is among a handful of countries, including and , where the process is reversed.

Under the Soviet rule most traditions that linked Russia to its patriarchal roots have been destroyed. When today鈥檚 Russian politicians present their policies as traditionalist, they manipulate the public. Russia has long been an urbanized, individualistic society, one that is much or conservative than the Russian Orthodox Church officials claim. Russia鈥檚 and rates are among the highest in the world.

Under the pretense of 鈥渢raditionalism鈥� the Kremlin is constructing a quasi-conservative, 鈥渘ormal鈥� and 鈥減atriotic鈥� core of loyalists by igniting hatred of 鈥渙thers鈥� and mistrust of 鈥渇oreign agents.鈥� This is part of the Kremlin鈥檚 long-developing war with the West and, by extension, with the West鈥檚 stooges at home.

In February 2013, the newly appointed chief of the General Staff, Colonel General (now Army General) Valery Gerasimov, made a about how Russian military science lags behind reality. In modern warfare, he said, indirect, asymmetric actions unrelated to combat operations predominate. Physical battles take place only in the last phase of the conflict. As an example of indirect warfare, Gerasimov cited the Arab Spring, noting that with indirect influence from outside, 鈥渋n a matter of months or even days, a prosperous state can be turned into an arena of fierce armed struggle, become a victim of foreign intervention, and plunge into the abyss of chaos.鈥�

According to Gerasimov, in the political, economic, informational, and humanitarian field, Russia鈥檚 enemies use 鈥渘onmilitary measures, implemented with the use of the country鈥檚 protest potential.鈥� The general called any protests the methods of military confrontation. According to Gerasimov, the internal opposition does not grow all by itself but is 鈥渃reated鈥� and becomes 鈥渁 constantly operating front on the entire territory of the state.鈥�

At the time, many in the West were frightened by this speech, seeing in it a new Russian military doctrine that suggests waging a 鈥渉ybrid war鈥� (a phrase that was not in Gerasimov鈥檚 speech) against the West. In fact, Gerasimov鈥檚 message was that the Russian military and its political leadership fail to understand the dangers of the indirect war the West is waging against Russia.

The protests of 2011鈥�2012 were still fresh in everybody鈥檚 mind at the time, and mentioning the Arab Spring was a reference to them. The strategic direction of the fight against any grassroots activism had already been chosen: the search for foreign agents. The first law on foreign agents came into force in November 2012, and in the same November Gerasimov was appointed head of the General Staff. He could not have developed a new doctrine by February of the following year. In line with Russian bureaucratic logic, the general was addressing his one and only important listener, President Putin. He simply developed and supplemented an attitude that Putin had already adopted.

Simply classifying one鈥檚 opponent as an external enemy transforms domestic politics into war. It is no longer a dispute in parliament, not a competition between political parties, not a dialogue in the public sphere, but a war. And a war requires a constant mobilization of people and resources that is impossible to stop. The Kremlin鈥檚 domestic war of othering has been much more successful than its war of aggression against Ukraine. 

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.